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INTRODUCTION
This thesis has been conceived neither as a military history 
of the Emergency in Malaya, nor as a politico-military study, but as an 
operational analysis; the difference is more than semantic.
In surveying the Emergency originally, it seemed to me that 
an orthodox military history in the nature of a campaign study might be a 
significant contribution to knowledge: I was quickly disabused of this
notion for several reasons, one of which has already been expressed by 
another student of the subject:
"When I was put on to examining sources of material for an official 
history," wrote J.B.P. Robinson, "I looked first for documentation 
which would give me (and the Historian) a picture of the main thread 
of events - a framework, a backbone on which to hang side issues. I 
quickly found this approach to be a mistake; it was not only fruitless 
but actually misleading. The emergency is not a sequence of events 
in which a broad pattern of development can be traced. Even considered 
in operational terms alone, it is (in a physicist’s language) a 
continuum of random occurrences. It is like one of those maddening 
jig-saw puzzles that do not have a picture, the random occurrences can 
be made to fit together geographically, but they do not build up a 
colour reproduction of a tidy battle scene."1
In the course of the Emergency itself, not only is there an almost complete
absence of the ebb and flow of battle which one associates with an
orthodox military history - on no occasion for example did the casualties in
a single action amount to more than a platoon on either side - but in the
context of the real problems which had to be faced, a concentration of
attention on the purely regimental and military, would have little more than
antiquarian interest.
For the problems which this thesis seeks to examine are not 
merely (or even mainly) military in origin, but affected virtually every 
aspect of government. Before the Government of Malaya could begin to 
suppress the insurrection, it had to set its own house in order and integrate 
its efforts. To do this it had first to refurbish the forces at its 
disposal; intelligence services, police and armed forces. It is the inter­
action of this process with the actions of the insurgents themselves - 
which I have termed operational analysis - with which this thesis is mainly 
concerned. Moreover, it has in my opinion been given added significance by
1 Robinson, J.B.P.; Transformation in Malaya, London 1956, p 118.
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several comparative writings on the subject.
As the Emergency has receded into the distance of time, there 
has been a tendency to make British success in suppressing the 
insurrection much more bland.iloquent and predictable than it actually was. 
Partly this has been an indirect result of the massive United States 
involvement in the Second Indo-China War, and the persistent search for 
comparative didactic models which accompanied it. This has led in turn to 
tw7o further consequences: first, a remarkable historical amnesia in
relation to the disarray which impeded initial British efforts; and second, 
a tendency to make the insurgent enemy in Malaya bigger than life size and 
thus a more worthy opponent in a campaign which extended tediously over more 
than twelve years. Thus, in relation to the first, a senior and recently 
retired Australian Army officer could write in a professional military 
journal that:
"The Special Branch (in Malaya) was well established and was able 
to expand as required."2
In reality, there was no Special Branch in Malaya when the Emergency was 
declared, and the creation of one was a long, difficult and frustrating 
process. And, in relation to the second, Major General Richard Clutterbuck 
uses the Napoleonic hyperbole of the ?Big Battalions' when describing the 
insurgents' military forces at the height of the conflict in 1951:3 yet 
the Malayan Races Liberation Army numbered at the time less than 3,500 men 
spread over twelve loosely grouped 'regiments', not one of which had the 
offensive strength of more than two British infantry companies.
And again, Sir Robert Thompson in 1969, comparing the 
Emergency in Malaya with the conflict in Vietnam said;
2 Speed, Brig. F.W.; What is New in Vietnam? The Army Quarterly, Vol. xcix, 
October 1969-January 1970, p 87.
Clutterbuck, R.L.; The Long Long War, London 1967, pp 42-54.3
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"I myself and my colleagues on the British Advisory Mission to Vietnam, 
all remarked that we had found nothing new in Vietnam except in scale 
and intensity. "1+
Yet one of the most frequent statements made by Australian Army Officers who 
fought in both campaigns, was that the difference in scale and intensity 
between the two conflicts made all the difference in the world.
However, this thesis is in no sense a comparison with other 
insurrections, but within the framework of an operational analysis of the 
methods used by the government to defeat the Emergency in the years 1943- 
1954, it sets out to prove the following contentions:
a. If the Government of Malaya had acted more promptly and decisively in 
1948, the Malayan Communist Party could have been neutralised at far less 
cost in lives and money than subsequent operations demanded;
b. Having failed to avoid large scale terrorism, and even allowing for the 
rigorous conditions of terrain and jungle under which operations were 
conducted, it was still the failure of the government to make a coherent 
plan which dogged counter-insurgent operations for the first few years and 
rendered a protracted campaign inevitable;
c. The failure of the M.C.P. to gain a lasting ascendancy over the 
Government of Malaya was due at least as much to the Party's faulty 
appreciation of its own strength as it was to the efficacy of British 
counter-measures; and finally,
d. That success was not achieved until the Government integrated its
 ^ Thompson, Sir R.; No Exit Prom Vietnam, London, 1969 p 133. The tendency 
to make unreal or unreasonable comparisons between the Malayan 
Emergency and the Second Indo-China War has been seriously challenged in 
a number of works, notably: Osborne, M.E.; Strategic Hamlets in South
Vietnam: A Survey and a Comparison, New York, 1965; Fall, B.B.; The Two 
Vietnams, London, 1963. Especially pp 337-382; and Tilman, R.O.; The Non 
Lessons of the Malayan Emergency, Military Review Vol. 46, December 1966, 
pp 62-71. Dr. Osborne points out that in addition to the quantitative 
difference, there was also an immense qualitative difference betvzeen the 
abilities of the two groups of insurgents to conduct their terrorist 
campaigns. In Vietnam, during the period (1962), when the strategic 
hamlet program was in operation, the casualty rate was of the order of 
one hundred government and civilian casualties per day with some five 
hundred violent incidents per week. At the height of the Emergency in 
Malaya, the total annual casualties for military, police and civilians, 
including killed, wounded and missing was 2,215 of whom 1,020 were wounded; 
giving a daily casualty rate of less than seven per day. Osborne, M.E.;
Op.Cit., p 53.
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strategy by determined leadership and by what, under less extreme 
circumstances, would amount to arbitrary politico-military controls.
The period 1948-54 is significant because the Briggs Plan - 
which laid the foundations for the destruction of the insurgent organisation 
was adopted and, after a protracted period of gestation which demonstrated 
grave weaknesses in the machinery of Government, was effectively consummated 
by General Templer who combined the dual appointments of High Commissioner 
and Director of Operations. When Templer left Malaya in May 1954, the back 




THE COMING OF THE EMERGENCY
The Decision to Revolt.
Immediately following the return of the Malayan Communist 
Party delegates from the two communist party conferences held in Calcutta 
in February 1948," the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the M.C.P. was held in 
Singapore from 17th-21st March 1948. This meeting which marked a turning 
point in the strategy of Malayan Communism, was dominated by the 
Australian Communist leader L.L. Sharkey, who attacked the previous M.C.P. 
policy, in particular the decision to dissolve the party’s guerrilla force- 
the Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army- after the Second World WTar. He 
also expounded the significance of the new international line which had 
evolved since Zhdanov's Cominform speech six months earlier, emphasising 
that it demanded a more aggressive policy from Asian communist parties.1 2
The Plenum’s directives were issued as three resolutions.
The first concluded that as the British Labor Government had shown itself 
no less imperialist than its predecessors, the struggle for independence 
must take the form of a 'peoples revolutionary war' which the M.C.P. was 
ready to lead. The second exhorted the party to abandon its former 
'ostrich policy of surrenderism' and to prepare the masses for an 
uncompromising struggle for .independence without regard to considerations 
of legality. The third stressed the need to restore discipline.3
On 10th May at the Fifth Plenum, a twelve point 'Plan of 
Struggle' was accepted, which emphasised illegal work, urged that the Pan 
Malayan Federation of Trade Unions and the various Federated Trade Unions 
consider themselves vehicles for anti-British propaganda and called for 
strikes to disrupt the economy. Open organisations were to be closed
1 The two conferences were: The Conference of Youth and Students of South 
East Asia Fighting for Freedom and Independence, which was sponsored by 
the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and the International Union 
of Students and which took place from 19th to 24th February 1948; and 
the Second Congress of the Communist Party of India from 28th February 
to 6th March 1948.
2Basic. Paper Vol. I Part 2, pp 43-44




except for a few to produce propaganda. The same meeting was informed 
that a new party program would be ready in three months.^
M.C.P. inspired violence began to mount until on 16th June 
the High Commissioner, Sir Edward Gent declared a State of Emergency in 
certain ar^as, extended on the following day to the whole of Malaya.* 5 
How could such a situation have come about? How was it possible that a 
party which, not many years before had been Britain’s ally against the 
Japanese, could so suddenly be transformed into a resolute and implacable 
enemy of British rule in Malaya, and opt for armed revolt to remove'that 
rule? To answer such questions it is necessary to look briefly at the 
development of communism in Malaya.
The Malayan Communist Party
The most striking feature about the M.C.P. was that it was,
\and has always been predominantly Chinese. According to Malayan 
Government records, communism was first introduced into Malaya by a 
number of Indonesian revolutionaries. However, they reported little 
success among the Malays who were Mazy and contented'; the chief hope, 
they considered, lay in working on the Singapore Chinese among whom two
 ^ Ib_idj P 14.
5 On 16th June, Gent declared a State of Emergency to exist in the Ipoh 
and Sungei Siput districts of Perak, and in the Kluang and Muar 
Police Circles of Johore. This was extended to the whole of Malaya 
on the following day. The Times, 17th and 18th June 1948. The 
Emergency was initially declared under the British Military 
Administration. (Essential Regulations) Proclamation. However, so that 
the powers conferred on the Government would not continue to rest on 
a military proclamation, an Emergency Regulations Bill repealing the 
pre-war legislation was passed through all its stages in the 
Legislative Council on 5th July. The M.C.P., its affiliated bodies 
the M.P.A.J.A. Ex-Service Comrades Association, the New Democratic 
Youth League and the Ikatan Perabela Tanah Ayer Malaya (A.P.I.) were 
declared illegal organisations on 23rd July 1948. M.C.P., Banditry, 
pp 2 and 14.
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clans in particular, the Hakkas and Hailams appeared to be especially 
promising.e In the peninsula the Malays, secure within the cohesive force 
of Islam, were well content with British rule and remained impervious to 
communist efforts to recruit them. Moreover, social divisiveness within 
both the Chinese and Indian communities of Malaya also retarded the growth 
of the movement. A major part of both these populations considered 
Malaya as only a transient home. Among the Chinese, the success of the 
Kuomintang and later the communists in China, in some cases served only 
to increase the stridency of their claims to be Chinese citizens first 
and not Malayans, and during the 1920s and 1930s the ratio of Chinese 
emigrants to immigrants remained about equal. Among the Indians, although 
some were able to find common ground with the Malays as Muslims the 
tenuousness of their loyalty to Malaya was also a divisive factor: 
their focus of loyalty was reserved for India and the Congress Party 
rather than Malaya.
Thus, despite its claim to represent all the races of 
Malaya, this problem proved to be a millstone round the neck of the M.C.P. 
which continued into the Emergency itself. As one party report stated:
"We understand the importance of racial work but we have not 
tried our best to revise the Indian party. We never thought 
of finding means of carrying out Malay racial work. This has 
been the cause of our being unable up to the present moment 
to mobilise the Indian labourers. This has given the British
G The importance of the Hailams in the early development of Communism in 
Malaya cannot be underestimated. As Onraet puts it, 'a curious phase 
of this early Left-Wing movement was its almost complete monopoly by 
the Hailam clan of Chinese. Whether this was deliberate or accidental 
is difficult to say. But what is certain is that no other set of men 
could have been so successfully secretive and persistent against 
organised opposition.’ Onraet, pp 110-111. It should also be noted 
that much of the Hailam influence was directed through two groups: 
the ’Main School' group who were engaged in the organisation of trade 
union influence through the communist dominated General Labour Unions, 
and the 'Middle School' group who were engaged in recruiting communist 
youth. Many Hailams taught at night schools, which apart from 
disseminating general propaganda, also prepared students for the 
Whampoa Military Academy in China: Precis, Basic Paper; p 3. In 1954 
as part of a socio-political study, Professor Lucisn Pye interviewed 
some sixty Surrendered Enemy Personnel (S.E.P.s) in Malaya. Of this 
number slightly more than half were Hakkas, and of those who had been 
M.C.P. functionaries a disproportionately high number were Hailams. 
Thus, the special place of these groups in the communist movement in 
Malaya continued into the Emergency period. Pye, pp 120-121.
4 .
imperialists the opportunity to recruit special constables and 
auxiliary police from the backward Malays, of making them their 
agents, and of carrying out their policy of dividing the races.,,/7
Nevertheless, the development and growth of the M.C.P. in 
the period prior to the Second World War although fitful, was also 
inexorable.' Until 19 27, it existed as the Malayan Revolutionary 
Committee of the Kuomintang but after the Communist-K.M.T. split in China 
it emerged somewhat shakily as the Nanyang (South Seas) Communist Party.
A Nanyang General Labour Union to direct agitational activity in trade 
unions was also formed. In 1930, at a conference in Singapore, both the 
above parties were reconstructed more formally along national lines as 
the Malayan Communist Party and the Malayan General Labour Union. At 
the same time, in order to increase Comintern control of the communist 
movement in Malaya, the supervision of the M.C.P. and its subsidiaries 
was taken out of the hands of the Communist Party of China and entrusted
\
to the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern in Shanghai. Nevertheless, 
the Chinese orientation of the M.C.P. was not so easily changed and 
although the party adopted the united front policy laid down by the 
Comintern at its Seventh Conference in 1935, and also accepted the 
Comintern’s directive to agitate against British ’imperialism’ after the 
Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939, the M.C.P. called off its anti-British 
agitation as a result of fresh instructiotis from the China Communist 
Party (which had reached agreement with the K.M.T. in Chungking) a year 
before it would have done had it been completely aligned with Russian 
policy. By 1934, not only had branches of the party been established in 
all the states of the peninsula, but its membership including members of 
affiliated organisations had grown to 12,716.8
' 3.T . , 4 th March 1949. Duriiig the Emergency, even Chinese insurgents 
who worked in the Racial Section of the organisation tried to 
minimise their contacts with Malays Tndians whom they usually 
referred to as ’blacks'. Pye; Op.Git., p 208.
8 Basic Paper, Vol. I Part 2, p 7. In March 1934, the party adopted 
a formal constitution of which the text (in translation) is contained 
in Hanrahan, pp 87-101.
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The Anti-Japanese Movement
At the time of the Japanese invasion the M.C.P. remained a 
minority party with limited popularity and although proficient in 
propaganda, sabotage and subversion it did not have a strong mass base. 
However, from the invasion of Manchuria by Japan in 1931, the strong 
anti-Japanese sentiment which this engendered among Chinese offered the 
M.C.P. an excellent opportunity for increasing its popular appeal.
During the Emergency a surrendered communist Lam Swee wrote:
MTn 1937, I was influenced by the surging waves of anti-Japanese' 
patriotism. Young men all over Malaya joined in anti-Japanese 
work to save the country, and their enthusiasm was great. Like 
them I joined in the work with great earnestness. Many of these' 
patriotic young men used to extol the brave and courageous spirit 
of the members of the communist party in their fight against the 
Japanese for the salvation of the country; and under the 
circumstances an impression was created in me regarding the Communist 
Party. I admired it as a gallant and heroic warrior ready to 
succour the weak.n<^
When the Japanese attacked China in 1937, the party made further gains 
by combining with K.M.T. elements in a National Salvation Association 
which it quickly dominated and finally, when the Japanese invaded Malaya 
the M.C.P. offered all out co-operation with the British Government which, 
after a period of negotiation it accepted.
The Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army (M.P.A.J.A.)
The British trained selected members of the M.C.P. in 
guerrilla warfare techniques and in all, one hundred and sixty-five went 
through the ten day course.10 Although the fortunes of the M.P.A.J.A.
9 Lam Swee; My Accusation, Kuala Lumpur, 1951, p 3.
10 Chapman, p 28. Commenting on the quality of men selected by the M.C.P., 
Chapman who was Deputy Commandant of 101st Special Training School 
stated: T1 was much impressed by the enthusiasm of these young
Chinese, who were probably the best material we had ever had at the 
school.'
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groups were in the early stages precarious, they survived and attracted 
many recruits. The ultimate effect was to produce a force of some 6,500 
men.11 In 1943 their strength was augmented by direct assistance from
South East Asia Command (S.E.A.C.) in the form of officers from Force 136.
/ ;
By an agreement signed on 31st December 1943, the M.C.P. undertook to 
follow the instructions of the allied Commander-in-Chief insofar as 
military operations were concerned. Post-war policy was not discussed; 
it was further agreed that the only action immediately possible was to 
keep anti-Japanese feeling alive, to foment labour trouble, and to carry 
out acts of sabotage, particularly against shipping.12 The British 
promised to send arms, ammunition and medical supplies. However, despite 
increased material co-operation, the M.C.P. never disclosed its full 
order of battle to the British liaison officers.
For many Chinese, the M.P.A.J.A. was the focus of their 
continuing struggle against Japan. For the M.C.P. itself this was the 
watershed in its political life. For the first time in the history of 
the party and its predecessors, the Nanyang Communist Party and the 
Military Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang, it had a military 
organisation.
But what did the M.P.A.J.A. achieve during the war? For a 
start it very prudently declined to become involved in set-piece 
operations against the Japanese,13 and while it was of some nuisance 
value in tying down numbers of their troops and was for this reason the 
target of occasional Japanese sweeps, its real value lay in its potential 
to be a harrassing and pathfinder force during the intended British 
re-occupation of Malaya.
11 They were organised into seven independent 'Anti-Japanese Regiments', 
each of five patrols of 100 to 150 men capable of operating as 
irregulars. Despite the change in prefixes during the Emergency by 
which Malayan Peoples Anti-British Army (M.P.A.B.A.) and later Malayan 
Races Liberation Army (M.R.L.A.) replaced Anti—Japanese; each group 
continued to operate in the same area as its parent force had done 
during the Second World War, and drew its support - intelligence, 
supplies and recruits from the same source.
12 Donnison, p 380.
lo As one observer put it: 'They, the M.P.A.J.A. were known to have issued
challenges to the Nippon Army to come out and fight....
But when Garrison Commanders took them seriously......the "Communists"
were nowhere to be seen.' Chin Kee Onn, p 110.
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The official history of the M.P.A.J.A. states that it 
undertook some 340 individual operations against the Japanese of which it 
considered 200 major efforts.14 However, in a similar period during the 
Emergency (June 1948 to December 1951) the Government of Malaya recorded 
13,585 terrorist actions of which 4,155 were major engagements,15 
indicating that during this phase of its development it was far more 
interested in remaining a force in being, acquiring experience and 
nurturing its strength for the future rather than risking a serious 
reverse at the hands of the Japanese. A debacle such as the Batu Caves 
massacre on 1st September 1942, affected its guerrilla program for a long 
time afterwards.15 Moreover, while conducting a relatively lukewarm 
policy of opposition to the Japanese, the M.P.A.J.A. pursued an active 
traitor killing program within its own ranks. According to its own history 
2,542 so called traitors were executed or murdered during this phase. 
Indeed, the Fifth Independent Force M.P.A.J.A., was set up specifically 
for this purpose.
f
However, the abiding legacies of the M.P.A.J.A.'s 
participation during the Second World War held important consequences for 
the party's future. First, it was enabled by its genuine popularity in 
some cases, and by its resort to violence in others, to build up a strong 
rural mass base, particularly among Chinese 'squatters' on the jungle 
fringes, their numbers swollen by flight from the Japanese. And, after 
the Japanese surrender, just,as the M.P.A.J.A. Ex-Service Comrades 
Association maintained a skeletal structure and close liaison between the 
Central Executive Committee and the disbanded guerrillas, so the M.C.P. 
maintained a continuing presence among the squatters by recruitment from 
squatter families and through the parallel hierarchy of clandestine party 
committees and village cells. The M.P.A.J.A. had also learned to employ
14 Central Military Committee, M.C.P., p 30.
15 Hanrahan; Op.Cit., p 44.
15 At the Batu Caves (north of Kuala Lumpur) on 1st September 1942, a
general conference of senior officials of the M.P.A.J.A. and the M.C.P. 
was betrayed to the Japanese by the Secretary General of the party,
Loi Tek who was both a Japanese and a British agent. Basic Paper Vol.I 
Part 2, p 36. Since more than half the political commissars in the 
M.P.A.J.A. were killed at Batu Caves this resulted inter alia in the 
abandonment of the commissar system in the M.P.A.J.A.
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the aboriginal tribes as an intelligence screen and'provisioning agency 
against the Japanese, a tactic they were to use later. Second, a new 
military arm of the party had been built up and ’blooded’, and whilst its 
success against the Japanese has been generously embellished by 
Communist historians, it had survived and was a significant military 
asset. Not only had it acquired direct experience of guerrilla fighting 
and operational conditions, it had become strongly imbued with Maoist 
thought, particularly the concept of protracted conflict. Ideological 
motivation was strengthened by rigorous daily timetables of political and 
military instruction interspersed with sessions of self criticism.
Potential officers attended a course in Pahang where the instructors had 
themselves fought in the civil war in China.
Nevertheless, there were weaknesses. Despite the strict 
Central Committee control of ideology and politics, central control of 
operations was weak. Chapman found the guerrillas’ means of physical 
communication grossly inefficient. During his year's stay with the Pahang 
group, they were in touch with the Selangor group on three occasions and 
through them with general headquarters, three or four times with the Negri 
Sembilan group to the South West, twice with Perak and once with the 
isolated guerrillas in East Pahang. The fragmentation of the peninsula 
by jungle and main range made the chances of sustained co-ordinated action 
remote, and the shortage of spare parts and batteries limited the use of
wireless. Moreover, the operational freedom necessarily delegated to theI
independent force commander encouraged centrifugal tendencies. A 
commander would respond to Central Committee injunctions provided that 
he could be reached; the instructions were timely and militarily feasible 
which was not always the case; his control had not been impaired by 
security force action; and he remained loyal. However, even against the 
Japanese, treachery was a major concern of M.C.P. authority:
"The facility with which the Chinese, otherwise so single minded 
in their hatred of the Japanese could turn informer," wrote 
Chapman,"was a perpetual source of astonishment to me. In the year 
that I spent with this patrol, no less than six of its members 
were tried for treachery and summarily shot, and several others who 
had fled from the camp and turned informer were hunted down and 
despatched outside. Those who have a better understanding of the 
oriental mind tell me that among the uneducated Chinese, personal 
pique can reach such limits that a man will be quite prepared to
9 .
kill himself - let alone sell himself - if he thinks that it will 
cause sufficient harm to his rival."17
As almost the entire rank and file of the M.P.A.J.A., and later the 
M.P.A.B.A., and M.R.L.A., could be categorised as ’uneducated Chinese' 
this particular psychological trait was potentially exploitable. The 
surrender terms, including the massive scale of rewards offered by the 
government during the Emergency aimed straight at it with telling effect.
Little initiative was shown by commanders at the middle and 
lower level, and although guerrilla schools were set up on an independent 
force level, the junior officers remained the weakest link in the 
guerrilla hierarchy.18 The average soldier was hardy, disciplined and 
uncanny in his ability to detect the presence of an enemy, but most were 
illiterate, lacked initiative and were poor marksmen. Their fire 
discipline was poor and remained so during the Emergency when several 
camps were found because the insurgents were having firing practice in 
the jungle.18 They were also unpredictable and while their camp discipline 
including their conduct towards female guerrillas was strict, they were 
much given to loud noises:
"in the still jungle dawn", wrote Chapman, "the noise of their 
shouting could be heard from a great distance ............. This same
1 •n Chapman; Op.Cit., p 145. When he interviewed insurgents who had 
surrendered during the Emergency, Professor Pye considered that their 
eagerness to compromise, and even lead Security Force patrols against 
their former comrades, sprang from the completness of their break 
with their former activities: 'Even when this meant killing people 
with whom they had lived and worked for .any years, they were not 
troubled by the prospect, since their break with the party had been a 
personal one. They no longer had any ties with those in the party; 
they had to establish new ones with those in the government.'
Pye; Op .Cit., p 339.
18 Chapman; Op.Cit., p 147; 'The control of guerrilla general Headquarters 
in spite of its geographical vagueness, was absolute and
all-embracing .... Policy, discipline, routine, ethics and above all
political ideology were entirely regulated from above ....  Within
these limits group and patrol leaders had complete power within their 
commands but none outside, nor would they ever dare to take the
initiative .... Every detail had to be referred above and the answer,
if it came at all, would take several months to receive.'
15 Ferret Report, p 9.
a.
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lack of common sense also permitted them to blow bugles loudly in 
the camps, a conspicuous martial noise which, like the booming of the 
siamang ape carries an immense distance in heavy jungle."20
The Post War Period
Several factors combined to make the post-war Malayan social 
economic and political scene the most complex in South East Asia. For 
its part, the M.C.P. had to decide quickly what its strategy would be.
After some violent and disorderly settling of scores between the Japanese 
surrender and the arrival of British forces and,21 under the leadership 
of Secretary General Loi Tek, the party opted for a return to a moderate 
policy of united front and labour organisation similar to the pre-war 
Comintern line, rather than embark on armed struggle in the manner of the 
Vietminh and Indonesian revolutions.22 Thus, when the British High 
Command called for the disbandment of the M.P.A.J.A., the order was obeyed. 
As each member of the M.P.A.J.A. was disarmed he received a mustering out 
bonus of M$350 and a bag of rice. In all some 6,800 men were demobilised; 
5,497 weapons were returned, 4,765 having been issued.^2 An estimated 
twenty per cent of Force 136 air-drops were retained by the guerrillas, 
who also had the arms discarded by the British at the disaster at Slim 
River, together with those taken from the Japanese at the end of the war
20 Chapman; Op.Cit., p 153.
21 There was a delay for more than a month between the Japanese surrender 
and the landing of British troops at. Mor'b, during which a political 
and administrative vacuum existed which i_he M.C.P. was eager to fill. 
Bands of the M.P.A.J.A. converged on the smaller towns and villages, 
disarmed the police and in some areas established an administration 
with all the trappings of a totalitarian state. Donnison; Op.Cit. ,
p 385. The M.P.A.J.A. also wreaked vengeance against persons accused 
of collaboration with the Japanese, many of whom were brought before 
People's Courts and in some cases executed. Particular attention was 
paid to Malay and Indian policemen accused by the guerrillas of 
treachery. These activities, which in some cases were reciprocated by 
the Malays, did much to accentuate inter-racial disharmony.
basic Paper, Vol I Part 2, pp 29-30.
23 Donnison; Op.Cit. , p 387.
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or from police posts.2tf
The M.C.P. immediately created a variety of front 
organisations.25 An M.P.A.J.A. Old Comrades’ organisation was formed to 
maintain contact with former guerrillas, and the New Democratic Youth 
League was organised to attract Malayans too young to have served during 
the war but anxious not to be left out of post-war developments. Even 
more formidably, in the labour field, the source of its pre-war strength, 
the M.C.P. quickly recovered its previous eminence. As early as January 
1946 it called a general strike which paralysed the country for two days. 
However, despite its official recognition by the British Government, its 
efforts to move into the open political arena were largely curtailed by 
the B.M.A. As early as September 1945, the B.M.A. refused to recognise 
the legality of various 'People’s Committees’ set up after the Japanese 
surrender. On 14th February 1946, the B.M.A. preempted a mass 
demonstration planned to commemorate the fall of Singapore, and to humiliate 
the British authorities. The police raided the headquarters of the 
Singapore General Labour Union, the New Democratic Youth League and the 
M.C.P., and jailed various party leaders. This marked the last large scale 
militant action taken by the M.C.P. until April 1948.26
Nevertheless, by then it had become apparent that two rival 
nationalisms, Malay and Chinese were in full force in Malaya. Immediately 
prior to their surrender, the Japanese had promoted the formation of the 
Special Peoples' Union of Peninsular Malaya - generally referred to by 
its Malay acronym K.R.I.S. - to seek a pan-Malay independence in 
association with Indonesia. The movement subsequently inspired the
24 Basic Paper, Vol.I Part 2 , p 28. Special Branch of the Malayan Police 
eventually estimated that as many as 4,000 guerrillas failed to 
surrender weapons. During interrogation by Singapore Special Branch in 
October 1946, Loi Tek stated that an estimated 2,400 assorted rifles, 
revolvers, tommy guns etc. were cached throughout Malaya.
25 A directive from the M.C.P.'s Central Committee issued in January 1945 
called for a secret M.P.A.J.A. to be established of ’trusted party 
members, incognito, xMiose responsibility is to gather and hide arms.' 
Loi Tek stated that no such force existed but that 2,000 communist 
guerrillas could be mobilised if necessary. Ibid, pp 28-29.
26 Donnison; Op.Cit. , p 394.
establishment of the Malay Nationalist Party and numerous political fronts. 
On the other hand, Chinese nationalism, dominated by the M.C.P., was 
also forming a series of organisations, some having connections with 
left-wing Malay and Indian movements. Into the midst of this, the British 
Government tossed the proposals to form a Malayan Union.
The Malayan Union and the Rise of U.M.N.O.
During the war, a Malayan Planning Unit in London had 
conceived a plan for the re—organisation of the complex pre-war structure 
of Malaya into a Malayan Union and a Crown Colony of Singapore. The 
majority of the Chinese community would become citizens. The plans for 
the union, published in January 1946, were bitterly resented by over­
whelming, previously apolitical Malay public opinion, particularly because 
of provisions conferring citizenship on most Chinese, and the manner in 
which the assent of the rulers was obtained by Sir Harold MacMichael.27 
This led to the establishment of the United Malay Nationalist Organisation 
(U.M.N.O.) under Dato Onn Bin Ja’afar, the Prime Minister of Johore in 
iL^ tcn 19^6, which refused to cooperate with the Government, and boycotted 
its ceremonies including the installation of the first Governor. The 
opposition resulted eventually in the replacement of the Union by the 
Federation of Malaya in February 1948. For the purpose of this study two 
consequences deserve notice. First, the suspicion of the Malays as to 
British intentions was thoroughly aroused, causing partial but not 
irrevocable estrangement from British rule at a time when British 
authority was about to be challenged by the M.C.P. in the labour field 
and later in the jungle. Had the M.C.P. been mindful and capable of 
exploiting the situation, this could have had disastrous consequences for 
the subsequent counter-insurgent campaign which depended very heavily for 
its success on Malay support. Alternatively, it could have posed as the 
champion of enlightenment against ’reactionary' Malay opinion and perhaps 
in the process have built upon its previous connections with the British,
2 7 tWarnings about the proposals being contemplated by the British 
Government had already been given in October 1945 by a previous 
Governor of the Straits Settlements, Sir Frank Swettenham who said: 
’Who has asked for these changes and a Malay Union? Certainly it is 
not the Malays.' The Times, 29th October 1945. A further letter in 
The Times on 16th April 1946 by seventeen prominent ex-Malayan civil 
servants characterised the MacMichael agreement with the Sultans as 
’an instrument for annexation.'
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while undermining still further the position of its rival for Chinese 
support, the K.M.T. In the event it did neither. It contented itself 
with front activities within the Pan Malayan Council of Joint Action 
(P.M.C.J.A.) formed in late 1946 to campaign against the proposed 
Federation. However, when the M.C.P. sought to use this association to 
enforce a hartal on 20th October 1947, the moderates refused to become 
involved. Later, when it became clear that the British Government and 
the Malay rulers intended to proceed with Federation, the middle class 
supporters of the P.M.C.J.A. bowed to the inevitable. The coalition 
crumbled, leaving the M.C.P. once more isolated.28 However, at the same 
time as its political front was collapsing, the M.C.P. was succeeding very 
well in the labour field.
The Trade Union Movement
When the B.M.A. moved to counter the threat of communist 
control or organised labour by reinstituting the 1940 Trade Union Enactment, 
the M.C.P. adroitly circumvented the restriction by reorganising its 
General Labour Unions (G.L.U.'s) into the Pan Malayan Federation of Trade 
Unions (P.M.F.T.U.) and the Singapore Federation of Trade Unions (S.F.T.U.) 
in February 1946.28 By the end of 1947 the P.M.F.T.U. controlled 214 
out of a total of 277 registered unions in Malaya, and claimed that it 
controlled some 75% of the organised work force.30 And while it did win 
real benefits for some of its members, this was incidental to its main 
purpose which was to manipulate labour at the behest of the M.C.P. For 
this purpose it developed a highly effective method of centralising finance 
in its own hands. As all subscriptions went directly to the P.M.F.T.U. 
which then paid for the administrative costs of individual unions, the 
M.C.P. had a very tight control over the movement.31
28 Brimmell, pp 207-203
z8 The first congress of the P.M.F.T.U. reported that it represented 
some 463,000 workers. Lu Cheng, 'Extracts From Reports On The Trade 
Union Movement In Malaya', Report of the W.F.T.U., London, 1949, p 95.
30 Shurncliff A.; 'The Growth of Democratic Trade Unions in the 
Federation of Malaya', Labor Monthly Review, September 1951, p 274.
31 Wyatt W.; Southwards From China, London, 1952, p 146.
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However, both the P.M.F.T.U.'s expansion and the momentum 
of strike action now began noticeably to slow. For a start the recovery 
of the economy after the ravages of the war provided a less favourable 
climate for agitation; but more importantly at this high point in its 
success in the labour field, the internal organisation of the M.C.P. lay 
in ruins.
The Defection of Loi Tek
In March 1947, on the eve of a meeting called by the 
Central Committee to accuse its Secretary General Loi Tek of 
treacherous dealings with the Japanese during the occupation, he 
disappeared. His defection caused an immediate dislocation in the 
leadership and functioning of the party from which it took months to 
recover.
For some time Loi Tek's wartime collaboration with the 
Japanese had been suspected but not proven.32 At the meeting in question, 
the Deputy Secretary of the party Ch’in Peng was to have confronted Loi 
Tek with several general accusations which included his personal life and 
’weak' leadership of the party.33 What was unknown to the Central 
Committee, was that Loi Tek was not only a Japanese agent during the war 
but also a British agent both before and after the war.34 Moreover, the 
general accusations of collaboration with the Japanese, did not include 
the knowledge that he had deliberately engineered the Batu Caves massacre 
of September 1942, which eliminated most of his rivals among the M.C.P.
32 Basic Paper, Vol.I Part 1, pp 29-30. Immediately after the war charges 
of collaboration with the Japanese were raised against Loi Tek but 
were disbelieved by the Central Committee, in part because they came 
from men who had themselves collaborated.
33 Ibid., for example, he maintained two families and engaged in private 
business in Singapore in addition to being Secretary General of the
M.C.P.
34 He entered the M.C.P. in the mid-1930's as a police informant passed 
on from the French Sürete in Saigon (he was Vietnamese) to the 
Singapore Special Branch, and worked his way into the upper levels of 
the M.C.P. hierarchy during 1936. Basic Paper, Vol.I Part 2, p 36.
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hierarchy, and that he also gave information to the Japanese which led 
to the arrest of all major leaders in Singapore.35
As a British agent, he had ensured that the course of 
Malayan Communism remained moderate. It was he who, at the Eighth Plenum 
in January 1946, the first since 1941, presented the arguments for 
moderation which led to its being reaffirmed as party strategy.“13 
Whether he genuinely believed that the British Government would intercede 
on matters of political, social and economic reform on behalf of the 
Chinese in Malaya - which it did in the Malayan Union proposals - is 
another matter. However, from the Malayan Government’s position, Loi Tek's 
place at the head of the potentially most revolutionary political group in 
the country was of considerable importance as it strove to put its house 
in order.“ Now, with Loi Tek gone it could only guess what the M.C.P. 
might do and, as will be examined in the next chapter, its intelligence 
was very faulty indeed.
35 Ibid.
35 Ibid., pp 33-34. ’The colonial problem,' he told the plenum,'can be 
resolved in two ways: liberation through a bloody revolutionary 
struggle (as in the case of Vietnam and Indonesia) or through the 
strength of a national united front.' Conditions in Malaya were not 
favourable for the first alternative, he argued; accordingly the 
party's tasks were 'to preserve a peaceful front, determinedly to protect 
world peace, to carry out the Charter of the United Nations, to 
annihilate the remnants of fascism, and to counter the imperialist 
policy of colonial exploitation.' Nothing was said specifically of 
independence as an immediate objective. Parts of Loi Tek's speech (in 
translation) are contained in Hanrahan; Op.Cit., pp 51-52
3/ The investigations into Loi Tek's actions carried out by Ch'in Peng, 
were subsequently published by the party as t e 'Statement of the 
Incident of Wright(Loi Tek)' dated 28th May 1948. In May 1947 Loi Tek 
was formally expelled from the party at the Ninth Plenum and Ch’in 
Peng named as his successor. A full report on the case was delayed 
more than a year, following Ch'in Peng's visit to China in 1947 in 
search of evidence of Loi Tek's past connections. Loi Tek was charged 
with embezzling M$350,000 from party funds as well as with pressing 
for policies, 'which could not be carried out,' thereby serving as 'a 
running dog and traitor of the revolution' Ibid.
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The Decline of the Communist Dominated Trade Unions
The defection of Loi Tek and the breakdown in party leader­
ship which followed, caused the M.C.P. to turn its attention inwards 
precisely at a critical moment for its trade union activities. The 
declining effectiveness of strike tactics, which was to have such 
important consequences in the first half of 1948, was already apparent. 
Whereas the number of man days lost in strikes had been for Singapore 
1,173,000 and for the Malayan Union 713,000 during April 1946 - March 1947, 
the figures for April 1947 - March 1948 had declined to 205,000 and 512,000 
respectively.38 Moreover, whereas in the socially disordered post-war 
atmosphere of 1945 and 1946, workers might have been prepared to revolt, 
by 1948 revolutionary fervour had abated even among some M.C.P. cadres.
By now many Indian and Chinese labour leaders were actively discouraging 
militancy and with increasing success. There is evidence that the 
P.M.F.T.U. leaders had come to believe in the lawful worker struggle, or 
at least they wished to avoid hazarding their positions by unnecessarily 
provoking the authorities. It is now apparent that the timing of the 
strikes called after the Fourth Plenum in March 1948 (previously referred 
to) was faulty. While the S.F.T.U. could still call major strikes at short 
notice, the mainland federations had to undertake intensive preparatory 
work. In April 1948 for example, when strikes in Singapore were at their 
height, only 13,000 man days (involving less than one per cent of the 
labour force) were lost on the mainland.38 Then in May came the measure 
which the M.C.P. and the P.M.F.T.U. most feared. The Trade Unions 
(Amendment) Ordinance, effective on 12th June 1948, declared the F.T.U.s 
illegal.4*3 It restricted union offices (other than secretary) to persons 
with at least three years in the industry, barred office to persons 
convicted of extortion, intimidation and other similar crimes, and 
restricted labour federations to unions of similar occupations and 
industries. This last provision shortly thereafter forced the dissolution 
of the P.M.F.T.U.
38 Figures extrapolated from Malayan Union Department of Labour Annual 
Reports 1947, Table X and Singapore Labour Department Annual Report 
1948, Table XIV.
38 Malayan Union Labour Department Monthly Reports 1948, Appendix A.
40 F.L.C.M.C.P. 1948, p B260
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Since the fourth Plenum the M.C.P. had been sending key officials in 
danger of arrest into the jungle, but it had not anticipated the sudden 
passage of the ordinance. Now, P.M.F.T.U. officials vanished suddenly, 
often taking only immediate supplies of cash and equipment such as 
typewriters and printing machines.41 The effects were dramatic. Deserted 
by their most militant and able leaders and frightened by increasing 
arrests, workers returned quietly to work. By 2Pth June, the number of 
strikes had fallen from 28 at the beginning of the month to 8.42 By 15th 
June, the number of registered unions had declined from 331 to 162.1+3
Failure of the M.C.P.’s Post-War Strategy
How can the M.C.P.'s post-war strategy be assessed? It had 
emerged from the war as one of the strongest communist parties in South 
East Asia. It had a strong mass base and its military strength cowed its 
political opponents. Its decision to disband the M.P.A.J.A. and adopt a 
moderate strategy is perhaps surprising, particularly when viewed against 
contemporary communist movements in Indonesia and Indo-China. However, 
to ascribe this solely to Loi Tele’s treachery (as the M.C.P. subsequently 
tried to do) is to exaggerate the case. Certainly, Loi Tek argued strongly 
for the adoption of a moderate line at the Eighth Plenum, but the moderate 
line continued for more than ten months after his defection and more than 
eighteen months after his leadership first came under review. Thus, it is 
reasonable to argue that a majority of leaders favoured this course, at 
least until the party received instructions to do otherwise. Loi Tek him­
self visited China twice in 1946 to seek guidance on strategy and, 
according to him, was directed to refrain from armed insurrection, rely on 
united front tactics and limit demands to self government so long as the 
British Labor Party was in office.44 The M.C.P. was also enjoined to look 
to the Communist Party of Great Britain for both aid and tactical guidance. 
Moreover, British Communist views of Malaya both during and after the war
41 Waller, Interview.
42 Malayan Union Labour Department Monthly Reports, 1948, June 1948, p 4.
43 Annual Report 1948, p 182.
4 4 Basic Paper Vol I Part 2, pp 31ff
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support this contention. The British party stated that the M.C.P. should 
concentrate on social and economic reforms, and unification of the three 
communities before independence. It also reaffirmed self-government, not 
independence, as the objective in most of England's colonies including 
Malaya 71*
The M.C.P.'s efforts to constitute an inter-racial front 
were never successful, partly because of the racial suspicion which it had 
inflamed by its arbitrary actions before the British reoccupation, and by 
its militant labour policy. In 1947, as its problems deepened, the 
defection of Loi Tek could hardly have occurred at a worse time. Even if 
nothing else, it virtually dictated that the party must eschew moderation 
and pursue an opposite course to purge itself of past errors and deviations. 
But how to do so when the morale of the party was low, when many who were " 
by now used to the good life had no wish to re-enter the jungle, and when 
the party's international mentors advised otherwise?
At this point therefore, the injunctions of the Calcutta 
Conference fell gladly on their ears. Not only would armed revolt expunge 
past errors, it would also enable the party to recover lost ground. 
Furthermore, it would give the diehards from the guerrilla period the 
action they had been clamouring for. In this atmosphere the party prepared 
for action. That some states like Johore and Perak were better prepared 
for insurgency than others, reflected the fact that not all senior 
officials of the State Committees had been equally won over to the new line. 
Some like Lam Swee, were loath to forfeit the positions of power they had 
acquired in the trade union movement and were equally loath to forego the 
sort of work they liked doing.1+6 Others however, tired of long years of 
relative inactivity were anxious to start. Led by these more zealous units 
the M.C.P., as one observer put it, 'almost drifted into revolution,' 
rather than mounting a tightly coordinated offensive.tf 7 It was one of
World News and Views; 12th December 1942, p 477. 29th September 1945, 
p 297. 9th February 1946, p 47.
lfo Lam Swee; Op. Cit. , p 6.
4 7 Morrison I; 'The Communist Uprising in Malaya', Far Eastern Survey, 
December 22, 1948, Vol.XVII No.24, p 285.
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these groups, a killer squad of the 5th Regiment, Malayan Peoples'
Anti-British Army (M.P.A.B.A.) which murdered three European planters at 
Sungei Siput on 16th June, provoking the Government to declare the 
Emergency. Ch'in Peng later admitted that this had been a mistake, since 
it aroused many British officials who until then had been rather complacent. s
Yet if the M.C.P. had lacked foresight, the Government had 
not displayed any greater perception. Once a state of emergency had been 
declared, the Malayan Police from 17th to 19th June launched a massive 
dragnet, Operation FRUSTRATION, and some 1,100 members of the M.C.P. and 
its front organisations were detained. But the hard core members of the 
party and of the old M.P.A.J.A. were already in the jungle, or now escaped 
to it.4  ^ Indeed, the ease and openess with which some did so is 
astonishing. When the Emergency was declared, Yeung Kwo the Deputy 
Secretary General was in Penang. He was able to return by train to his 
home in Kuala Lumpur and then motor by car along the trunk road to a point 
in Selangor, where he walked to his prearranged headquarters in the 
jungle.5*^ However, in both its success and its failure, Operation 
FRUSTRATION was a remarkable portent of things to come.
Madoc, Interview. 
1+5 Waller, Interview.




Professor Seton-Watson has argued that the decisive political 
factors in the success or failure of revolutions have been the resistance 
or collapse of the state machinery and the international balance of power.* 
The cases of Russia, China, Indochina and Indonesia support his argument.
In Malaya however the serious social and economic disorder of 1945 was 
quickly overcome, and when it was at its worst the M.C.P. was at its most 
moderate. The will of the regime, supported by the consciousness of what 
Malaya’s dollar-earning capacity meant to the sterling area, remained firm, 
and the ambitious programme of political and social reforms devised during 
the war by the Malayan Planning Unit, despite the blunder of the Malayan 
Union, speedily abandoned, and the problems caused by M.C.P. activities, 
first in the unions and later in the jungle, were continued with so far as 
communal differences allowed throughout the Emergency, until the eventual 
attainment of independence. The Malays were hostile to the insurgency, 
the Indians indifferent, even the Chinese were divided, and virtually no 
help reached the insurgents from outside. One might say therefore that 
they were doomed.
There were however still certain weaknesses in theI
administration which deprived the government of the capacity either to 
forstall the outbreak, or to make an immediately effective riposte. The 
ideal prescription for a government faced with an insurgency has been well 
expressed by Professor Paret:
"During the early stages of an insurrection, while the level of 
violence is still low, it is relatively easy to prevent further 
deterioration by an energetic effort to educate public opinion, 
coupled with necessary reforms, with repression by the police, 
administration, and the courts, and by Army control of the danger 
zones. Prerequisites for effective action are an alert intelligence 
service and a government that recognises the gravity of the threat 
and is willing and able to meet it."1 2
1 Seton-Watson, pp 332, 336.
2 Paret, p 23.
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Other writers would identify the crucial areas of government in various 
ways. Galula for example lists six principal areas, which can be further
Osubdivided, while Thompson, although less specific, implies the same 
general attitude in his five principles upon which government action 
should be based;14 the Australian Army pamphlet Counter Revolutionary Warfare 
takes a similar approach.* 345 *7 All three however agree with Paret that the 
intelligence service, the police, the armed forces, and comprehensive and 
timely planning form the basis of the government counter. Any government 
faced with a potential insurgency threat neglects these aspects at its 
peril. The Malayan Government's record in this regard will now be examined.
Intelligence
If a government is to be forwarned of a challenge to its 
authority it must have an effective intelligence service, especially if 
the country has an active communist party or an organisation modelled on 
it, maintaining a clandestine structure parallel with the legal party.5 
Before the War, the M.C.P. was proscribed as an illegal society, until 
the Japanese invasion forced the British to seek its help. Any indication 
that it might subsequently be legalized was avoided, but at the end of the 
war, after the substantial disbandment of the M.P.A.J.A., the M.C.P. openly 
regarded itself as a legal party proclaiming a radical but not 
revolutionary platform.' The Central Committee indeed remained underground, 
but two senior party members established themselves in the Party’s offices
at Kuala Lumpur, made speeches and attended functions alongside British
3 Galula, pp 26-33.
4 Thompson, Communist Insurgency, pp 50-62.
5 Counter Revolutionary Warfare, pp 25-27.
5 As early as 1920 the Nineteen Basic Tasks of the Second Comintern 
Congress included, as No. 12, "In all countries even the freest, most 
'legal' and most 'peaceful' - that is, where the class struggle is least 
acute - .... it is imperative for every communist party systematically 
to combine legal with illegal work, legal with illegal organisation .... 
This illegal work is particularly necessary in the army, the navy, and 
the police." Degras, p 122. The above tasks were endorsed by the 
M.C.P. in its constitution drawn up in March 1934. Hanrahan; Op.Cit., 
p 94 .
7 For an excellent analysis of the M.C.P.'s political programme at this 
time see Hanrahan; Op .Cit., pp 51-5.
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and Malayan dignitaries.
However the extent of the underground organisation was not 
known to the intelligence service. It was not ax^ are for example of the 
large secret stocks of weapons and ammunition, nor, until long afterwards, 
of the Fourth Plenum and the radical change in policy which resulted.
In effect, the government had no agency capable of detecting subversion 
in rural Malaya, or of operating within the clandestine organ of the M.C.P. 
The recently established Malayan Security Service (M.S.S.) was small, and 
operated only in the major centres of population.8 Special Branch of the 
Police Criminal Investigation Department did not yet exist. Consequently, 
although police officers in rural areas had already detected signs of 
increased communist militancy, their warnings were effectivelv ignored.9
The ineffectiveness of an organisation like the M.S.S. had 
been forseen in 1946 when Mr. Rene Onraet, Inspector General of Police, 
had been invited to examine the police situation. His report had urged 
the introduction and wide development of a pan-Malayan police intelligence 
organisation10 such as had been so valuable in 1940—42, but although the 
M.S.S. was established as a result of his report, his advice was only 
partially heeded. Although pan-Malayan it was hampered by the political 
separation of Singapore from the Malay States; moreover the direction and 
control of intelligence was now taken away from the Police which ceased 
to be a direct source of intelligence,11 while the M.S.S. was a mere
8 Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Penang, Ipoh and Seremban. The actual 
strength of the M.S.S. in June 1948 was 12 Gazetted Officers and 
44 Inspectors. However, due to absences on leave and for other 
reasons its effective strength was 20. In contrast, by the end of 
1953 the Special Branch had grown to 126 Gazetted Officers and 279 
Inspectors. Put another way, by 1953, 20% of all Gazetted Officers 
in the Royal Malayan Police and 18% of Inspectors, were in the 
Special Branch. Annual Report 1953, p.232.
9 On 23rd June 1948, the Straits Times editorial entitled "Interpreting 
Terrorism" stated: "Six months ago junior Police Officers in 
out-stations in Perak were saying that there would be a big Communist 
showdown "somewhere about June", and that if the Communists had not 
been brought under control by then, the whole British regime in Malaya 
v/ould be threatened. We are now into June, and we know that those junior 
police officers were right."
1 ® S.T., 18th September, 1950.
Ironically enough, an independent intelligence organisation similar to 
the M.S.S., known as the Political Intelligence Bureau had been, 
absorbed into the police force in 1923. Ibid.
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bureau, unable to confirm the raw intelligence which it collected.12 
The results were of immense consequence.
On 9th April 1948, less than seven weeks before a state of
emergency was declared throughout the Federation, the Director of the M.S.S
submitted a top-secret report to the High Commissioner which began:
"There is no immediate threat to internal security in Malaya, 
although the position is potentially dangerous."13
While the report goes on to say that ’communism is the greatest single
factor which is likely to aggravate the internal security of Malaya in the
next five years', its attention was focussed on a 'powerful Indian-
Communist section' and a 'Malay-Indonesian section’. The M.C.P. was
virtually ignored.14 In the event, neither the Indian, Indonesian, nor
pan-Malay wings posed any serious threat. Later, the report states again,
'The immediate threat to internal security is negligible.'15
Two inferences can be drawn from this. First, the 
government's intelligence adviser was palpably unaware of the real forces 
at work within Malayan society and was preoccupied with pan-Malay 
nationalism rather than Chinese communism which was the real threat. In 
short, the M.S.S. was looking the wrong way.15 Second, by underestimating 
the threat from the M.C.P., it lulled the administration into a false sense 
of security. Consequently, when the M.C.P. began to step up its attacks 
and murders, the government's reactions were weak and indecisive. Mien
12 Used in this sense, 'bureau' means a collector and repository of 
information rather than an executive authority such as a Special 
Branch of the police.
13 Dailey Report, p 1.
14 Ibid. , p 6.
15 Ibid., p 14.
lo Mr. G.C, Madoc (later Director of Intelligence, Malaya) who preceded 
Dailey as Acting Director of the M.S.S. said that Dailey worked 'much 
more by personal intuition than by logic'. He also stated that as 
Acting Director of M.S.S. he was principally involved in watching for 
manifestations of militancy among Malay nationalist groups, in 
particular the Malay Nationalist Party (M.N.P.) formed at Ipoh in 
October 1945, and the extremist youth organisations, Angkatan Pemuda 
Yang Insaf (A.P.I.) and Ikatan Pembela Tanah Ayer (P.E.T.A.)
Brimmell; Op.Cit., pp 200-201. These groups were proscribed by the 
Government on 23rd July 1948. Madoc also stated that neither he nor 
his officers were ever directed to bother about the M.C.P. and that 
only years later did he learn that Loi Tek had been a British agent. 
Madoc, Interview.
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the magnitude of the threat became clearer, a large police Special Branch 
was established, in August 1948, but an efficient intelligence 
organisation takes years to develop, so that it was not really effective 
until 1952. Had Onraet's advice been fully implemented in 1946, the 
Emergency need never have occurred.
A second factor which exacerbated this uncertainty was the 
complexity of the governmental machinery. As the responsibility for 
permitting the insurrection to develop has been laid overwhelmingly at the 
feet of the High Commissioner, Sir Edward Gent, it is necessary to examine 
the multiple strands of executive pressure which impinged upon him.
During the War he had headed the Malayan Planning Unit. Its 
plans had many admirable features: a simpler and more efficient governmental 
structure, a secure and substantial position in political life for the 
Chinese, an income tax, state welfare services, a progressive education 
policy, establishment of trades unions, a labour code, and employees' 
provident funds. All these Gent, as the first Governor of the new Malayan 
Union, intended to introduce himself.17 The collapse of the Union seriously 
compromised his position, and although he subsequently became High 
Commissioner for the Federation in February 1948, his more progressive 
policies, particularly In the trades union sector, were undermined by M.C.P. 
subversion, and later by terrorism. Moreover, his many good qualities did 
not include decisiveness in crisis.18
As High Commisßioner for the Federation, Gent answered to the 
British Government through the Colonial Office. The Governor of Singapore, 
Sir Franklin Gimson, was in the same position. However there was also in 
Singapore a third senior official, the Commissioner-General for South East 
Asia, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald. His appointment had been created just before 
the Emergency began, replacing those of Governor-General Malaya, who did 
not govern, and Special Commissioner in South East Asia, an appointment
17 Robinson; Op.Cit., p 31.
18 One observer states: 'In the first few months of 1948 there was a rising
tide of resentment against the apparent disinclination of Sir Edward 
Gent .... to take stern action against the party (M.C.P.) and its 
leaders .... Gent was therefore faced with the kind of dilemma that 
occasionally faces a governor. If he acted too soon without evidence
he would have been branded locally and throughout the world as an 
imperialist ogre. If he waited until he had evidence then he was bound 
to be too late - which was precisely what happened.' Miller, Menace, p77.
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with limited executive powers which was an outgrowth of the wartime Special 
Minister for State Far East. However, in the wake of the new Cominform 
strategy for colonial areas the need for a regional coordinator seemed 
pressing. The two posts were amalgamated into the Commissioner-Generalship 
on 1st May 1 9 4 8 . The Commissioner-General became responsible for 
coordinating administration and policy in the Federation, Singapore, North 
Borneo, Sarawack and Brunei.20 But, by the Federation of Malaya Agreement 
of February 1948, ’the prevention of any grave menace to the peace or 
tranquility of the Federation or any Malay State or Settlement comprised 
therein’ was a clearly proclaimed responsibility of the High Commissioner 
for the Federation of Malaya.21 These factors have an important bearing 
on the sequence of events which follows.
On 10th May 1948, MacDonald received a despatch from the 
Foreign Office which began:
"Reports from a number of sources make it clear that an important 
change in communist policy in South East Asia has taken place in
the past few months....The new policy is for Communist Parties-
in South East Asia to adopt the same general tactics as they have 
been employing since 1946 (sic) in Western Europe of doing everything 
possible to undermine and hamper the reconstruction and economic 
development of the whole area .... I should be grateful if, at posts 
where such action seems appropriate, the attention of the Governments
concerned could be drawn to this development,.... It may well be
practicable to turn the situation created by these developments to 
our advantage since they underline the fact that it is Russian, rather 
than British imperialism which is the prime menace to the stability 
and prosperity of the countries of Asia."22
Gent, Gimson and the other executive heads in the region 
were all consulted by MacDonald concerning these matters, and while the 
text of Gent's reply to MacDonald is not known to the present writer, it 
is clear that they held opposite views about the state of security in Malaya. 
The Foreign Office despatch, after all, related to general Cominform policy; 
Gent’s information from the M.S.S., which he can have had no reason to
19 S.T., 2nd May 1948.
2  ^An expert on the government and politics of the region has stated that: 
’They (the British) were content to set up piecemeal, or ad hoc links, 
through the Commissioner-General for South East Asia.’ Milne R.S. in 
Malaysia, A.Survey, edited by Wang Gung Wu, London, 1964, p 334.
21 Federation of Malaya Agreement 1948, p 12.
22 Foreign Office Despatch, 10th May 1948.
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doubt as yet, would have suggested that in the specific local situation 
that policy would cause few difficulties.
Meanwhile Gimson, increasingly concerned by industrial 
violence in Singapore, sought independently to confirm the British 
Government’s attitude through his own overlord the Colonial Office. In 
response, both Gent and Gimson were sent the following despatch:
"We fully appreciate your need for guidance in regard to measures which 
can be taken against communism..,. The difficulty when it comes to 
proposing direct measures, such as declaring Communist organisations 
illegal or excluding persons, and particularly British subjects, who 
are known to be Communists, from admission, is the widely different 
circumstances or different colonial areas.... One has to set off the 
advantages of stern measures against their disadvantages, and it is 
not always easy to assess where the balance lies.... This does not 
mean that direct measures are necessarily ruled out in advance, still 
less that Governors are not at liberty to recommend measures however 
severe, which they feel to be essential for good government. It does 
mean, however, that the Secretary of State would have to consider such 
recommendations in the light not only of local factors, but also of 
the wider aspects referred to above and that he would wish to be 
consulted before action is authorised."23
Since Gent declared a state of emergency the day after this despatch was
written and almost certainly before he had received it, it is unlikely that
he did consult the Secretary of State. And since he was now under extreme
pressure both within the Legislative Council, and from the Planting and
Mining Associations, to take ’stern measures,' it is unlikely that such a
woolly missive could have altered the surge of events which had by now
gathered its own momentum. Thus while Gent, in the opinion of his most
vehement critics, the planting and mining employers, had derelicted his
duty by not acting more positively,'-4 the above evidence suggests that the
British Government was more preoccupied with general imperial considerations
than with the specific situation in Malaya, and the potential of the M.C.P.
was largely underestimated by the Colonial Office as much as by the M.S.S.
Indeed, when the Secretary of State for the Colonies attended the
23 Letter from Secretary of State for the Colonies to Governor of 
Singapore and High Commissioner for Malaya, dated 15th June 1948 pp 1-2.
24 For example on 11th June the Planting Association of Perak had sent Sir
Edward Gent a telegram saying: ’Managers are appalled at the present
general lawlessness. They are no longer able to maintain orderly routine 
on their estates. They demand that a state of emergency, martial law,
or other appropriate action be instituted immediately. In our opinion 
the present deplorable conditions are entirely due to the weakness of 
civil government by its failure to implement police action and court 
judgements,’ Miller, Menace, p 81.
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inaugural meeting of the 
when the list of murders 
already impressive,25 he 
problem?1 And, when the 
that:
"The bestial campaign 
now that they are making a desperate effort to impose the rule of 
gun and knife, in plantations, mines and factories,"2^
the implication that the M.C.P. was the cause of the violence was queried 
by the British Government in terms amounting to a rebuke.27
Whatever else may be said about this episode in British Colonial 
Government, it was not notable for its purposeful coordination of either 
executive or intelligence matters. The least that can be said in defence of 
Gent, is that he was mislead by his intelligence service. Moreover, if he 
had acted earlier against the M.C.P. - and both his temperament and 
political inclinations were against this - the British Government might well 
not have supported him.
Federal Legislative Council in February 1948, 
directly attributable to communist violence was 
actually inquired ’Is there then a communist 
Commissioner-General, on 5th June 1948, stated
of communist agitators must be struck down,
Police
The inadequacy of the security service was merely one aspect 
of a disability affecting the Police Force as a whole. Battered and 
demoralized by the Japanese occupation, deprived of its European officers, 
it had cooperated with the Japanese to some degree, and was attacked by the 
M.P.A.J.A. as a 'Kempetai tool1. Whatever the justification for this, the 
consequences of the occupation were adverse. To make room for British 
prisoners, the gaols of Singapore had been cleared by releasing hardened
25 The number of murders and abductions in Malaya attributed to communist 
terrorism between 1st October 1945 and 30th June 1948 i.e. before the 
Emergency began was 298 (this excludes the interregnum before Malaya 
was reoccupied by British forces on the defeat of Japan). Of this 
figure, 107, over one-third occurred in the first six months of 1948 
before the outbreak of the insurgency. Thompson, Communist Insurgency, 
pp 26-27.
26 S.T., 6th June 1948.
27 Telegram from Secretary of State for the Colonies to Commissioner- 
General, despatched 8th June 1948, received 14th June. In his reply 
which was despatched on 14th June MacDonald pointed out that his phrase 
’must be struck down1 referred to the suppression of violence, not of 
the Communist Party, which had been the substance of the initial query 
from the British Government.
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criminals. Firearms were easy to obtain and a shocking record of brutal 
crime had demonstrated a general collapse of police efficiency:
"Returning British police officers found that they had to measure 
against the power of imperfectly controlled crime, the dregs of a 
Police Force; badly equipped, shabbily dressed, with no morale, and 
carrying its share of hatred and contempt which the Japanese system 
of secret police working through spies and informers had called down 
upon the whole force. There were few, if any, to take the place of 
the old personnel who had been trained in investigation; all 
standards of honesty were gone; the extortion practised by the police 
was frightful, and the whole force was so rotten with corruption as 
to require a special branch of the Criminal Investigation Department 
to attend to its own delinquency,"28
In this situation, the government's first responsibility 
was to revitalise the police and, where possible, to take other measures to 
cure lawlessness. Instead, it virtually refused to enforce the Banishment 
Ordinance by which criminals and undesirable aliens had been deported before 
the war, even though the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer, and the 
C-in-C Allied Land Forces South East Asia, both represented in the strongest 
possible terms the potential threat to organised government inherent in a 
projected M.C.P. demonstration intended for March, Admiral Mountbatten 
refused to act by preventive arrest of the communist leaders and only 
reluctantly agreed to expel them.
28 Jones, p 169. The composition of the force was predominantly Malay. 
However, the majority of Gazetted Officers were British. Comparative
figures for the years 1947 and 1952 are given below:
1947 1952*
,Gazett- Police Gazett- Police ,
ed Inspec- Lieut- Rank ed Inspec- Lieut- Rank
Offic- tors enants & Offic- tors enants &
ers File ers File
European .130 " T  8 - - 532 697 -
Malay 19 115 - 7,999 54 264 ; - 23,700
Indian & 
Pakistani 3 41 - 1,469 18
I
170 | 1,554
Chinese 2 24 - 402 16 281 j 2,191
Eurasian & 
Others - 4 33 5 Lii.L. 284
-The figures do not include Special Constables and civilian Asian staff.
Annual Report 1953, p 224.
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"His reluctance," according to the British Official War Historian, 
"proceeded not only from his personal conviction of the advantages to 
be gained from a liberal approach, but from the knowledge that it was 
at that time a part of the British Government policy for the future 
of Malaya that the power to banish should not be used."20
Admiral.Mountbatten's motives are unquestioned, but Malayan officials with 
a far greater local experience than he remained convinced that this was 
not the way to confront subversion:
"Almost immediately," states Onraet, "danger signals were to be 
observed; organised crime, organised political agitation, and a 
host of opportunist criminals became progressively bolder and more 
numerous. The police force made little impression on what was no 
longer a crime but a flood whose monthly tides have topped for over 
two years the annual high water marks of pre-war years."30
In 1948 little was known of the techniques of communist revolutionary warfare, 
but at least intuitively and from long acquaintance with similar problems, 
experienced police officers realised that the government’s post-war liberal 
policies would founder unless instituted on a framework of properly restored 
law and order. It was apparent to them that the British Government had 
acted prematurely when it had decided that the former laws governing the 
activities of societies were to remain in abeyance. Great numbers of 
secret societies as well as the M.C.P. were allowed to proliferate. As 
these societies began to regain the^r grip on racketeering, black 
marketting and extortion, general lawlessness increased and the communist 
party revelled in the chaos.
Moreover, in their attempts to deal with these problems there 
were, even among European officers, a number of factors which weakened 
morale. Responsibility for failures, and f^r wrong decisions taken is an 
occupational hazard for which any career professional within a hierarchical 
organisation has to be prepared. Yet even when compared with a parallel 
service such as the army, the qualities of leadership required of Police 
Officers at the more junior levels are in certain respects more exacting.
The distinction has been made by Field Marshal Lord Harding:
"The big difference between the two services is that for the most part 
soldiers operate in groups under the direct personal leadership of 
their officers, whereas policemen work mainly as individuals out of 
sight of their officers, and often out of contact with them for long
20 Dennison; Op.Cit. , p 391. The point here is that although the Government 
did eventually act, it did so with reluctance. And since the M.C.P. 
was at the time engaged in a cynical trial of strength with the 
Government,the latter did not exactly emerge with its authority enhanced.
S,T., 15th April 1947.30
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periods as well. For that reason alone command of police 
forces is the more difficult of the two. It is easier to 
inspire men to do their duty in the face of difficulty and 
danger when you are with them on the spot, than to do so at 
the end of a telephone line in an office miles away."31
The streng-th of a rural police station in the first months of the 
Emergency was generally not more than seven. And, in a number of 
instances it was the police post in the isolated village which, by 
holding out against insurgent attacks, had to ensure that government 
control in up-country Malaya was maintained.
In the higher ranks, an additional factor promoting 
self-consciousness of the hazards of professional life was the fear of 
the 'axe'. Some normal redundancies, together with the emerging process 
of r lalayanisation', gathered momentum as the Emergency went on. But in 
any case the world had entered a new era for the colonial policeman.
As country after country encountered emerging nationalism or communist 
insurgency, the grave and heavy responsibilities bearing upon senior 
police officers compared with most other civil servants became manifest. 
The problem can best be illustrated by the following examples, where 
each of the officers concerned departed abruptly, and in some cases in 
a mysterious silence from his command during or after the events shown 
in each case:








Deputy Inspector General (Designate) 
Colonial Police Forces.
Commassioner, Singapore Police.
Commissioner, Federation of 
Malaya Police.
(cont’d)
31 From an article by Field Marshal Lord Harding in the magazine of the 
Police College, Ryton-on-Dunsmore. Quoted in Police Gazette, p 12.
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Territory Officer's Name Event Post
Cyprus Robins E.O.K.A. Commissioner, Cyprus Police
Terrorism
Cyprus Bibles E.O.K.A. Deputy Commissioner, Cyprus Police.
Terrorism
Cyprus Lock E.O.K.A. Deputy Commissioner, Cyprus Police.
Terrorism
Kenya 0 ’Rourke Mau-Mau Commissioner, Kenya Police.
Terrorism 32
In addition, a distinct cleavage existed among European 
officers between those who had been incarcerated in Japanese prisons and 
those w7ho had escaped. Many of the latter had returned as members of Force 
136 and the B.M.A., and after the Japanese surrender there were clear signs 
of enmity between the two groups. When late in 1948, a large number of 
ex-Palestine policemen arrived, including the new Commissioner, W.N. Gray, 
a further rift developed which a subsequent police investigation failed to 
heal.33 jt was not until W.L.R. Carbonell, an old Malaya hand and a veteran 
of Changi became Commissioner in 1953, that domestic peace was really 
restored in the police force. Whatever justification existed for the claim 
by either group that favouritism in professional matters was sown the other, 
such bickering detracted from performance.34
32 Ibid., p 12. It is revealing to compare the Malayan experience with the 
situation which confronted the Commissioner of Police, Cyprus in August 
1955: TMr. Robins, the Police Commissioner was at his wits end.... Coming 
from Tanganyika a few months before, he had been asked to turn a weak 
peacetime force, used to trailing after pickpockets and erring motorists, 
into a body capable of dealing with armed terrorism. Negligence, mean­
ness, stagnation over the years had sapped the spirit of his men long 
before E.O.K.A. appeared. Every expenditure proposed by his predecessors 
was foredoomed. EvenX-175 for torches had been struck off: the police 
were expected to grope for criminals in the dark. Completely without 
radio, often without a telephone or transport, police stations were being 
raided one after another.... The Emergency had brought many hours of 
overtime without extra pay, and policemen at roadblocks often depended on 
sharing the soldiers food.7 Foley, C.; Island in Revolt, London, 1962
p 36.
33 Interviews with Catling, Madoc and Waller.
34 Ibid.
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Nor was morale enhanced by conditions of service. Before the 
Second World War police officers had been the servants of individual States 
and different conditions of training and service prevailed. An advantage 
of the reorganisation on a country wide basis after the war was that the 
force could now be more flexibly deployed, but in practice standardisation 
of method's necessarily takes time and, even when the Emergency broke out, 
redeploying a man from his traditional haunts to a higher priority area 
elsewhere was difficult.35 Moreover, even in 1965, after the Emergency had 
ended a Gazetted Officer was, on average still working fifty-four hours 
overtime a month without extra pay, and during the Emergency itself the 
situation was far worse.35
By the time the Emergency was declared, although the police 
force was beginning to regain the ascendancy over crime, it was still 2,000 
under strength and lamentably short of arms, radios, vehicles and even 
uniforms. By the time General Templer left Malaya in 1954, the Malayan 
Police, enormously expanded, reorganised, tested and confident, was one of 
the finest organisations of its type in the world. In June 1948 however, 
it was woefully ill-prepared for the task which awaited it.
Armed Forces
When the insurrection began, it was at once obvious that the 
under strength police force was incapable of controlling the situation.
The armed forces were therefore placed in aid of the civil power and 
commenced operations almost immediately.37
Anyone might have been forgiven for failing to forsee the length 
and difficulty of the Emergency in 1948, but in retrospect at least the 
optimism of some public statements does suggest a certain naivete. In a 
broadcast of 6th July 1948, the General Officer Commanding (G.O.C.) Malaya, 
Major General Boucher said, 'I have had experience in fighting red 
terrorists in Greece and India, and I can tell you this is by far the 
easiest problem I have ever tackled.'38 And yet, twelve years later the
35 In a letter to the writer, Mr. W.N. Gray (Commissioner of Police 1948-51) 
stated that when he first arrived in Malaya in August 1948, he found he 
had to obtain the permission of the Sultan before posting a police officer 
from one state to another. He said that he soon put a stop to the 
practice.
35 Police Gazette, pp 21-29.
37 M.C.P., Terrorism, p 4.
38 S.T., 7th July 1948.
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insurgent high command was still intact. Even allowing for the difficulty 
of tracking and destroying insurgents in large areas of primeval jungle, 
the performance of the army fell far short of the G.O.C.'s extravagant 
promises.
The main reason was that the army, like the intelligence 
organisation and the police, was not prepared for counter-insurgency 
operations. Although the army had a long and generally impressive record 
of counter-insurgency (for example in Upper Burma in 1886, in South Africa 
during the Boer War, and mere recently in Greece and Palestine) the 
specialised professionalism required in anti-terrorist operations has seldom 
been an abiding skill in any army. Moreover, Malaya was a unique situation 
and even the best doctrine from other areas was seldom directly applicable. 
Most infantry battalions in Malaya formed part of a strategic reserve and 
internal security was not considered part of their task. There were no 
proper facilities for training until the Far East Land Forces Training 
Centre was established at Kota Tinggi in June 1949,"° and no common tactical 
doctrine emerged until the first ATOM Pamphlet (Anti-Terrorist Operations 
in Malaya) was published in 1952. Indeed, the forces available in 1948 
had little local experience and in any case were undergoing reorganisation.
In addition to the two battalions of the Malay Regiment, the 
bulk of the troops in Malay were provided by the Brigade of Gurkhas who had 
six battalions dotted up and down the mainland and a seventh on Singapore 
Island. In many respects it was fortuitous that so many troops were 
available in Malaya at all. The Gurkha battalions were stationed there 
after the partition of India, apparently because there were no other suitable 
areas to wThich they could be sent. Apart from the lst/6th, the lst/7th and 
the 1st/10th Gurkha Rifles who had all come from Burma in January, the
35 Brooke, Interview.
1+13 The ATOM Pamphlet published under General Templer's supervision, has 
proved to be an enduring document. It set out in concise form the 
accumulated know-how of four years experience against the insurgents 
and included: descriptions of the terrain, climate, wild life and
vegetation of Malaya; the origins and development of the M.C.P.; 
a resume of Own Forces and methods including the Briggs Plan, Navy 
and R.A.F.; characteristics of operations, ambushes, patrolling; 
immediate action drills and jungle navigation. It was reprinted by 
successive Directors of Operations in 1954 and 1958 and has remained 
the basis of British Commonwealth doctrine ever since.
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remaining battalions were in a state of convalescence having been drained 
of men and even of clothing in India. A project to reform the 17th Gurkha 
Division, complete with Gurkha arms and services added complications, for 
the lst/7th Gurkhas were to form the artillery and had already begun to 
train for conversion; they now reverted to infantry. The only British unit 
on the mainland was the 26th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, which was at 
Tampin in Negri Sembilan helping in the conversion of the lst/7th Gurkhas; 
they also took the field as infantry. In Singapore, two British 
battalions, 1st Battalion, The Devon Regiment, and 1st Battalion, The 
Seaforth Highlanders, were also available, and on Penang Island was the 
Second Battalion, King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry. Initially by 
companies, these battalions were deployed to the mainland.41
More troops were made available in July by Singapore District; 
in August, a battalion of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers arrived from 
Hong Kong and in September, 2nd Guards Brigade from the United Kingdom. In 
short, the British Government served notice that it intended to fight for 
Malaya and as the Emergency Regulations were codified and severely applied, 
the campaign became ostensibly ’total’.
But it was not total in practice. Even after reinforcements 
arrived, the British infantry battalions in the Federation were all on Lower 
Establishment which meant that each had the equivalent of three rifle 
companies instead of four.4“1 The shortage of police meant that the army
41 By the end of July 1948 battalions were disposed as follows:
North Sub-District (H.Q. at Taiping)
lst/6th Gurkha Rifles, 2nd Battalion, Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, 
2nd/2nd Gurkha Rifles, 1st Battalion, The Malay Regiment, 2nd Battalion, 
The Malay Regiment.
Central Sub-District (H.Q. at Seremban)
2nd/6th Gurkha Rifles, lst/7th Gurkha Rifles, 2nd/7th Gurkha Rifles,
26th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery.
Johore Sub-District (remained under command H.Q. FARELF in Singapore)
1st Battalion, The Seaforth Highlanders, 1st Battalion, The Devon 
Regiment, lst/10th Gurkha Rifles. M.C.P., Banditry, pp 4-5.
42 In the early years of the Emergency the average battalion had about 
600 officers and men. Thus, on 30th September 1949, 1st Battalion,
The Suffolk Regiment numbered only 32 officers and 566 other ranks: by
31st March 1950 it had 33 and 650 respectively. In January-February 
1951, battalions went on to ’War' or ’Higher Establishment' which gave 
them a further rifle company and put them at just over 800 on the average. 
See also relevant issues of Quarterly Historical Reports 1st Bn.
The Suffolks (SECRET). At the Higher Establishment a full strength 
battalion would consist of 840 officers and men of whom 250 were 
administrative (Brooke, Interview.)
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was also required to protect estates and mines, hence opportunities for 
taking offensive action were few. Moreover, the majority of British troops 
were National Servicemen, and few of the remainder had any experience of 
jungle fighting:
"I looked round at the men I had to lead in this arduous campaign," 
wrote one company commander, "They were so young and so incredibly 
innocent, boys of nineteen most of them.... Most of the older men 
had been with me in Greece.... but there were only a few of these....
The others were very young and I did not know them well for they had
joined the unit at Port Said on the way out,"43
A constant problem was the question of ’turn over’, both of battalions and
of the men within them. The normal tour of a battalion was three years.
Of the eight hundred men, some four hundred were National Servicemen, and
three hundred of the remainder might be Regulars on a three year engagement;
the engagement of the remaining one hundred was usually longer. In a three
year tour of duty all the National Servicemen and Regulars on a three year
engagement would have been replaced at least once. A Commanding Officer
might return home after his tour with about fifty of the men whom he had
taken out three years before, and about two thousand would have passed
through his hands during that time.414 Even the six battalions of Gurkhas
included some 3,500 partially trained recruits x^ ho were used to guard
estates and mines until sub-units of special constabulary could be formed.
The proportion of recruits to seasoned soldiers within the Gurkha
battalions x-;as abnormally high; 'even rifles had hardly been issued xMien
the Emergency began’.45 Like everyone else in Malaya the Gurkhas learnt
the hard x^ ay. While it x^ as in principle a gross misuse of troops to employ
them in static tasks dotted around the countryside in sub-sections, in
practice protection for the hard pressed rubber estate and mine managers
could have been provided in no other x^ ay.
As the British Government committed its reserves from elsex/here, 
it was apparent that they were ill-conditioned for the conflict and many 
units shox-zed signs of being hastily scratched together. As part of 2nd 
Guards Brigade, the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards xvere warned for duty in 
Malaya on Friday 13th August 1948, a day subsequently referred to by all 
affected as 'Black Friday’. The battalion, stationed at Chelsea Barracks,
”5 Campbell, pp 9-11.
414 Henniker, Red Shadow, pp 192-193.
45 Bredin, p 127.
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was well under strength in both officers and other ranks. It had been 
heavily involved in London Duties for more than a year and had to be 
hurriedly built up to strength with men who had not completed even their 
basic training. ’Let it be freely admitted,' states an official account of 
the battalion’s tour, 'that when the 2nd Battalion stepped ashore in Malaya, 
the standard of training of the majority was extremely low. '45 Because of 
the rapid turn-over referred to above, promotion within the battalion had to 
be equally rapid. It took about a year to create and perfect a series of 
standardised manoeuvres and drills for jungle fighting which were 
introduced throughout the battalion. Early in 1950 drafts of recruits from 
the United Kingdom began arriving at steady intervals and in fourteen 
successive courses each of three weeks duration a battalion training staff 
taught them about operations in Malaya; techniques for patrolling, action on 
contact, the laying of ambushes and other common procedures,
"As the Rifle Companies gradually filled up with these carefully 
trained men during 1950, so the operational efficiency of the 
Battalion may fairly be said to have improved, an improvement borne 
out by the ever greater percentage of kills to contacts as compared 
with the previous year."47
However, until the above skills had been mastered, which in the Scots 
Guards' experience had taken fifteen months, a battalion new in country 
amounted to little more than an impressively large number of names on a 
nominal roll.
Lack of intelligence was a constant problem. The intelligence 
organisation was so skeletal and disarticulated that it could not provide 
sufficiently accurate information to base successful operations on.48 
Insurgents were killed by chance encounters and then only after hours and
45 Scots Guards, p 22. By 1952 the procedure had changed and battalions 
warned for service in Malaya were given time to condition themselves 
for their task. The 1st Battalion Somerset Light Infantry was with the 
British Army of the Rhine when it was alerted for Malaya and began to 
train in the German pine forests. Company Commanders were flown out to 
Malaya to attend jungle warfare courses prior to the battalion's arrival. 
The soldiers, guided by their officers, underwent two months training 
at the Far East Training Centre at Kota Tinggi. Two years later (1954) 
the battalion again spent three months retraining to refurbish and 
sharpen its basic skills. Whitehead K.; History of the Somerset Light 
Infantry, London, 1961.
4 7 Scots Guards, p 23.
48 FARELF Intelligence Reviews (SECRET) for the years 1948—49 never spoke of 
individual insurgents and rarely mentioned units; they simply referred 
to 'bandits' and 'bandit gangs'. H.Q. Malaya District was no better 
informed.
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hours of fruitless ’speculative’ patrolling.14 g An attempt to bridge the 
gap until army units could be trained, by using a specialised formation 
known as Ferret Force was not a lasting success. Ferret Force was far too 
small and ephemeral for the task and its leaders, mostly ex-officers of 
Force 136 were almost all Malayan Civil Servants and urgently needed in the 
administration.50
As in the Burma campaign of the Second World War, so in 
Malaya operations suffered because so few could speak and read the local 
languages to any degree, let alone well enough to interrogate or to translate 
captured documents. Nor could the army obtain enough help from the police 
and civilian organisation, who were often equally lacking in detailed 
knowledge of the country and its people. Many ex-members of the Malayan 
Civil Service felt that the insurgents had obtained a firm hold on the rural 
areas only because government officials had neglected their duty, 'The sole 
trouble in Malaya,’ said one, ’is that the administration's officers are 
out of touch with the people.... are not used to dealing with problems on 
the spot, and scarcely know either the country or the people.’51
However, it is clear that Malaya's problems were not singular 
in nature but affected the whole machinery of government. With an 
intelligence bureau looking in the wrong direction, a police force in serious 
disrepair, and an army untrained in counter-insurgency tactics but expected 
to be instantly expert - while it already had a hard enough task raising 
the basic military skill of its large proportion of new recruits - it is 
scarcely surprising that the M.C.P. was allowed time to train and consolidate 
during the vital early stages when it was most vulnerable. But the most 
costly mistakes of all were made in the sub equent planning of the
^  Looking back on Operation SICKLE, in December 1948, the commander of a 
Gurkha battalion wrote: "Contrary to what one might expect, there was no 
information about anything in the area on the day the operation was due 
to start apart from the generally accepted fact that the haystack did 
contain a needle or two; then, to carry the simile a little further, the 
only thing to do was to disturb the hay and hope at least to get our 
fingers pricked." His final summation was: "There is no ’intelligence’ 
worth the name.... Appendix C to Quarterly Historical Report, 1st 
Battalion, 2nd King Edward VII’s Own Gurkha Rifles, December 31st 
1948 (SECRET).
5(1 The employment of Ferret Force is discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter VI.
51 Royce S.C., Sunday Times, 21st June 1948.
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anti-terrorist campaign and here, it was the government on the spot, and 
not the shadowy Colonial Office officials in London who were greatly to 
blame.
Government Planning
Despite these grave weaknesses, the Government, had it 
perceived them clearly, could have remedied them quickly and mounted a 
systematic counter-offensive while the M.C.P. was still struggling to over­
come its own unpreparedness. Had this been done, the insurgency could have 
been torn up before it had firmly established the roots which were to nourish 
it for twelve arduous years. Instead, from June 1948 to April 1950, the 
Government moved from one ad hoc solution to the next, until finally a 
comprehensive plan - the Briggs Plan - was evolved and accepted. Even then 
it took the assassination of a High Commissioner, a revolution in British 
colonial policy, and two years of ruthless and dynamic leadership by 
General Templer, before the main pillars of insurgent strength were broken.
This is not to say that all operational planning undertaken by 
the government in the early period was futile. An enduring contribution to 
the containment of the Emergency and the protection of Britain’s economic 
stake in Malaya was made in the first weeks by the Commissioner-General,
Mr. Malcolm MacDonald. On 18th June he flew to Kuala Lumpur and in 
consultation with Gent, the G.O.C. Malaya, Major General Boucher and the 
Commissioner of Police, Mr. H.B. Langworthy, he insisted that installations 
vital to the ’life, economy and employment of the country', namely the 
estates and mines, had to be protected. It was as well that he did. Until 
he intervened, no common purpose had emerged in Kuala Lumpur. Gent was still 
not convinced that a major threat to the economy existed; Langworthy wanted 
merely to pursue malefactors by the normal means; Boucher prepared to use all 
available troops on jungle operations and to carry on training with the 
remainder. It was MacDonald, using the considerable prestige of his office, 
who also interceded with the C-in-C FARELF, Lieutenant-General Sir Neil 
Ritchie, to secure the reinforcements from Singapore and Hong Kong.52 Had 
this not been done, the insurgents might have come a good deal closer to 
their initial aim of weakening the Government’s resources and making it 
possible to establish secure base areas. In turn, the employment of Special
52 Thompson, Interview.
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Constables, Auxiliary Police and Kampong Guards helped to damp down the 
insurgency and protect the economy. Along the Thai border, a Frontier Force 
composed predominantly of Malays with local knowledge of jungle routes and 
smugglers’ trails patrolled the area to prevent infiltration. To provide 
offensive air support for the troops on the ground, fighter aircraft were 
flown from Singapore to be stationed at Kuala Lumpur.53 At sea, the Royal 
Navy prevented the insurgents from being succoured from outside. National 
Registration in selected areas extended the Government’s surveillance over 
the civilian population. Comprehensive Emergency Regulations were issued 
which were to grow into a bound volume of 150 pages by 1953, and covered 
every foreseeable situation varying from one regulation empowering the Mentri 
Besar of a state to direct that undergrowth abutting a main road which might 
facilitate an ambush, be removed by the owner of the land, to another 
empowering the government to take control of businesses whose profits were 
likely to go to ’bandit’ funds.54
However, for the first two years government policy had a 
curious binomial quality. On the one hand there was a tendency for affairs 
to be conducted on a ’business as usual' basis, with little sense of urgency, 
while on the other, the army in particular took to pursuing insurgents as 
if it was engaged on a larger scale partridge drive.
To take the second case first. Having underrated the enemy 
in his opening statements, General Boucher compounded the error by his concept 
of operations; in fact the general saw his strategy as a simple process of 
’disinfection’:
”1 cannot give you details of my plans, he said in a public statement 
on 6th July 1948, "but I can give you an example of how they work.
53 Terrorism, pp 2-18.
54 Emergency Regulations, E.R. 40 (4)c; and E.R. 41 pp 40 and 41. The 
point should be made however that the Malayan Government did not have a 
large corpus of Regulations already prepared at the outbreak of the
Emergency . To quote Gurney: "In Palestine (where he had been Chief 
Secretary) the Emergency Regulations were continually being added to and 
tightened up, so that at the end it might almost have been said that the 
whole book of regulations could have been expressed in a simple provision 
empowering the High Commissioner to take any action he wished. If all 
these powers had been taken and exercised immediately at the beginning, 
perhaps the outcome might have been different. Similarly, in Malaya, the 
same process has developed and powers for the more drastic and indeed 
ruthless measures were not provided or exercised until six months after 
the outbreak." Despatch from the High Commissioner, Federation of Malaya 
to Secretary of State, 5th May 1949.
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An area in upper Perak was neglected by troops and police for quite a 
time. The communists in that area became very bold. I moved across 
from Kota Bahru a company of the Malay Regiment and gave them their 
task in upper Perak. They went into action that night and the next day, 
and they obtained an extremely good bag. Now they are back in Kota 
Bahru.1,55
He had, in fact, perpetrated two cardinal errors of counter-insurgency 
practice which were to be repeated continually in the first two years. First, 
he was not inflicting permanent damage on the insurgents who quickly made 
good their losses and benefited from the military experience. Second, by 
deploying troops temporarily to a remote area instead of working outwards 
systematically from a firm base he was exposing government supporters in 
both the Kota Bahru area and upper Perak to reprisals from the insurgents 
once government forces withdrew. In similar spirit a number of large 
operations was carried out during this time and all yielded meagre results. 
One difficulty was to achieve surprise while using large numbers of troops.
In Operation RAMILLIES held in the period 12th to 22nd April 1949, three 
battalions were used to ’sweep' an area to the west of the Cameron Highlands 
in Pahang. The official report of one of the battalions stated that:
"Surprise was NOT achieved and it never seemed likely that it would 
be. There is no evidence whatever of any leakage of information but 
the inevitable assembly of a considerable extra number of troops in 
the Cameron Highlands area before the operations must have made the 
bandits fairly alert even though, until the start they would not have 
known the direction of operations. Once the operation started there 
can have been little doubt as to what was happening; it is also clear 
that by using lightly equipped messengers already familiar with the 
routes, news of the movement of our own troops x^ as alx^ays available
to the bandits x-7ell ahead."55 #
Not only did this operation like others, fail to achieve any substantial 
gain, it had as one of its expressed intent ons the unusual object,
’To destroy, or at least disperse or move on any bandits encountered.'57
The latter part of this objective is significant because it 
x^ as one of General Boucher's firm beliefs that the best thing to do to the 
insurgents was to drive them into the jungle. When General Briggs later 
conceived a plan for enticing the insurgents out of the jungle by strangling
55 S -T -, 6th July 1948.
56 Op- RAMILLIES, p 4.
57 Ibid., p 3 .
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their supply lines, a stage was being reached where the Malayan public were 
more confused by operational policy than were the insurgents, and with some 
reason:
"We have, under Major General Sir Charles Boucher," said Che’ Abdul 
Aziz a Malay member of the Legislative Council, "driven the bandits 
deep into the jungle; under another General Sir Harold Briggs we have 
tried with all our might to drive them out again."58
His criticism was justified, but this was not the only area in which 
government policy vacillated.
The importance of a Director of Operations - and the point 
is argued strongly in chapters IV and V - is now an article of the counter­
insurgent’s faith, but it took a long time in Malaya before it was 
established. In May 1949, when the Emergency was almost a year old, the 
High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney, forwarded a despatch to the Colonial 
Office in which he said, 'The Military Forces available to aid the civil 
power should be at the disposal of the Commissioner of Police and operate 
under his general direction.’ He went on to assert that coordination in 
matters of operational policy could best be achieved in an informal 
atmosphere, 'Once a week I hold a conference attended by the G.O.C., the 
A.O.C., the Chief Secretary, and the Commissioner of Police. At this 
conference any question can be brought up without notice, no record is kept, 
but each member notes the action required of him.'58
This ’informal’ approach contrasts sharply with the extremely 
formal and systematic procedure which developed later and it is important 
to consider the implication which this despatch conveyed. The High 
Commissioner clearly failed to realise how burdensome the duties of the 
Commissioner of Police were, and how ill-placed he was to supervise 
operations. The police force was undergoing a sevenfold expansion, and the 
work which this entailed for the Commissioner and his small staff left no 
time to coordinate operational policy effectively for all the Security 
Forces. Consequently, direction of the Emergency became a legatee of all 
the other demands on the Police Commissioner’s time and virtually nothing
58 F «L.C.M.C.P., pB 40, 28 th September 1951.
58 Gurney’s Despatch No. 5, 30th May 1949.
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was achieved.60 Moreover, if the High Commissioner had pressed strongly for 
a Director of Operations, then the whole complexion of the Emergency might 
have changed because by May 1949, the insurgents had retreated into deep 
jungle to reorganise and retrain. A. systematic counter offensive at that 
time would probably have achieved far more than it did later.
A similar degree of unrealism was apparenc at the time in 
other departments of government.
Taking a leaf from the communists' book, a committee entitled 
'The Central Committee to Combat Communism,' met under the chairmanship of 
the Acting Chief Secretary of the Federation on 5th August 1948. It 
included representatives of the Departments of Labour, Chinese Affairs, 
Police, Attorney-general's, Public Relations and the Army. In the light of 
the grave and immediate problems confronting the Federation, the questions 
to which it addressed its attention were curiously untimely. One 
resolution concerned racial discrimination:
"The committee felt that the discrimination shown by many European 
Clubs in the country had a bad effect on inter racial feelings and 
provided a possible cause for political discontent, particularly 
amongst young Asian intellectuals.
It is recommended that an official approach should be made to club 
committees to seek their cooperation in relaxing their club rules 
and in giving active encouragement to the introduction of Asian guests 
as a general practice, or on specific nights."61
This, while men were fighting for their lives. Moreover, the 'business as 
usual' attitude in Malaya was reflected in Britain. It took four months, 
from 4th July 1948, when Sir Edward Gent was killed in an air-crash over 
London, before the new High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney was installed on 
6th October. During this period the Acting Chief Secretary, Sir Alec 
Newboult was forced to acknowledge the acting nature of the government:
60 The result was that the army took the lead in planning at every level.
As late as January 1949, Major General Boucher remarked that the police 
'were taking their proper place in the higher direction and planning of 
operations' and he added his hope that this example might ultimately be 
followed at the lower levels. By implication, whatever deference might 
have been paid to the police as the civil authority nominally in control, 
the army was still guiding operations at all but the highest level. In 
August 1948 Gray had said that the police were not ready to take the lead 
(Minutes of the CinC's Conference September 21st-22nd, 1948, 
CR/FARELF/5565/G(Ops), 28th September 1948 (SECRET) - - and in practice 
they never did. (Brooke/Waller, Interviews).
Carcosa Conference, 5th August 1948.61
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"You must remember that we are all acting," he stated at a press 
conference held in Kuala Lumpur.... "An acting High Commissioner,
.... an acting Chief Secretary, .... an acting Attorney General,
.... an acting Commissioner of Police, .... and a chain reaction 
of acting appointments in the grades below these posts."52
Even within the ambit of the generally efficacious Emergency 
Regulations themselves, there was a tendency to draft regulations without 
considering the realities of the situation. Thus, the regulation which 
provided severe penalties for, ’Any person who consorts with any other 
person whom he knows or has cause to believe to be a person who intends, or 
is about, to act or has acted in a manner prejudicial to public safety or 
the maintenance of public order,’53 while formally judicious, took little 
account of the more than 500,000 ignorant squatters, many of whom provided 
willing or unwilling support to the insurgents, but whose security the 
Government could not guarantee. Sir Robert Thompson, then a member of the 
Malayan Civil Service, has since stated in relation to the Second Indo-China 
War that:
"The dividing line must be drawn at the point at which the government 
is in a position to give the peasant a clear choice between supporting 
the government or supporting the insurgent .... When, however, an area 
is outside government control and the peasant is at the mercy of the 
insurgent, then he has no choice and the government has no right to 
be ruthless. There was a tendency in Vietnam to get this the wrong 
way round."54
A similar criticism can be made of the Government of Malaya at this time.
The Commander of Ferret Force Group 2, Mr. J.P. Hannah, an ex-Force 136 
officer, found in August 1948, that in his area of operations there were 
upwards of 5,000 squatters, who had been subjected to continuous communist 
propaganda for more than six years, but had not seen any government official 
’of any degree,' since 1941:
"One individual believed that the British had only re-occupied the 
’bid’ towns (e.g. Bidor) and had left outlying districts to be run 
by the M.C.P. as a reward for the M.C.P. having defeated Japan in 
1945 and made that agreement with the British before they (the M.C.P.) 
allowed the British to return. This was given by the M.C.P. as the 
reason for the delay between the Cease-Fire of early August 1945, and 
the arrival of the British Forces in Perak about the 10th of September 
1945."5 5
52 S »T ., 6th September 1948.
5 3 Emergency Regulations, p 5.
54 Thompson, Communist Insurgency, pp 146-147
65 Ferret Report, p 2.
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The Government's misapprehension that the insurgents were 
being supported by an ascertainable number of misguided sympathisers who 
could be wTeaned away by threats or exhortations, also led to two dubious 
acts of policy in 1949 and early 1950. On 6th September 1949, the 
Government announced generous surrender terms which amounted in effect to 
an amnesty for all insurgents except those found guilty of murder. During 
the next four months some 116 insurgents surrendered. However, as might 
have been expected in the existing military situation, none of these was a 
hard core member and all could be classified as waverers. Moreover, the 
insurgent propaganda machine skilfully exploited the event through its 
vernacular news sheets as a credible example of government impotence.66 
And, since members of the administration except the police seldon ventured 
near the squatter areas, the squatters believed the insurgents' claims that 
the government, in offering surrender terms, had done so out of weakness 
and fear.
Again, on 26th February 1950, the government launched an 
'Anti-Bandit Month'. Some 350,000 people responded at the outset to appeals 
to help the police and administration to man road blocks, assist in 
screening operations, and generally provide auxiliary services. 
Psychologically, the purpose of the month was to encourage the population to 
'declare' for the Government. On paper the results were mathematically 
impressive. In the Muar district of Johore some thirty-eight local 
associations, taking refuge in anonymity, called on the 'bandits' to stop 
their violence and to surrender.67 And, on 2nd April, when the 'Anti-Bandit 
Month' ended, the government proclaimed with obvious enthusiasm, that nearly 
half a million people had corne forward to assist. But the new insurgent 
offensive which had commenced at the beginning of the year, had obviously 
taken no account of the 'Anti-Bandit Month'. As insurgent incidents rose 
in June 1950 to five times their 1949 level, and the murder of civilians 
(mainly Chinese) rose to over 100 a month, Sir Henry Gurney's statement in
66 For example, the insurgents were able to seize on a statement of Sir 
Henry Gurney's in support of the Government's surrender campaign that, 
'the M.C.P. have achieved no success whatsoever.... all those who are 
with the bandits.... are looking for an opportunity to surrender 
themselves', and turned it to their own advantage as an example of the 
Government's lack of real knowledge of the insurgent. organisation 
M.C.P., Propaganda, p 59. Waller, Interview.
°7 M.C.P., Terrorism, p 86. The Government also secured the support of the 
Malayan Chinese Association which called on Chinese business groups 
throughout the country to support the 'Anti-Bandit Month'. Ibid., 
pp 82-85.
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the Federal Legislative Council that the overwhelming response to the 
'Anti-Bandit Month', 'had revealed the hollowness of the Communist claims', 
was matched only by the hollowness of the Government’s claims to be 
vigorously prosecuting the Emergency.88
In short, what the Government had clearly failed to discern 
until the arrival of General Briggs, was that it was engaged in a 
competition in government. However maladroitly they had done so, the 
insurgents had set up a parallel hierarchy which was competing for the 
adherence of the people. Particularly in rural areas they were more than 
matching the Government’s administration in demonstrable organs of control. 
And, however desultory their operations were, they could continue to do so 
until the government, by properly orchestrating its campaign, could actually 
control the population and provide it with security. As Sir Henry Gurney 
reminded the Colonial Office, ’Terrorism equipped with modern automatic 
weapons and political aspirations is a new development in the British 
Commonwealth’. 88 Certainly, within the lifetime of his own personal 
administration in Malaya, the answer to the problem was still being sought.
68
69
Ibid., p 91. There is strong evidence of a backlash from the 'Anti- 
Bandit Month’. First, becuase the new insurgent offensive had made 
conditions demonstrably worse than they had been before; Second, because 
of the naivety and inaccuracy of government propoganda; and Third, 
because many of the Chinese w7ho had come out in support of the government 
were marked down and killed by M.C.P. assassination squads as a warning 
to others. Waller, Interview.
Gurney’s Despatch No. 5, .^ Oth May 1949, p 2.
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CHAPTER III
THE INSURGENT ORGANISATION - DEVELOPMENT AND DECLINE
Fortunately for the Government, its own disarray was more than 
matched by the problems which confronted the M.C.P.
The insurgency remained racially and politically confined 
because at no time could the M.C.P. enlist any significant Malay or Indian 
support. Despite the renaming of its guerrilla force, the Malayan Races 
Liberation Army (M.R.L.A.) in February 1949,1 95% of the troops were Chinese;, 7
the remainder were mostly Malays. But the Malay regiment allegedly raised 
in Pahang -• the 10th Regiment - was largely a propaganda device', and had
i
vanished by the end of the year.2 After Special Branch became fully 
effective in 1952, the relatively small number of insurgents, and their 
inability to be reinforced from outside, permitted the government to develop 
a closed circuit strategy based on highly detailed dossiers and records.
Nor was there ever more than a trickle of material support from outside, 
either across the Thai border or from the sea. Thus the M.C.P. was entirely 
dependent on the resources it had left from the war years and whatever it 
could capture.
Militarily, the insurgency also remained low-keyed because the 
insurgents never overcame the shortcomings apparent during the war, namely in 
leadership, communications, weapons and logistics. They suffered an immediate 
setback when their military commander Lau Y •/ was killed on 16th July 1948. ^
1 General History, pp 4-6. This occurred on 1st February 1949. The Central 
Committee of the Party also issued its ’’Programme of the Malayan Peoples 
Democratic Republic" which was similar to its appeal in 1939 for an "All 
Malayan Races United Front". The Programme stressed: a. Democratic 
Centralism with a Central Peoples Council being invested with supreme 
authority. b. A national
structure based on the principles of the New Democracy which would be a 
"dictatorship of a coalition of the revolutionary classes of the various 
races". c. Sovereignty of the
Malayan Peoples Democratic Republic was to belong to "all the people of 
Malaya" but with the revolutionary classes holding the dictatorship.
2 The Malays were chiefly members of the proscribed left-wing organisations 
A.P.I. and P.E.T.A. There were some Indians and a number of Japanese 
deserters. Within the M.R.L.A., some 60% of its members had been with the 
M.P.A.J.A., but of those only 30% to 40% had been trained or had seen action 
during the Japanese occupation. Precis, Basic Paper Part IV, p 2.
2M,C.P., Terrorism, p 46.
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But he was little mote than a competent organiser and after him the remaining
leadership was thin. As the Political Bureau itself noted:
"Our handicap lies in the fact that our armed forces were formed 
without a revolutionary cadre of regular army men.... None of our 
troops have received sufficient training before the outbreak of the 
struggle, nor have our commanders been graduated from any regular 
military academies."4
Certainly, there was no Mao or Ho. Eventually, with the experience born of
many reverses, some local leaders developed a strategy for survival, but
theirs was a strictly local dominance. The only man who commanded general
respect, Ch’in Peng, proved that he was neither the theoretician nor the
strategist which the situation demanded. The booklet The Strategic Problems
of the Malayan Revolutionary War published in December 1948, had been
rationalised from Mao’s experiences in a totally different strategic,
geographical and political situation.5 Mao’s base areas included large
highly populated food producing regions in which the Communist Party by
assiduous organisation had gained the adherence of the people. The M.C.P.'s
proposed bases were in deep jungle, inhabited only by small bands of wandering
Sakai. As the Politbureau itself said,
"We can withdraw to the jungle mountain ranges. But the masses do 
not live in these areas and we should not be able to carry out any 
development or political propaganda work.”6
Moreover, by concentrating on jungle bases, the insurgents virtually 
excommunicated themselves from the population, leaving an increasingly 
harrassed Min Yuen to step up its terrorism and intimidation to extort the 
necessary supplies and funds.
Communications remained an abiding problem. Throughout the 
Emergency the insurgents had to rely on jungle couriers. The organisation 
never possessed tactical or strategic radio stations capable of broadcasting 
from one state to another.7 Some letters were sent through the public mail
4 'Supplementary Views of the Central Political Bureau of the M.C.P. on 
Strategic Problems of the Malayan Revolutionary War’, cited in Hanrahan; 
Op.Cit. , pp 119-120.
5 Ibid-, pp 101-116.
5 Supplementary Views of the Central Political Bureau on Strategic Problems 
of the Malayan Revolutionary War, (Text in translation in Malaysian 
Government Archives), p 3.
7 The report by General Boucher (S.T., 6th July 1948) that two communist 
radio stations located in the jungle in north and south Malaya may have 
been 'their long range control' was subsequently found to be false.
Precis, Basic Paper Part VII, p 1. These were merely 'receiver' sets for 
monitoring Radio Peking.
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service and although the jungle courier system became highly developed it 
was cumbersome, slow and, since couriers were subject to ambush, 
unreliable.8
Acquisition of weapons was an even graver problem. The 
insurgents were forced to rely exclusively on small arms. The lack of 
heavy support weapons drastically limited their tactical operations; stand­
off attacks by mortars and rockets were never used. The insurgents had no 
rockets and only two small mortars without ammunition,8 Even for small arms, 
the shortage of ammunition meant that insurgent attacks were seldom pressed 
home. Nor had they the necessary tactical knowledge or popular support to 
construct fortified camps and villages. For similar reasons mines, which 
created minor havoc during the Second Indo-China War, were used to harrass a ;
the Security Forces on less than a dozen occasions in twelve years and 
mining x/as never developed as a technique. Thus, insurgent operations 
except in isolated cases, never progressed beyond ambushes and light 
skirmishing.
Logistics was the responsibility of the Min Yuen but it x^ as 
soon apparent that it could not supply forces larger than a few hundred in 
any one area. This further caused the M.R.L.A. to decentralise its 
operations. Even before resettlement of the squatters in 1950-52, the 
provisioning of even moderately sized forces x^ as unpredictable.
M0ur greatest x^eakness," stated one report, "is that x^ e have not 
sufficient strength to protect co-operative villagers. Therefore, 
our environment becomes more and more difficult, especially from 
the financial and provision supply aspects. We suffer from unreliable 
information, non-cooperation of the people and difficulty of 
movement. 8
In effect the M.R.L.A. x^/as more tied to its administrative tail than were 
the Security Forces with their aerial resupply, and eventually helicopters.
8 So cumbersome, that local leaders were mostly left to themselves to 
interpret broad guidelines rather than orders. The Politbureau simply 
laid dox-7n quotas of terrorist acts for a given period - so many rubber 
trees to be slashed, mines to be sabotaged etc. Madoc, Interview.
8 Precis, Basic Paper Part IV, pp 3-4.
Government Press Release, 12th May 1949.
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The M.C.P.'s Early Strategy
It was soon obvious that the M.C.P. had been pitchforked into 
action by its leaders without essential preparation. In a booklet published 
on 5th July 1948, the Central Committee admitted that it possessed neither 
a central command nor a uniform system of organisation. However, an 
immediate short term policy was laid down, the main features of which were:
(a) the expansion of the army;
(b) the readjustment and expansion of the party organisation; and
(c) the organising and arming of the rural areas in support of the 'armed 
struggle'.11
Long term military strategy was envisaged in three phases. 
Phase 1 was guerrilla warfare and terrorism to disrupt the economy and 
communications, and to kill government, police and K.M.T. officials. Phase 
11 was to be the establishment of communist governments in 'liberated rural 
areas'. Phase 111 would see the joining up of 'liberated areas', the 
capture of towns and general revolt. At the end of July 1948, some three 
hundred insurgents tried to 'liberate' the towns of Gua Musang and Pulai in 
Kelantan. They ambushed a relief column but were driven out after five days 
This marked their first and last serious attempt to capture and hold an 
area.12 By September, the insurgents realised that their haphazard 
mobilisation and narrowly conceived form of guerrilla warfare were getting 
them nowhere.
In either September or early October, the Central Executive 
Committee reviewed the directives of 5th and 25th July.13 A further meeting 
was held in December, as the result of which a strategic plan for the 
reorganisation and re-disposition of the insurgent organisation was prepared 
The insurgent leadership believed the Phase 1 was now completed, and the 
party could advance to Phase 11, the setting up of 'liberated areas'. Three 
were designated: (1) the Pahang - Kelantan border area; (2) the southern
area of Selangor; and (3) the Kedah - Thailand border area.
In each, a base was to be established for ’mobile warfare'. 
Outside these areas the country was to be divided into three zones, each
11 Entitled, 'Urgent and Pressing Tasks Confronting the Party at Present', 
General History, p 7.
12 M.C.P., Terrorism, pp 46-47.
1 3 Precis, Basic Paper, p 5.
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under a Regional Bureau of the Central Committee. Within each zone miniature 
mobile bases were to be set up, closely linked to and supported by the 
People's Movement (Min Yuen).11* Meanwhile, the M.P.A.B.A. was to concentrate 
on its Phase 1 activities (sic), to which were added the extermination of 
spies, intensified training and the acquisition of equipment, particularly 
arms and ammunition, by ambushing convoys and by attacking police and 
military posts. Initially, command of the troops was to be vested in the 
State Committees, but once deployment had been completed control was to be 
centred in independent Military Commands in the three main bases.16
The plan fell far short of its grandiose aims. Only in the 
Betong salient area of the Malaya - Thailand border was a reasonably secure 
base established because the insurgents were on the Thai side, and until 
agreement had been reached with the Thai Government, they could not be 
pursued. A statement by the party in December 1948, attested to the 
difficulty which this strategy involved:
"Generally speaking, our army is at present still wTithout a base.
Although a number of rural districts are now under our Army's control, 
it has not yet succeeded in beating off enemy attacks on such rural 
areas. What our army has been able to do has been 'to retreat when 
the enemy advances and to advance when the enemy withdraws.' We are 
frequently forced to'move off elsewhere' on our own account. This is 
because the rural districts in Malaya are both cut off and surrounded 
by a close network of public roads and railroads, enabling the enemy 
to launch a sudden attack at any time and place, thereby making such 
areas unstable and changeable."16
Thus, at every stage of its 1948 campaign, the M.C.P. had 
failed. It failed to disrupt significantly the economy. Rubber and tin 
production was little affected during the critical months of May and June, 
and the port cf Signapore was only partially and briefly affected by 
strikes.17 Although the program called for a stepping up of violent outbreaks 
in early June, they were badly organised. Instead of being closely 
coordinated and mutually reinforcing, the armed attacks were sporadic. With
1  ^ Ibid, , p 5.
Ibid^, pp 5-7. 
lo Hanrahan; Op♦Cit., p 115
i7 R.ubber production on estates rose from 32,724 long tons dry weight in 
April to 33,294 tons in May and remained steady at 33,246 tons in 
June. Malayan Rubber Statistics Handbook 1948, Table 14. Tin production 
fell marginally from 84,195 piculs in May to 80,008 piculs in June but 
recovered quickly. Annual Report on the Minina Industry for 1948, Table 
Ila, p 13.
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proper organisation it should have been possible to kill 300 scattered 
European planters and mine managers instead of the 3 who were killed on 
16th June. Again, although the M.C.P. had made the interdiction of 
government communications a priority task, it x^ as not until 15th. September 
that a halfhearted attempt was made to blow up the Singapore - Kuala Lumpur 
railway.18 Indeed, for the first two years of the Emergency the production 
and distribution of both rubber and tin actually increased in spite of the 
attacks on their means of production and transportation.18
The attempts to set up 'liberated areas' and then join them 
together, were ill-conceived and quite beyond the insurgent’s capabilities.
For all the talk of Regiments and Brigades, the terminology was 
deliberately imprecise and highly exaggerated. At no stage did an M.R.L.A. 
Regiment approach even a British battalion in terms of fighting strength and 
men actually carrying weapons, and the M.R.L.A.’s complete lack of support 
weapons made the disparity even greater.20
M.C.P. Organisation
The M.C.P. organisation which had to grapple with these problems 
was based upon the orthodox Leninist 'cell’ structure.21 Cells within 
similar industries and trades were co-ordinated by Branches. Above these, 
in ascending order came District and then State (or in Penang and Singapore, 
Town) Committees, and hardly distinct from it. Below the Central Committee 
were the Organisational Bureau, the Propaganda and Education Bureau, the 
Racial Bureau and the Labour and Trade Union Department. Within this
18 hLC.P., Terrorism, p 49,
18 Production of tin, for example rose from 44,815 long tons (1948) to 
54,910 (1949) and again to 57,537 (1950) Annual Report 1950, p 100.
28 For example, at the height of the Emergency in 1950/51 the posted strength 
of a British Infantry Battalian in Malaya was 800 men (approx.). In 
November 1951, two of the strongest and most active regiments of the 
M.R.L.A., 5th Regiment, operating in Central and South Perak and, 3rd 
Regiment, operating in North West Johore, consisted of 470 and 360 
members (approx.). Military Intelligence Section FARELF Report, November 
1951.
21 The first reasoned exposition of a revolutionary movement based on 
clandestine 'cells' is contained in the "Revolutionary Catechism' of 
Bakunin and Nechaev. It was later adapted by Lenin. In 1869, Nechaev's 
'Society of the Axe' was founded on groups (cells) of five, 'each member 
of the group owing implicit obedience to a chief who, in turn, took his 
orders from a central committee’. Carr, E.H.; Michael Bakunin, London, 
1937, p 383.
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hierarchy, discipline was strengthened by procedures. First, the senior 
members or secretaries of the lower committees were members of the next 
higher committee.“2 Second, although in theory State and Town Committees 
were to meet regularly to elect delegates to a Pan-Malayan Representatives 
Conference, which in turn was to elect a Secretary-General and a Central 
Committee, in practice this Conference had not been held since 1930, its 
place being taken by ’Enlarged Meetings of the Central Committee’.23 
The dictatorial system of filling appointments had been followed right down 
to Branch level, indeed, it was only at the level of Cells, which chose their 
own leaders, that genuine elections were held.
However, as the organisation grappled with the problems 
referred to above, further modifications became necessary, and after December 
1948 the following structure finally emerged:
22 At the height of the ’Emergency' 1950/51, there were about 50 M.C.P. 
Districts in Malaya and each had its committee. The next and lowest 
Committee i^ as the Branch, of which there were about four to a 
District. Madoc, Interview.
23 For example, in May 1947 Loi Tek was formally expelled from the Party 
and Cn’in Peng named as his successor as Secretary-General at the Ninth 
Plenum which included members of the Politbureau and some, but not all 
of the State Secretaries. 'Statement of the Incident of Wright' dated 
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As rioted in Figure 1, the Military High Command was merely the name adopted 
by the Politbureau when it issued orders or directives to the insurgent 
forces.'7-14 Early in the Emergency an Armed Forces Department was established 
in every State or Regional Committee, comprising the Party Representative, 
the Commander, and the Vice-Commander. In practice, because of the lack of 
military expertise, members of State and Regional Committees were appointed 
and as many of them were men who had spent their lives in political work,, 
they were reluctant to accept military appointments. Where sufficient 
executive talent was available, the Commander might also be given a Chief of 
Staff and a Chief of the Party Education Committee, responsible, under the 
direction of the Party Representative, for political and educational 
training.25
After the Batu Caves massacre, as so many Political Commissars 
had been killed, the appointment had been abolished: it was now reinstated
and the Party Representative at all levels became the most powerful 
appointment in the insurgent organisation. While the Commander and Vice- 
Commander were primarily responsible for operations, supplies and discipline, 
neither could issue an order or deliver a judgement without his prior 
concurrence. Further to ensure the preponderance of the party, he chaired 
a committee within each command to supervise political and educational 
matters.26
In theory, each Armed Forces Department at State or Regional
level was to control a Regiment or ’brigade’ with lesser units built up as
follows (Fig..3):
FIGURE 3 27
Consisting of Minimum Maximum
Section 7-13 men 7 13
Platoon 2-4 sections 14 52
Company 2-4 platoons 28 208
Battalion 2-4 companies 56 832
Regiment 2-4 battalions 112 3328
2,4 The Military High Command never really recovered from the death of its 
head, Lau Yew (who had led the M.P.A.J.A. Contingent at the Victory march 
in London after World War II), who was killed in a clash with police near 
Kajang on 16th July 1948. At the time Lau Yew was planning an attack on 
Kajang which never took place. Waller, Interview.
25 Precis, Basic Paper, Part IV, pp 1-2.
26 Ibid., p 2.
2 7 Based on M.C,P., Notes.
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Except for the Section, the above figures do not include a command element, 
but even within the widely divergent figures permitted, and accepting lavish 
increments for command and auxiliary elements, individual strengths 
attained by M.R.L.A. organisations seldom corresponded remotely with those 
intended. Battalions were never formed and the strengths of regiments 
varied widely (Fig. 4):
FIGURE 4 28
Central Committee









7th Regiment N.E. and 
South Trengganu 
(160)
8th Regiment Kedah Perlis, 
Penang, Province Wellesley, 
West Perak. (405)
3rd Regiment North 
West Johore (360+)
10th Regiment Central 
Pahang (130)
4th Regiment Johore 
(350)
5th Regiment Central 
and South Perak 
(430-470)
11th Regiment North Pahang 
(Generally ineffective but 
size not known)
12th Regiment North Perak 
and Kelantan 
(480+)
6th Regiment South 
Pahang (320+)
Border Committee Malacca 
and North West Johore (180)
In similar fashion sub-units within a regiment varied from weak companies 
to relatively strong independent platoons. This was the case in both the 
3rd Regiment (North West Johore), and the 5th Regiment (Central and South 
Perak), Figures 5 and 6: FIGURE 5 28
3rd Regiment _M._R.L .A.
____________ ' _ ( 360+) _______________________________
H.Q. 3rd Regiment — H.Q. 4th Company
(100) 5th Independent
I 1----------- 1 Platoon (60)
8th Independent 10th Platoon 12th Platoon
Platoon (100) (H.Q. (60) (40)
3rd Regt, and 8th 
Independent Platoon 
operated as one unit)
2~ FARELF; Military Intelligence Section, November 1957 













39th Platoon 36th 37th
(30) Platoon (40) Platoon (40)
Section Section Section Section
r 1
(20) (20) (20) (20)
16th or 18th 17th Platoon
Platoon (60) (50)
H.Q. Platoon__ 6th Platoon
(27) i (50)
8tli Indian 't 27th Platoon 
Platoon (60) (50)
In the examples quoted above, the H.Q. of the 3rd Regiment forsook its 
real effectiveness as a command group by electing to live and operate in an 
offensive role with one of its platoons. Similarly, the H.Q. of its 4th 
Company set orthodox hierarchical beliefs on their head by building itself 
up to a strength greater than that of either of its sub-units. In the 5th 
Regiment, the 16th and 17th Platoons fought as independent entities with only 
a tenuous link to the regimental headquarters in another part of the state. 
However, the M.R.L.A. seldom accepted these organisational deviations from 
choice. Unit strengths were; determined by influences outside the Central
I
Committee’s control. Each group developed in almost exact relation to the 
strength of its popular base and following among the local community, and 
the effectiveness with which individual leaders attained this by pre-existing 
family and local ties, by terror, or by both.
This organisational and command weakness, combined with the 
unreliability of communication by courier, the unexpected strength of 
British resistance, and the difficulty of building up food stocks in advance, 
largely explain the M.C.P.’s chronic inability to co-ordinate attacks in 
strength.30 Even companies and independent platoons seldon combined for 
attacks or operated outside their own areas. This process of
30 In practice, multi regimental attacks did not occur during the 
Emergency and an attack by a single regiment was a rarity.
Madoc, Interview
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decentralisation led to District Committees and District Organisations 
assuming an increasingly important role in the insurgent structure; even 
in some cases to the creation of new insurgent districts. It also led 
inevitably to tx^ o further developments. First, the ties between the 
District Organisation and the Masses Organisation (Min Yuen) in certain 
areas became so strong that the insurgents seemed impervious to disruption. 
Only when the Special Branch, Police and Army developed a combined 
technique based on food denial (described in Chapter VI), did the 
insurgency in such areas collapse. In a number of districts, particularly 
in Johore and Perak, this did not occur until 1958. The M.C.P.’s District 
Organisations were analogous to the compartments of a battleship’s hull; 
it was possible for the insurgents to lose a number of them without causing 
the collapse of the State Organisation. However, the very robustness of 
such an operation, built up on a series of semi-independent entities, 
became a positive drawback when it wanted to take the offensive. Similarly, 
the reaction time of the insurgents was normally far below that of the 
Security Forces. Secondly, the M.C.P. was increasingly backing away from 
its Maoist strategy. It could not go forward to the next stage of the 
protracted war and when it tried to do so in 1951, it could not go back.
As one writer has put it, the party had become ’the prisoner of 
terrorism'.31 The circumstances which permitted it to develop resilient 
district organisations also confined its activities to that level and, 
without strong external support, or a collapse of the Government’s will, it 
was only a question of time before insurgent morale cracked.
The Min Yuen
As stated earlier, the strength of the insurgent organisation 
in any area depended directly on the strength and enterprise of the local 
Min Yuen.
The Min Yuen was originally intended to be an open front 
organisation to replace the M.C.P. controlled F.T.U.s and National
31 Pye; Op,Cit., p 104.
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Democratic Youth League.32 However, once Emergency Regulations were 
introduced, TopenT M.C.P. organisations were out of the question. The 
M.C.P. was also concerned that the expected ’mass up rising’ of the rural 
population - particularly the squatters - did not take place. During the 
Japanese occupation, the M.P.A.J.A. had received spontaneous support from a 
wide diversity of groups, gradually unified into the Malayan Peoples 
Anti-Japanese Union (M.P.A,J.U.); but post-war efforts to retain links with 
the local masses in an organisation similar to the M.P.A.J.A. Old Comrades' 
Association virtually collapsed when Soong Kwong, the ’open1 representative 
of the M.P.A.J.U. was found guilty of extortion by a B.M.A. court and 
imprisoned.33 In certain squatter areas, the links which the M.P.A.J.U. 
had woven were maintained by continuing propaganda, but again such contacts 
were localised. These disparate groups were eventually incorporated into 
M.C.P. Districts. The net result was a number of agencies, known by a 
variety of names. Area Committee, Peasant’s Union, Liberation League, 
Women’s Union and Self Protection Corps - but similar in their general 
functions, including the collection of funds, supplies and intelligence, 
the dissemination of propaganda, and the provision of a reservoir of 
recruits for the party and the M.R.L.A.; all of which came to be known as 
'Min Yuen activity.'3^
As government counter action developed, fewer and fewer 
inhabited areas remained sufficiently remote from the Security Forces to
allow the easy establishment, of Min Yuen organisations, in particular theI
Branches and Cells. However, their logistic functions had to be carried 
out or the M.R.L.A. could not continue. By force of circumstance, this 
responsibility fell on existing Branch and Cell members, who carried out 
Min Yuen duties in the name of an Area Committee, Peasant's Union or
32 It was intended that the leadership of the Min Yuen should be in the 
hands of a nucleus of Party members occupying most of the executive 
positions and through whom the M.C.P. would control the movement.
The actual work was to be carried out by civilian workers recruited 
for the purpose. Precis, Basic Paper, Part V, p 1.
33 C.C. Too, Notes and Interviews.
3tf Precis, Basic Paper, Part V, p 1. The term ’Min Yuen activity’ was 
used initially by the M.C.P.
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Women’s Union, which often did not exist.35
Supplies and money collected by the Masses Executives (M.E.’s) 
were usually brought to a collecting point on the fringe of the jungle.
In addition to weapons, ammunition and food, there was a continual demand 
for such items as medicines, torch batteries, kerosene, stationery, watches 
and clothing.35 The nature and extent of ’contributions’ in money varied 
from district to district. In the Segamat M.C.P. district of Johore, with 
72 insurgents and a Chinese population of 40,552, quarterly subscriptions 
amounted to M$61,000 (at the time about £ 7,117 stg.). Another Branch of 
10 collected between M$2,000 and M$2,500 a month, mainly be demanding $1 a 
month from each Chinese rubber tapper for being allowed to tap, by a levy 
of 50 cents per acre from Chinese small holders, and by similar extortions 
from small Chinese businessmen,3  ^ In the case of rubber, Chinese estate 
owners were forced frequently to hand over a fixed proportion of their 
output to the insurgents.
At district level all funds collected were handed to the 
District Committee which passed the sum laid down by the State Committee to 
any M.C.P. armed forces operating in the area. According to a resolution 
of the Perak State Committee dated September 1948, District Committees might 
not retain a balance of more than $3,000, nor incur any expenditure over
35 As the difficulties of extorting support increased, the nomenclature 
of these various groups was standardised and from June 1949 onwards 
they were known as Self Protection Corps. When resettlement and food 
denial began to get thoroughly into its stride (from 1952 onv/ards) the 
Self Protection Corps was charged by the Party with the protection of 
the trusted Masses Executives (M.E.’s), who were card carrying members 
of the M.C.P. and actually collected the supplies from the villagers.
In practice the members of the Self Protection Corps went to great lengths 
to protect the M.E.’s and conceal their identity. Thus the Self 
Protection Corps were a parallel organisation to the Government's Home 
Guard. They lived clandestinely among the villagers. In Yong Peng 
(Johore) for example they consisted mainly of young men and girls 
between 18 and 20 years old. Until 1953, they continued to report for 
military training once a week in a nearby patch of jungle. Thereafter, 
they were increasingly used to smuggle rice out of the village gates. 
Madoc, Interview and C.C. Too Notes.
35 M.E.’s collected supplies either as contributions in kind, or as money; 
they then purchased the necessary goods from a ’contractor’, usually 
a local Chinese shopkeeper. Madoc, Interview.
37 Review 1948-57, p 6.
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$300 without the prior consent of the State Committee.38
Before June 1949, each District Committee had its own armed 
unit known usually as a Special Service or Killer Squad. On the declaration 
of the Emergency, the M.C.P. decided to expand its military forces, using 
these units as a framework. When they were finally unified as the M.R.L.A. 
they came under the control of the State Committees. Military support for 
District Committees was to be supplied by a detachment from the nearest 
M.R.L.A. formation. This compromise worked satisfactorily until December 
1948 when the Politbureau decided to concentrate M.R.L.A. units into base 
areas. Thereafter, many District Committees found it difficult to obtain 
military support for civil activities. In June 1949 therefore, the M.C.P. 
placed armed units under their control to back up their collection work.
The decision was implemented by different states according to local needs 
and the units themselves were variously named. In Negri Sembilan, they 
were called District Units and captured documents describe them as 
comprising all Party and Min Yuen executives from District Committee level 
downwards. These executives were armed, given para-military training, and 
divided into sections with the District Committees themselves forming 
District Unit Commands to carry out either Min Yuen or terrorist activity. 
Where there were not enough executives to form an armed unit, small 
detachments from the nearest formation were given to the District Committee. 
They ceased to belong to the M.R.L.A. and were used as Armed Work Forces 
(A.W.F.'s) in support of Min Yuen activity.38 Their composition was in all 
cases similar. They were organised into sections of ten men and women, 
under a section commander and a vice-commander. Sections lived as separate 
units in camps usually just inside the jungle fringe where they were in 
touch by jungle letter-box with the District Committee. Unlike the Self 
Protection Corps, they were liable to be transferred from area to area 
although in practice this was seldom done. They were at times ordered by
38 Precis, Basic Paper Part VIII, p 2. A Central Committee directive dated 
December 1948 Laid down a scale of allowances for M.C.P. executives:
Min Yuen Executives, messing allowance M$25 a month, sundry expenses M$10 
a month;
Couriers, messing allowance M$25 a mouth, sundry expenses M$12 a month; 
Women Executives, same as for Min Yuen, but an additional pre-natal 
allowance of M$150 on confinement.
Family allowance was paid to executives whose families were in 
necessitous circumstances. In theory officers were paid the same as 
rank and file but were provided with such items as watches and fountain 
pens.
38 In 1951, it was estimated that the number of insurgents in A.W.F.’s was 
between 1,000 and 1,500. M.C.P. Notes, p 18.
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the District Committee to concentrate for particular operations which were 
then carried out under the District Committee, or with an M.R.L.A. unit.
Of these sub-units, the Self Protection Corps came nearest to the M.C.P.'s 
original idea of Min Yuen organisation. Certainly, until 1952 its 
responsibility was confined to the area in which its members lived, and it 
was not subject to transfer elsewhere. Its members lived at home, acting as 
insurgents as required. Later, when the Briggs Plan began to bite, the 
importance of these corps in providing protection for the collectors of 
supplies and money was increased.
In general the M.C.P. intended that the M.R.L.A. should attack 
the Security Forces and other major targets, the District Units and Armed 
Work Forces confining themselves to the elimination of traitors and to 
minor s a b o t a g e . I n  time, the M.C.P. found that it could not afford this 
distinction and the District Units and Armed Work Forces had to carry out 
similar tasks to those of the M.R.L.A.
As the Emergency progressed, the District Committee became the 
focus of both logistic and military activities. After 1952, the regiment 
and company headquarters ceased to exist, their functions being transferred 
to State and District Committees; the M.R.L.A. was reorganised into 
Independent Platoons. Since each District had several Branches to sustain 
it, it could survive to loss of all but one, then rebuild the rest. Until 
the government could destroy all its branches simultaneously, the 
District Committee could usually carry on, albeit in emasculated form.
40 "Traitor-killing" was not carried out by the M.E.’s for two reasons: 
First, it was absolutely vital to the support of the jungle 
organisation that the M.E.’s identity remained concealed; M.E.’s did 
not even know each other by sight, only by code names. As the 
Emergency Regulations were tightened the M.E.’s were responsible to 
collect every pound of rice, pair of boots, torch battery or bottle of 
drugs which went into the jungle, and if caught the penalty was death 
(E.R. 4c); Second, so tight did insurgent security become that each 
Branch Committee Member dealt with only one or two M.E.’s, and each 
M.E. dealt with only one or two members of the Self Protection Corps who 
in turn dealt only with a small cell. Many M.E.’s were not aware of 
their title in the M.C.P. hierarchy. For these reasons selective murders 
were usually carried out by an A.W.F. or independent platoon alerted for 
the purpose. The M.C.P. generally kept faith with their M.E.’s and 
called them into the jungle if they were likely to be blown, or 
alternatively looked after their families when they were captured.
Waller/Madoc, Interviews.
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The Quest For A Guerrilla Strategy
As stated earlier, the M.C.P.'s attempt to set up ’liberated 
areas’ during the second half of 1948 was unsuccessful. Its further attempt 
to establish bases succeeded only in the Betong salient. The second 
concentration planned for the Kelantan-Pahang border soon proved impractical 
because of logistic difficulties and pressure from the Security Forces; 
during May and June 1949 it was completely dispersed. The third, planned 
for South Selangor, was never attempted; instead one was established with 
difficulty in the border region of South Pahang and Northern Negri 
Sembilan. 1
Almost immediately however, the party confused its own forces 
with further changes. During January and February 1949 it issued its 
’February Manifesto’ which, as well as renaming its force the M.R.L.A., 
decreed that it would be organised as independent regiments as described 
previously (Fig. 4), and while these trained for future tasks, the Special 
Service Squads, which were to be absorbed into the regiments, would keep 
the Security Forces occupied.42
Not surprisingly the confusion, exacerbated by the slowness 
of communications, together with the very real problems which the 
reorganisation engendered, forced the M.C.P. into relative quiescence 
during most of 1949.43 The June Resolutions of 1949 therefore exhorted units 
to be more aggresive:
,fl Precis, Basic Paper Part II, p 6. The real intention behind this plan 
was that two-thirds of the insurgents would move to the three base areas 
leaving one-third to distract the attention of the Security Forces during 
the retraining phase. The whole plan was confused, and due to the difficulty 
of communications, was only partially implemented. The M.P.A.B.A. 
comprised about 3,000. M.C.P., Notes p 14.
If?- This was an almost exact reversion to the Group areas in which the M.P.A.J.A. 
had operated during the Second World War (Map. 3) and acknowledged the 
fact that the armed forces were dependent on their traditional suppliers 
among the local population. This period was to see the emergence of the 
A.W.F.’s who were given the task of retaining links with the masses and 
harassing the Security Forces. Precis, Basic Paper Part V, p 2.
43 At the same time the Central Committee admitted that the declaration of 
a state of emergency had caught them unawares: ’it was absolutely
impossible to make all the necessary arrangements secretly in advance, 
before suddenly exploding into the open to set up the foundations of 
success.... Hence comrades should not grumble on this point'.
C.C. Too, Notes, p 18.
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"When in difficulties, take over the initiative and launch attacks 
against the enemy to raise the morale of the comrades and elevate 
the prestige of the party among the masses.... the party must lead 
the masses actively and push them on to the struggle, a conservative
or cowardly policy would lead to isolation of the Party from the 
n44masses.
Exhortation was of little avail however, until reorganisation and retraining
were completed. By November, after almost twenty months of revolt, the
Politbureau issued its Supplementary Opinions of the Central Politbureau
On Strategic Problems In The Malayan Revolutionary War.45 The document
stated that the previous analysis, in the Directives of December 1948, was
correct and properly based on Mao’s concepts, but needed elaboration. A
year’s fighting had demonstrated that the compactness of Malaya, together
with its highly developed communications, was a marked asset to the
government. As this had prevented the establishment of rural bases, more
organisational work among the masses was necessary, requiring ’a strong
force of relentless and daring Min Yuen cadres'. The jungle fringes were
the best location for the Army to maintain contact with the populated
regions. By keeping to the edge of the jungle however:
"Heavy concentration of our forces will put us in a disadvantageous 
position for withdrawal in the face of a large scale enemy assault. 
Because of this we must utilise the tactics of 'Relative Dispersion', 
to be adopted by all units in our army. The aim of these tactics 
is to enable our Army to concentrate and to disperse swiftly and 
smoothly."46
Again, since Malaya was agriculturally backward, the Government forces must 
be expelled from the small towns and villages so that the Army could feed 
itself. The party also admitted that it had so far failed to solve the 
racial problem:
"The British have already created a totalitarian, complete, penetrating 
system of administration, from the Federal Government down to small 
towns and Malay kampongs. Malay feudal chieftains, from State Sultans 
down to Ketuas of Kampongs, are to all intents and purposes, lackeys 
paid and employed by the British imperialists. Hence in Malaya we 
have nothing like feudal provincialism to exploit."47
However, many of the advantages which it had claimed in December 1948
persisted: it had the support of the squatters; the international situation
44 Ibid. , p 18.
45 Text in Hanrahan; Op.Cit., pp 117-130.
45 Ibid., p 118.
47 Ibid., p 119.
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was encouraging; Communist victory in China., and substantial achievements 
all over South East Asia. The struggle would indeed be long and bitter but 
the M.C.P. still had its powerful friends, from the U.S.S.R. and China to 
'the democratic elements in the imperialist countries', and its successes 
had been commended by numerous international proletarian organisations.
The party therefore decided upon the following tactics: 
the June resolutions, which had already stressed the need to seize the 
initiative, would be carried out; temporary bases would be set up among the 
Min Yuen territories, from which spearheads would radiate into enemy areas 
to intermesh with other territories. ('This sort of tactic could lead to 
extremely fluid situations and a difficult period for the M.R.L.A., but it 
could be done.') Then the enemy would be driven from small towns and estates 
by tightening the encirclement, and further expanding the Min Yuen 
territories and the armed units. Eventually, 'Main Force Guerrilla 
Regiments' (or Brigades) could be formed and mobile warfare undertaken.48
Despite the rich accumulation of experience which the party 
had confidently quoted, the plan contained nothing new. Nevertheless, the 
initial onslaught, coinciding with the Government's 'Anti-Bandit Month', 
did alarm the Government as never before. Sporadic terrorism rose abruptly 
in early 1950 and continued to rise until June 1951. Moreover, insurgent 
strength increased commensurately.48 In 1950, the number of incidents 
(4,739), was almost twice the figure for the combined years 1948 and 1949 
(2,716); in 1951 the number (6,082) was greater again.58
48 Strategically, this was a reversion to Stage One of Mao's classic theory 
of Protracted War (Selected Works, Vol. 11, pp 136-145). Initially, 
the insurgents were to engage in straight!orward fighting at platoon and 
section strength, with the aim of damaging the economy, inflicting heavy 
casualties on the security forces, and capturing large stocks of weapons 
and ammunition. Stage Two was to begin when the M.R.L.A. was strong 
enough to overrun small Security Force outposts; this would be done in 
company strength. Stage Three wTould begin when the areas dominated in 
Phase Two were 'liberated' and joined up into a solid block of insurgent 
held territory; pitched battles with the Security Forces would finally 
decide the outcome.
48 In January 1949 insurgent strength was estimated to be 5,000, in




Yet despite these increases and noticeable improvements in 
technique, there was no real increase in the scale of the attacks; nor did 
the insurgents display any greater ability to concentrate their forces in 
combined operations. At no time could they deploy more than 300 troops in 
a single operation, and in the whole of the Emergency they employed more 
than 200 on no more than a dozen occasions, one-third of them in 1948.
The average number of insurgents taking part in operations during the first
four years of the Emergency was approximately 50. An analysis of some 200
insurgent operations during this period disclosed the following:
FIGURE 752Types — — - ---- No. Per Cent
1. Raids
(a) Against rubber and tin estates 50 25
(b) Against police stations 12 6
2. Road ambushes 32 16
3. Murder 31 15.5
4. Robbery 22 11
5. Sabotage 22 11
6. Grenades thrown 11 5.5
Skirmishes with Security Forces 20 10
Total 200
The revised strategic plan was clearly intended to progress to 
bigger and better operations. As the party admitted at the time, ’At 
present every one of our units is acting separately and independently,^ 
but the effort to find the solution to the problem in ’relative dispersion' 
by which forces would mass for an operation and then disperse before the 
Security Forces could retaliate was not successful. There were also other 
problems. Open dissent had already been vo ced. And now, as the 
Government’s programs, including the resettlement of squatters gathered 
momentum, the party's best means of supply and support could well be cut off.
51 Moreover, since these estimates were based on the reports of troops and 
police who were actually involved, they may be inflated. Knowing the 
poor state of insurgent communications and logistic support, it is almost 
certain that actions were only carried out by elements e.g. single 
companies or independent platoons at the most. Henniker, Interview.
52 Hanrahan; Op . Ci t. , pp 68-69
52 Supplementary Views, p 128.
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Moreover, the Min Yuen was now having to use more terror and
intimidation than before to obtain cooperation which was tending to alienate 
popular support. Members of the Min Yuen also complained that M.R.L.A. 
actions frequently drew the attention of the Security Forces to their areas 
thus making Min Yuen activities impossible: the local M.R.L.A, leaders in
turn accused the Min Yuen of being tardy and cowardly and of consuming most 
of the food and pocketing most of the subscriptions.51'
A further change in strategy was therefore needed. Indeed, 
the failures of 1948-49, had caused a potentially dangerous degree of 
internal dissension.
Internal Friction Within M.C.P, Ranks
Beginning in 1949, the autocratic conduct of the Central 
Committee became a target for criticism by the rank and file of the party.55 
The latter demanded a meeting of leaders from the States and Settlements 
to prepare for a Pan-Malayan Congress which would elect a new Central 
Committee in accordance with the rules.
The members of the Central Committee were sufficiently alarmed 
to deputise several members to investigate the matter. The results of the 
investigation, and the Central Committee's comments, were issued in booklet 
form on 10th January 1950 under the title General Summary of the Central 
Politbureau in Reviewing the South Johore Incident of General Despondency
and Attack upon Leadership.* 05 As a result, two senior members of the party, 
Lam Swee of the South Johore Regional Committee, and Lum Tatt a member of
the Central Committee but in charge of the r'outh Malayan Bureau, were
criticised and stripped of their ranks. Lam Swee was also accused of having 
been an 'internal spy' before the start of the Emergency, when he had been
secretary of the P.M.F.T.U. Lum Tatt was purged because of his failure to
5‘f Madoc and C.C. Too, Interviews.
55 The latter claimed that there was no 'democracy' in the Party, the Central 
Committee had not been elected into office, neither had there been any 
election for as long as they could remember. The 'rank and file' were 
disturbed that they were required to render 'absolute obedience' to a 
Central Committee whose members they did not know. Moreover, they held 
that while the Central Committee had purged Lol Tek, its members had not 
purged similar bourgeois influences among themselves. How therefore, 
could such a bourgeois Central Committee lead a proletarian party?
C.C. Too, Notes.
56 Ibid., p 26.
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maintain discipline.57
A more serious challenge to the leadership and to the 
ideological basis of Central Committee strategy was posed by Siew Lau, a 
senior party official in the Johore-Malacca border area. He too criticized 
the way that members of the Central Committee had 'elected themselves’.
As a leading theoretician he was especially critical of certain parts of 
the Program of the People’s Democratic Republic.58 He contended that the 
party did not fully understand Mao’s ’new democracy’, which postulated 
equal distribution of land in the first instance to attract the support of 
the masses against the capitalists-feudalists. He stated that the Program 
stipulated that the large industries, which in Malaya meant rubber estates, 
would be nationalised as soon as the M.C.P. captured political power.
How therefore, could the masses be induced to support the revolution which 
expropriated the rubber estates without giving them a share? Moreover, 
terrorism caused so much trouble to the masses as to alienate them. Such 
practices as robbing them of identity cards, burning buses, slashing rubber 
trees and indiscriminately shooting at trains should be stopped. Setbacks 
in Johore were attributable to wrong party leadership and lack of popular 
support. In short, the Central Committee was driving the party to its 
doom.59
Siew Lau incorporated the above criticisms in a booklet 
entitled Keynote of the Malayan Revolution which he distributed among 
members in his area. Then in November 1949, without permission, he called 
a meeting of local insurgents where he emphasised that the armed struggle 
could not long be maintained, and that he was husbanding his strength 
waiting for an opportunity to set up a riva1 party. He advocated 'a policy 
line of retreat by dissolving the armed struggle, fading away the armed units, 
and hiding their arms to wait for a more propitious time’, and urged the 
insurgents to get identity cards.
Siew Lau was called upon by the Central Committee to recant 
but refused to do so. In December 1950, he was deprived of his rank and 
membership of the party, and kept under surveillance. He wrote a final
57 Madoc, Interview
58 C.C. Too, Notes pp 16-17.
59 Ibid. , PP 28-30.
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booklet, A Thesis on the Equal Distribution of Rubber Estates in the 
Malayan Land Revolution, to prove in detail how well the agrarian economics 
of Mao’s 'New Democracy’ would apply in the 'Malayan Revolution’, and how 
fundamentally current policy differed from it. He was finally liquidated 
in May 1951.60
A third heretic of consequence was Lau Siew of the Kedah- 
Penang Joint State Committee, who was indicted by the Central Committee in 
May 1951 on three charges: First, that like Lam Swee and Siew Lau he
doubted the leadership of the Central Committee and the legality of Ch ’ in 
Peng's election to the Secretary-Generalship. Second, that before he had 
the authority to do so, he announced details of the Loi Tek incident in two 
District Committee meetings in early 1948 while the Central Committee was 
still trying to keep the matter secret. And finally, that he refused to 
undergo ’retrospection'. He was dismissed from the State Committee, deprived 
of his personal carbine, and reduced to assistant stencil-cutter in his 
State Committee's jungle printing press. Eventually, he surrendered to the 
government.s1
Despite the heated dielectic which these incidents aroused, 
they are unlikely seriously to have affected the morale of the 
organisation or its efficiency; certainly not with any immediacy. 
Communications were so poor that even official instructions took a long 
time to reach the rank and file. Siew Lau's controversy was in any case 
highly esoteric. Moreover, the controversies themselves were prolonged:
Siew Lau’s for more than a year; while Lau Siew procrastined for more than 
two and a half years before he surrendered. Nevertheless, the Central 
Committee was concerned at the number of surrenders (398 in 1949-50 as 
against 56 in 1948) and in the table cited below (Fig. 8), 'Dislike of 
Policy’ was the most prominent reason given by S.E.P.'s in the years 1949-52:
°° Ibid., p 30. There is something noble but also medieval in the way 
Siew Lau was called upon to recant, refused to do so, and was finally 
executed. The M.C.P, denounced him in counter-charges as a deviationist 
who had, among other things, made the fatal error of categorising 
’rubber-workers' as ’agricultural’, and thereby deducing that they should 
have equal shares in the rubber estates. The M.C.P. held that rubber and 
tin must be regarded as industries which would be nationalised.
C.C, Too, Interview.
6 1 Ibid., pp 31-34,
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FIGURE 8
Reasons For Surrendering As Cited By S.E.P.'s
Date Dislike Internal Hope­ Impulse Hunger
of Policy Friction lessness (%) (%)
(%) (%) (%)
1949-51 58.3 20.9 20.9 15.8 0.0
1952 51.2 14.7 12.2 41.4 26.8
Jan-June
1953 38.8 20.8 29.6 34.0 25.0
Jul-Dec
1953 19.7 35.0 21.7 21.1 24.9
Jan-Mar 
1954 18.7 16.2 25.4 41.4 26.6
Apr-Jun
1954 13.8 17.3 31.1 68.0 35.6
Jul-Sep
1954 8.3 19.5 33.3 50.4 16.7
Oct-Dec
1954 5.1 7.7 25.7 64.0 36.0
Jan-Feb 
1955 0.0 14.3 35.6 85.5 28.5
Eventually, many of Siew Lau's ideas were to be incorporated in the 
Directives of October 1951, but by then Cominform strategy in South East 
Asia had been amended and the Central Committee could be seen to be loyally 
reacting. Almost by accident, the Government was able to profit from the 
M.C.P.’s embarrassment. When Lam Swee surrendered on 27th June 1950, and 
published his ideas in the pamphlet My Accusation, the party published a 
counterblast to try and discredit him. Sub equent evidence from S.E.P.s and 
captured documents showed that counter-propaganda against Lam Swee was so 
vehement and extensive that many insurgents, previously ignorant of the case, 
obtained copies of My Accusation to find out what Lam Swee had said. A 
number of his comrades in Pahang surrendered as a result.02
52 In the opinion of the writer the figures cited should be accepted as 
portraying trends rather exact circumstances; but even with this 
qualification the differences are immense. It is particularly important 
to note the relative decrease in the figures for 'Dislike of policy' 
when compared with the increases for "Hunger' and 'Impulse*. In my 
opinion 'Impulse' equals generell disillusionment and lack of morale PLUS 
the greater ability of the Government through Templer's revised 
psychological warfare campaign to communicate with the insurgents. 
Figures based on Ops Research Memo 6/55 pp 6-9
62 C.C. Too, Interview.
71.
But by now, a further change in strategy was needed. It 
appeared in the October Directives of 1951.6lf
The October 1951 Directives
These were in the form of two booklets; the Directives 
proper, and a publication entitled, Struggle For Greater Victory In The 
Warn65 They begin with an explanation that the Central Committee had over­
come 'rightest opportunism’ in 1947, and continued to oppose the rightest 
trend by the June Resolutions of 1949. However, this had been carried too 
far, leading to ’leftist deviation’, which had prevented a more 'successful 
development and accumulation of the Party’s might’. For example, orders in 
December 1948 to concentrate forces and establish bases had made it 
necessary to rely entirely on the masses for food and its instructions that 
they should be ’led forward' by force had placed too heavy a burden upon 
them. Similarly, the policy to counter resettlement, announced in 1950, had 
further harmed and alienated the masses.66
In its June Resolutions of 1949, the Politbureau had accused 
itself of failing to distinguish 'the incorrigible big bourgeosie' from the 
exploitable 'medium bourgeosie’, so that the latter, who should have been 
won over to the united front, were antagonised. Leftist deviation had also 
appeared in aggresive activities near towns where the enemy was strong. 
Activities in such areas should be confined to subversion and infiltration 
conducted by the masses organisations.
64 Brimmell’s opinion is that it was extremely unlikely that the change in 
strategy was occasioned by instructions or advice from Peking. By this 
time (late 1951) the Thought of Mao Tse Tung had approximately equal 
standing with the Thought of Stalin. Again, it was in 1951 that the 
Vietnamese Communists dropped the facade of leading a purely nationalist 
insurrection, and performed the few adjustments necessary to align their 
revolutionary organisation with the Chinese norm. Brimmell; Op.Cit., 
pp 326-327. Whilst my own evidence can demonstrate that the M.C.P. 
received regular copies of the Cominform's Journal, and also monitored 
broadcasts from the New China News Agency, I cannot substantiate that 
external direction or instruction was the reason for the change.
OJ An abridged version of the Directives proper is contained in 
Hanrahan; Op.Cit., pp 130-133.
°6 The Directive went on to reprimand the party for the mistake of 'absolute 
emphasis upon the basic interests of the revolution and discarding the 
existing interests of the masses' - which is the same criticism Siew Lau 
had made two years before. C.C. Too, Notes.
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In general, the rectification of errors was to be achieved by 
studying Mao’s thought, and uniting theory with practice. More particularly, 
there were seven urgent tasks: (1) In masses work, the supreme criterion 
was to be ’whether the activities undertaken were supported and accepted by 
the broad sections of the masses’; (2) the armed struggle was to be developed 
and weapons were to be captured from the enemy, attacks being confined to 
platoon scale, with ambush as the main tactic; (3) vigilance against spies 
was to be improved; (4) the workers’ and peasants’ struggle was to be 
developed by means of illegal trade unions in rural areas and the 
infiltration of legal trade unions in urban areas; (5) the united front was 
to be expanded and 'the medium capitalists' were to be won over;
(6) development work was to be conducted among 'the enemy and pseudo-elements’, 
and attempts were to be made to infiltrate the Police, Home Guard, Malay 
Regiment, and Civil Service; and (7) procurement of 'material and food 
supplies' was to be put on a sound basis, in which regard the masses were 
still the main sources of supply, cultivation by the insurgents was to be 
stepped up to take over from the masses if necessary, and food dumps were to 
be extensively created.67
Finally, attacks upon the masses such as seizing identity 
cards, slashing rubber trees, burning religious buildings, sanitary trucks,
Red Cross vehicles and ambulances were to cease.63
The Directives had a dual purpose. First, by invoking Mao's 
'new democracy', and widening its class appeal, the party hoped to widen 
its mass base. Secondly, by ending indiscriminate terrorism and by 
turning to agriculture, the party hoped to lighten its pressure upon the 
masses, thus enabling them to view its political program more favourably.
The program involved increased scope for the Min Yuen, who 
were to infiltrate the 'bastions of capitalism in the towns'; the schools 
and labour unions. The 'big bourgeoisie', in areas where the party could 
take action, were ordered to improve their attitude towards their employees, 
but they were only to be assassinated if completely reactionary.03
67 Ibid., pp 24-26.
63 Hanrahan; Op.Cit., p 130.
63 In particular, Chinese owners of mines, plantations and businesses who, 
because of both race and geography were more vulnerable.
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A table of subscriptions to ba paid by planters \?as to be prepared, and 
another for tin mines, Hence the party was not about to abandon 
intimidation and extortion, but merely to place it on a more regular basis. 
Similarly, policemen and soldiers surrendering in battle were to be spared 
unless they were traitors, British or Gurkha troops, senior civil servants 
or police officers. Members of the K.M.T. and the M.C.A. could be 
assassinated, but not members of U.M.N.O. or the Independence of Malaya 
Party, because these were popular with the Malays. Finally, the decision, 
’whether a band should continue to fight or should withdraw for retraining 
and redeployment should depend on local conditions’, and was left to the 
local commander.
In addition to the October Directives, a further military 
operation order was also issued but was never recovered by the Government. 
But its general lines soon appeared from events. First, deep jungle bases 
were set up for reorganisation, retraining and cultivation. Secondly, the 
aborigines were mobilised to help grow food and to act as a human screen 
around these jungle bases. Thirdly, the large regular units were disbanded; 
henceforth the largest unit would be the independent platoon.71
It took from a year to eighteen months for the Directives to 
reach all units; in that period the total number of incidents dropped from 
564 in October 1951, to 135 in October 1952, and to 99 in April 1953. By 
June 1953 the reorganisation had been completed and the party commenced to 
operate under the nexvf directive. Almost immediately, dissension of an 
opposite sort began, as members who had joined to fight were now ordered to 
dig. At this point the activities of the insurgent organisation can best be 
considered by area, namely the Deep Jungle, the Jungle Fringe and the Open.
^  C.C. Too, Notes.
V 1 Those members of the M.R.L.A. who were not included in independent 
platoons were absorbed into A.W.F.'s. Reviex-7 1954 and Intelligence 
Appreciation 1954.
*7 9- Appendix 1. Other pertinent figures for the same months are as follows:
Date October October April1.95.1 1952 1953
Total Civilian Casualties 94 23 14
Total Security Force Casual­
ties . 134 30 17
*Total Insurgent Casualties 170 178 133
*This figure includes S.E.P.’s
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Activities in the Deep Jungle
Initially, the Politbureau had planned the establishment of 
three extensive jungle bases as follows: (1) three main base areas in the 
Perak, Kelantan and Thailand area, the South Perak, Kuala Lipis and Raub 
area, and the Tasek Bera area; (2) tx*;o bases for the Penang-Kedah and the 
Selangor State Secretariats; and (3) bases for other state and regional 
secretariats where possible.
These were not conceived as fixed camps but as safe areas, 
supplied by numerous small, well camouflaged agricultural plots. During 
1952, Armed Work Forces were to establish the plots and thoroughly acquaint 
themselves with the areas so that they could guide the main forces 
entering the base areas in 1953. This aim however was not attained. For a 
start the bases could only become self supporting in root crops and padi: 
salt, cooking oil, clothes, digging equipment and funds still had to come 
from outside.73 Even cultivation failed in the long run due to the ravages 
of wild animals, and of aerial spraying. Detection of plots from the air 
was at first made easy by the Chinese penchant for planting in neat rows 
rather than higgledy-piggledy in the manner of the aborigines, but even when 
the insurgents did so and also found that defoliation could be countered by 
knocking off spray affected leaves, the aircraft just as readily directed 
ground patrols to the plots, which were then blown up or torn up and burned. 
How bleak life had become for the insurgents, can be seen by the following 
excerpts from a captured letter:
"9th. I went to see if any letters had come. While going along 
(to the jungle letter box), I spent time looking for traces of 
the enemy. I climbed up a hill and I saw footprints probably made 
by three persons who had been there two days ago. On close examination 
of the footprints I concluded that they were not made by the enemy.
I received a letter and read it.
10th. Caught more than ten rats after breakfast. Thereafter I busied 
myself with washing utensils and making a sack. Two Auster planes flex*; 
past here probably making food drops to the fort nearby.
11th. Caught seven rats. Ate some of them for breakfast. Was out 
again at 10.30 a.m, to a jungle clearing x/aere the Yee Ling camp stands. 
Having reached it, I then x*;ent to the masses’ (aborigines) cultivated 
plot but I met nobody there. Spent 6% hours on the journey.
73 This proved to be a task beyond the capacity of a single District
Committee; in some cases two and three District Committees had to pool 
their resources to carry out a stocking programme, making themselves 
worthxdiile targets for Security Force ambushes in the process. Intelligence 
Appreciation, 1954, p 4, This process is analysed in Chapter Vi.
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Spent 9h hours on digging up and cooking tapioca. Retired for the 
night at 10 o 7 clock.
By 1954, the only base that had appeared to make any progress was in the 
area of Tasek Bera. But as the Government’s policy of winning over the 
aborigines through the establishment of Jungle Forts began to take effect, 
all the deep bases were quickly neutralised.'7^
Activities in the Jungle Fringe
It was from the jungle fringe that District Committees 
controlled the Branch Committees and their subordinate Cells, which in turn 
through Masses Executives controlled sympathisers. The District Committees 
also controlled the A.rmed Work Forces set up at Branch Committee level to 
provide for the party's protection among the masses (see Fig. 9):
71f Government Press Statement, 1st July 1955, ’Excerpts from a Communist 
Letter 1.
This process is analysed in Chapter VI.
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SELF PROTECTION CORPS 
LITTLE DEVILS ORGANISATION 
Village and other supporters
****AWF’s worked either under District and in support of Branch or 
directly for the Branch Committee.
A Branch might be responsible for some five to ten villages.and labour 
lines (on rubber estates and tin mines) containing up to 10,000 people. 
Instructions to the Armed Work Forces insisted on aggresive military actions 
against minor military and para-military targets, but in practice many 
began to avoid such actions, alleging (perhaps with some reason) confusion 
about who should or should not be killed, and in general hiding behind the
7 7 .
complexities of the October Directives13
This inactivity not only weakened the M.C.P.’s control over 
the people, but also began to debilitate the organisation as fewer arms 
were captured and less supplies collected.7  ^ Beginning in October 1952, 
the Central Committee was now forced to call for even greater military 
activity, and a modified return to terrorism. For example, the following 
directive was issued by the South Johore Regional Committee:
"According to the Directive issued by the State Secretariat on April 
10th 1953, all the Commanders of Malayan R.aces Liberation Army units 
and Armed Work Forces have been instructed to pay more attention to 
military operations such as lightning assaults, disturbances, sabotage, 
etc., which were to be included in the working programme and to seize 
every opportunity to conduct these operations.
Six months have elapsed, and there is still quiet on the 
whole front, except a fewT minor operations including the cutting of 
telecommunications wire, burning of latex trucks, etc. On the contrary 
there is unfavourable news of attacks, encounters and ambushes.
(i.e. by the Security Forces)....
What has obstructed most of all in military operations during 
this period is conservative thinking which controls the minds of some 
executives.... minor difficulties are regarded as unconquerable; they 
had no courage to tackle any problem, but endeavoured to avoid it and
For example, in the period from January to March 1954, incidents by
degree of seriousness were as follows:
Degree of Seriousness Per Cent
Involving preplanning, risk, and death or damage of
more than Stg/,100 5.7
Involving risk and preplanning, but no death
and less than Stg/.IOO damage 21.9
Involving no risk or aggresiveness, but causing
death or more than Stgi.lOO damage 8.4
Involving no risk, aggressiveness, or death,
nor more than Stg_ 100 damage 64.0
100
Ops Research,Memo 9/54
7 7 In an effort to counteract this tendency, operations were put on a quota 
basis, and each District and Branch was required to render returns on what 
had been achieved each month. Independent Platoons varied in strength 
from 30 to 100. After 1951, the A.W.F.'s had to be increasingly bolstered 
by enlisting members of the Self Protection Corps, and even where 
necessary by milking the strength of the Independent Platoons. M.E.s 
aimed to collect a basic 51bs of rice per week for every insurgent in the 
jungle whom they were responsible for supporting. For 50 insurgents 
therefore, 250 lbs of rice had to be collected usually in large acid jars 
which were buried up to the neck and camouflaged. Jars were moved about 
every three months in case footprints made them too easy to detect.
Madoc and Waller, Interviews.
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x-zere quite satisfied to be reconciled to the present 
situation."78
The Directive went on to censure the District Organisations 
strongly for failing to use their Armed Work Forces in an aggressive role 
and for failing to give the necessary assistance to M.R.L.A. units.
Activities in the C^en
The policy for x-7ork in the open was more complicated. In the 
rural areas, as stated above, it consisted of obtaining supplies, arms and 
ammunition, and where possible funds, intelligence, couriers and recruits, 
and the subversion of the Home Guard and the Special Constabulary, at least 
to ignore the party’s activities.
The more ambitious urban program of the Directives, 
subsequently reaffirmed by an instruction from the Deputy Secretary-General 
in charge of urban work, was to build up an underground organisation to 
operate upon the general population through such legal bodies as trade 
unions, political parties, and teachers' associations. However, despite 
some minor success among teachers in independent Chinese schools and in 
organising 'Little Devil Squads' among school children to pass information 
about movements of the Security Forces and carry out minor auxiliary tasks, 
little progress was made in face of the vigilance of Special Branch.78
The strategy of the Directives therefore, missed its aim of 
extending the mass base and obtaining greater room for political manoeuvre. 
The turn away from terrorism towards agriculture, and the lower place 
accorded to military activity in preference to political activity and
78 Government Press Statement, 20th April 1954, South Johore Regional 
Committee Directive: 'Main Duties of Our Present Work'.
78 The basic problem x-zas that the experienced insurgents who might have 
undertaken such Xszorlc were known to Special Branch and hence could not 
work in the open. Nevertheless the Party did make some progress in 
spreading propaganda in independent Chinese night schools x-zhose curricula 
xvere still largely unsupervised. In this respect it is significant that 
Lt.Gen. Box^er,Director of Operations in 1957 stated that 'supervision 
of the curriculum of independent schools x-zas a vital prerequisite for 
preventing revolt in immature states.' Reviex-z 1948-57, p 26.
By 1954 the monthly average of civilians killed (8), and Security Forces 
killed (7) had been overtaken by deaths from road accidents in Malaya,
35 a month. R.eviex-7 1954, pp 3-4.
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subversion, sapped the morale of the M.R.L.A. From 1952 onwards it was 
struggling merely to survive. Its high point had been passed in 1951; 
from then on the party found that recruits were insufficient to replace 
losses.80 By altering its strategy, it had lost the initiative. But the 
successive crises which had turned the M.C.P. away from large scale 
terrorism towards a situation where (by 1955), it offered to negotiate an 
end to the Emergency, stemmed in large part from the Government’s own 
increasingly successful efforts to solve the problems which it faced. How 
it met and eventually defeated the challenge is the subject of the next 
two chapters.









Ops Research Memo 1/57, p 14.
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CHAPTER IV 
THE ADVENT OF BRIGGS
Having failed to prevent the insurrection in June 1948, the 
Government was given a second opportunity to regain the initiative in 1949. 
However, despite a sizable increase in its own forces, it came no closer 
to finding a solution to the Emergency nor the machinery for implementing it.*
From an average of over fifty insurgent inspired incidents per 
week in 1948 the number dropped steadily until in the first week of August 
1949 only twelve were recorded. Moreover, these were 'jitter’ attacks and 
the insurgents demonstrated a marked reluctance to attack targets which were 
guarded, or where surprise and numbers were not overwhelmingly in their 
favour.2 Captured documents show7ed that the M.C.P. was aware of its own 
difficulties and was increasingly concerned about its declining ability to 
coerce the masses. 'The situation has changed', stated a directive issued 
in mid-1949, 'but we have not even slightly changed our methods'.3 But the 
government seemed content with its own handling of the Emergency and this 
complacency affected other sectors of the community. Thus, in its Annual 
Report for 1948 the government stated that 'The Communist inspired military 
campaign had been reduced to the proportions of squalid guerrilla 
depredations by increasingly demoralised bandits, fighting for their lives 
against increasingly well organised Security Forces',lf when it had no valid 
basis for such a claim. Not surprisingly, a significant element of the 
population, taking its cue from the government, regarded the Emergency as a 
temporary disturbance which the government and its Security Forces should be 
left to attend to.
1 The Regular Police Force had increased from 9,000 (June 1948), to 12,767 
(January 1949), plus 33,610 Special Constables. In the same period the 
Army had increased from 10 to 15 battalions of infantry plus an 
Armoured Car Regiment. Review 1948-57.Appendices B and C.
2 M .C.P. Banditry, p 21.
3 M.C.P. Propaganda, p 3. This, in substance, was the tone of self-criticism 
made in the June 1951 Resolutions, which were referred to in the previous 
chapter.
4 Annual Report 1948, Introduction (unnumbered pages).
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Publicly, the High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, and other 
prominent members of the Administration, deprecated ’this business as usual 
attitude which may lead to no business at all’, and exhorted the general 
population to avoid any slackening of effort.5 But in his confidential 
correspondence with the British Government, and in his own behaviour,
Gurney’s restrained understatement, and his adherence to civil service good 
form, failed to convey a conviction of the gravity of the situation.
In certain respects Gurney remains an enigmatic figure; yet 
the doubt lies in his methods rather than in the type of man he was:
"Inherited position, natural ability and the impeccable background 
of Winchester, University College, Oxford, and the 60th Rifles had 
made Gurney in 1948, at the age of fifty, the perfect administrator," 
states C. Northcote Parkinson. "He was intelligent, courageous, 
well read and experienced, quick to gra-sp a problem and firm in making 
a decision."0
But perhaps these very qualities may have led Gurney to believe that the 
insurrection could be overcome without resort to the urgent measures which 
later had to be taken. Certainly, this would seem so from some of his 
judgements. For example, in one despatch he quoted from an article about 
civil war in Greece, where brigandage had developed into guerrilla war and 
then into civil rebellion, in order to demonstrate that the elimination of 
’brigandage’ (which he equated with the Emergency) was not a military 
operation at all:
"It is a civil and political task, for which the primary responsibility 
rests with the police and the Ministry of the Interior, not with
soldiers and the War Office.....In 1945 (in Greece) this point was
missed. Generals were put into the Ministry of the Interior to do 
civilians’ jobs; soldiers instead of policemen organised the hybrid 
forces designed to restore order; and reconstruction never had a chance 
to begin.,,/7
Few would disagree that a State of Emergency is a civil and political task; 
but manifestly, Gurney was confusing ends with means. It was precisely 
because the police had failed to control the situation in Malaya that the 
Armed Services had to be called in at all. Now Gurney wanted them to be 
placed metaphorically out of sight by pretending that matters could be 
co-ordinated by his Police Commissioner, who in addition to wrestling with 
the enormous expansion of his own force, possessed neither the means nor the 
equipment to set up a proper coordinating headquarters, and had to borrow 
radio sets from the army before he could even begin to establish effective
5 Gurney, Speeches, p 11.
5 Parkinson, pp 5-6.
7 Gurney's Despatch No. 5, 30th May 1949, p 6. The article itself was from 
The Spectator, 3rd September 1948.
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communications within the Police.
Again, in referring to points of communal psychology Gurney 
stated that, 'If a situation requires drastic measures .... it is better to 
present it as serious and requiring all the help and cooperation that the 
civilian population can give rather than create the impression that the 
Government has the situation well in hand. He then went on somewhat 
confusingly in the same report to say that terms such as 'enemy', 'war', 
'insurrection', insurgents', 'rebellion', etc., should be avoided in official 
statements on the grounds that the insurance cover provided by British 
companies for commercial enterprises in Malaya such as rubber planting and 
tin mining might be withdrawn;® whereas his major problem, in official 
circles and elsewhere in Malaya, as seen from his many public statements on 
the subject, was that people were not viewing the Emergency seriously 
enough. Indeed, this official self deception which was later to bedevil the 
efforts of Sir Harold Briggs during his entire period as Director of 
Operations, permeated much of the bureaucracy in Malaya.®
A false confidence was also evident in the Government's 
relationships with the Chinese community. By late 1949, the Communist forces 
in China had defeated the Nationalists, and British recognition of Communist 
China in January 1950 had a marked effect on the attitude of the Chinese in 
Malaya:
"On the one hand the bandits themselves were much encouraged and on 
the other there was a significant change in the attitude of a considerable 
section of the Chinese in the Federation, which became less ready to 
cooperate with the Government and more disposed to ensure themselves 
with the other side; for they feared that if they openly sided with the 
Government in Malaya their relatives or their property or both in China, 
would suffer at the hands of the Communist Government."1®
Yet, not two months before, the Chief Secretary had stated 
that the fight against Malaya's Communists ’would not be affected if the
8 Ibid., p 16.
® For example, it was not until 1950 that the section dealing with the 
Emergency was elevated in status in the Federation of Malaya Annual 
Report, from an obscure appendix, where it had languished in 1948 and 
1949 to become Chapter 1. In other words, Gurney could not have it both 
ways. Either the Emergency was a phenomenon of serious proportions, in 
which case it deserved to be treated as such, or it was not.
M.C.P. Terrorism, p 19.10
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British Government recognised the new Chinese People’s Government'.1'1 And, 
less than a month before, Gurney himself had declared, 'Nothing that may 
happen in China will weaken the determination of the people of this country 
to eliminate militant communism here, rather will their efforts be 
strengthened.'1  ^ The failure by the Government to understand the feeling of 
insecurity, both immediate and potential, which was at the root of the 
dilemma confronting the uncommitted mass of the Chinese population meant 
that little common ground existed between the two groups and consequently, 
little confidence flourished until the Government showed that it intended to 
win.
Finally, when the tide of insurgency began to flood out of 
control early in 1950, the impetus for change came not from Gurney, but from 
the British Defence Coordination Committee, Far East in Singapore which, in 
giving its analysis of the situation, stated flatly that the present 
direction of the campaign was unsatisfactory and suggested that a civil 
coordinating officer, directly under the High Commissioner, be made 
responsible for prosecuting the campaign. The committee added that heavy 
reinforcements of troops and air power would not bring the needed 
improvement, unless paralleled by vigorous action on the civil side.1-1
The Appointment of Briggs
In early 1950 the situation worsened dramatically. Although 
there had been a time in 1949 when it was even thought that a reduction in 
the number of troops in Malaya might be possible, events quickly dispelled 
this illusion. There were 221 incidents in February, an increase of eighty 
per cent over the average monthly figure of 1949. The number continued to 
rise until October, when the peak figure of 571 was recorded.111 There was 
also a change in the direction and magnitude of insurgent attacks. In 1949 
few had required any initiative, courage or risk; effort had mainly been
11 Ibid., P 70.
12 Ibid., p 73.
1:1 Quarterly Historical Report, (Ops/SD) Branch, FARELF March 31, 1950 
(SECRET)
14 M .C.P., Terrorism, p 19.
84.
directed at sabotage on rubber estates and tin mines which could not be 
termed ' hard targets'. The new offensive was different. On 4th February, 
Simpang Tiga, a village in the Sitiawan area of Perak was burned down by an 
insurgent group and 1,000 of its inhabitants made homeless.16 On 22nd 
February, another group attacked and set fire to the police station at Bukit 
Kepong in Johore; thirteen constables, six Kampong Guards, two women and two 
children were killed and the weapons of the defenders were captured.16 The 
'jitter' incidents of 1949 had given way to moderate sized but well 
coordinated attacks which puzzled both the Security Forces and the Government.
Sir Henry Gurney, thoroughly alarmed for probably the first 
time in his administration, departed radically from his previously 
expressed policy of reposing coordination of the Emergency in the hands of 
the Commissioner of Police and, on the advice of the British Defence 
Coordination Committee referred to above, asked the British Government to 
appoint a Director of Operations.
Yet here again, there was a cleavage between the intentions of 
the High Commissioner, and the strength of local interest; in particular the 
planters' 'lobby'.17 Gurney's predilection as always was for a civilian; 
the planters wanted a soldier on the active list. In Gurney’s preference 
there were combined, the inborn suspicion which professional civil servants 
have for professional soldiers and more pressingly, the need to maintain 
the appearance of civil government under the still fragile Federation 
Agreement. The planters, who with vast numbers of Chinese, were in the 
front line of the Emergency, wanted to get things done and to see security 
established as quickly as possible. They saw the appointment of a soldier 
as the quickest means of achieving both. The British Government compromised 
and in March 1950 appointed a Lieutenant General on the retired list to the 
post in a civilian capacity.18 As Director of Operations, Malaya, he was to
15 Ibid., p 83.
16 Ibid.> PP 85-86.
17 Certainly from as early as July 1948 the Planters and Miners had been 
calling for a 'Supremo' with wide powers to be given office in Malaya. An 
editorial in the Sunday Times 4th July 1948, concluded, 'Could General 
Sir William Slim, the victor of Burma, be the man to replace the reputedly 
unthroned Sir Edward Gent?’
lo In commenting on the appointment The Economist of 25th March 1950, noted 
that 'It is also satisfactory that London has admitted - much later than 
was necessary - the need to accept advice from the spot and to achieve 
decisive results by new methods.' However, despite the general accuracy 
of the report, neither The Economist nor any other publication was aware 
that part of the responsibility for procrastination lay with Gurney.
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rank equal to the Chief Secretary, but have full powers of coordinating 
the Police, Naval, Military and Air Forces. These departments however 
retained the right of appeal to the High Commissioner in the case of the 
Police, and to their respective Commanders-in-Chief in the case of the Armed 
Forces.1  ^ In this there lay a fundamental weakness which will be analysed 
later. Both the character of the man chosen to be the first Director of 
Operations, and the term itself, owed much to the judgement of Field Marshal 
Slim, who as Chief of the Imperial General Staff had visited Malaya in 
October 1949 and was now asked for his recommendation.
The man selected, Lieutenant General Sir Harold Rawdon 
Briggs, K.C.I.E,, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O. (ret.) had already concluded a 
distinguished career. Born in 1884, Briggs had graduated from Sandhurst 
into the Indian Army in 1914 and served throughout the First World War in 
France, Mesopotamia and Palestine. From 1940 to 1942 he had commanded 5th 
Indian Division in the Western Desert, Iraq and Burma. He had become 
General officer, Commander-in-Chief Burma Command in 1946 until he retired 
in 1947. Briggs’ qualifications for the new post in Malaya may not have 
been unique, but they were distinguished by three important characteristics. 
First, he had acquired wide regimental experience in Asia and understood, at 
least in part, the minds and cultures of the Asian peoples with whom he was 
to deal. Second, he had fought a jungle campaign in Burma and was not 
unpractised in conducting operations in difficult terrain. Third, and most 
important of all, in the confused conditions of post war Burma he had already 
given clear indications that he had a broader view of his duties than merely 
administering the military machine by dissuading the Governor from suppressing 
the rising tide of nationalism in that country. On all three counts, Briggs 
had shown that he could be relied upon to act in a difficult situation with 
tact and wisdom. In Burma his 5th Indian Division had formed part of Slim’s 
Fourteenth Army:
"It”, (the 5th Indian Division) wrote Slim, "owed much to its commander, 
Major General Briggs, and like all good divisions - and bad ones - 
reflected its commander’s personality. The war had found him in command 
of a battalion in this division; a battalion that in some extraordinary 
way was always where it was wanted, that always did what was wanted and 
was ready to go on doing it. So Briggs got a brigade. His brigade was 
just as steadily successful as his battalion had been. It went into the 
toughest spots, met the most difficult situations and came out again 
like its commander, still unperturbed and as quietly efficient as ever.
19 Briggs Report, p 3.
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So, while others fell by the wayside Briggs got his division. I know 
of few commanders who made as many immediate and critical decisions 
on every step of the ladder of promotion and I know of none who made 
so few mis takes . n/-°
Arriving in Malaya on 3rd April 1950, Briggs made a rapid 
and extensive tour of the Federation and a week later gave Gurney his views. 
This was done in the modified form of a military ’Appreciation of the 
Situation’ which was so significant for later operations as tc warrant 
reproducing here in full.21 From this logical and comprehensive assemblage 
of factors, Briggs arrived at a plan for the elimination of the Communist 
Organisation and armed forces which he submitted to the British Defence 
Coordination Committee, Far East on 19th May 1950.22
The Briggs Plan
The theme of the plan was clear. The Emergency was not a war
in the classic sense, buc a competition in government. Terrorism could be
eradicated only by cutting away the props which the terrorists depended on
within the population at large. This may have been dimly perceived before,
but the real significance of the link between the M.C.P.'s armed forces and
the Min Yuen had not.21 It was this link which had to be broken.
’’The Min Yuen is able to exist and function in populated areas mainly 
because the population as a whole lacks confidence in the ability of 
the forces of law and order to protect them against gangster Communist 
extortion and terrorism. In consequeiice, information, which is 
essential if the Min Yuen and the bandits are to be eliminated, is quite 
inadequate. "2lf
2(1 Slim W.J.; Defeat and Victory, London, 1955, p 145.
21 Appendix C .
Briggs R.eport, p 6. Like most long-rang^ operational prescriptions it 
reads more as a statement of intent rather than a plan. But even though 
modified, refined and amended over ten years, its essential content was 
the same in 1960 as it had been in 1950, Although classified SECRET its 
existence quickly became known through the press as the'Briggs War Plan1 
(S.T., 12th June, 1950), and later simply as the ’Briggs Plan’ (S.T. ,
6th August, 1950).
/ '
21 For example when Mr. Guy Madoc returned to take over the M.C.P. Desk
within Special Branch in April 1950, he found that there was only a vague 
understanding among the staff at Federation Police H.Q. of the real 
significance of the Min Yuen, Madoc, Interview. Again, although the 1st 
Battalion, the Devon Regiment (referred to in Chapter II) had been in Malaya 
from the beginning of the Emergency, it knew nothing of the Min Yuen 
until early in 1950. Q.H.R., 1 Devons, 31st March, 1950.
Briggs Report, p 6.24
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Therefore security, and with it confidence and information, could only be 
restored and maintained by a coordinated series of measures which included 
the following:
"(a) by demonstrating Britain's firm intention to fulfill her
obligations in defence of Malaya against both external attack 
and internal disorder;
(b) by extending effective administration and control of all populated 
areas which involves
(i) A large measure of squatter resettlement into compact groups,
(ii) A strengthening of the local administration,
(iii) Provision of road communication in isolated populated .areas,
(iv) Setting up of Police Posts in these areas;
(c) by exploiting these measures with good propaganda, both constructive 
and destructive."2^
And whereas before Briggs arrival many of these measures had been proceeded 
with disparately and almost intuitively by the Government and the Security 
Forces, in future the basis of the Government's counter insurgent strategy 
was to be a deliberately implemented sequence of methodical action.
In a paper submitted to the newly established War Council, 
Briggs injected greater detail into his strategic and tactical intentions:
"Broadly, the intention is to clear the country, step by step, from 
South to North, by:
(a) dominating the populated areas and building up a feeling of 
complete security in them, with the object of obtaining a steady and 
increasing flow of information from all sources;
(b) breaking up the Min Tuen within the populated areas;
(c) thereby isolating the bandits from their food and information 
supply organisation in the populated areas;
(d) and finally, destroying the bandits by forcing them to attack us 
on our own ground."Zo
Basically, the plan was to depend on a 'Framework' of 
security which was to be established simultaneously in all states and would 
remain even though other, more venturesome operations might be superimposed 
upon it. This basic matrix of security would then become the key to a 
"slow-squeeze" which would sever the links between the insurgents operating 
in the jungle or along its fringes, and their supporters in the populated 
areas.
2 2 Ibid .',' p 6.
26 Ibid., p 7.
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To achieve these objects Briggs planned that in all states:
’’(a) the Police Force will concentrate on fulfilling normal police 
functions, including the obtaining of intelligence, through its Special 
Branch organisation in all populated areas; (b) the Army will maintain 
in states in turn (sic) a framework of troops, deployed in close 
conjunction with the police, to cover those populated areas which the 
police cannot themselves adequately cover. This will entail the setting 
up of a series of strong points whereon patrols will be based; (c) the 
Administration will strengthen to the utmost extent possible their 
effective control of the populated areas by increasing, duplicating or 
trebling as necessary the number of District Officers and other executive 
officers "in the field" to ensure that all populated areas are 
effectively administered; by making access roads to isolated populated 
areas where necessary; by establishing Police Posts in all populated 
areas brought under control; and by stepping up to the maximum extent 
possible within the limits of the manpower available in all areas where 
they are needed, the provision of the normal social services that go 
x«7ith effective administration, e.g. schools, medical and other services'.'27
Thus, 'Framework Operations' (the equivalent term applied in 
South Vietnam was 'Pacification') were designed to restore the normal processes 
of civil government. The technique depended on a number of interlocking 
factors: the judicious use of troops; the close cooperation of troops and
police; accurate and timely intelligence above all from Special Branch, and 
finally, as an earnest of long term government aims, the revitalising of 
local government.2,2
To give added momentum in certain areas, and to permit the 
conduct of operations which, although relatively opportunist might result in 
a considerable success, 'Striking Forces' were also earmarked to be employed 
in 'Priority Areas'.2g In general, this meant that extra troops and 
resources were to be superimposed on the 'Framework' for operations within 
each state in turn. Having achieved their ask in one state they would then 
be moved to another further north. Moreover, it was envisaged by Briggs that 
the army forces available 'might be reduced by one, and later possibly by 
two brigades as the programme for clearing Malaya state by state from south
22 Ibid., p 7.
23 In practice 'Framework Operations' came to include all the arduous, 
unspectactular measures usually carried out by Administration, Army and 
Police acting in concert, which has since distinguished this type of 
conflict from any other; it includes such practices as the imposition of 
curfews, food denial, patrolling, ambushing ard so on.
29 Briggs Report, p 7.
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to north progresses’.30 The Striking Forces were to dominate the jungle up 
to about five hours’ journey from potential ’bandit’ supply areas. Continual 
ambushing and harrying of the insurgents was intended to make their 
organisation and its supporters either fight, disintegrate, or leave the area. 
Thus, when the Striking Forces left, insurgent strength and morale would be 
so reduced that other insurgents would be unable to re-infiltrate the region 
successfully.31
From May to June 1950 the troops in the Federation previously 
assigned to areas on an ad hoc basis, were redeployed. Johore was designated 
a Priority Area on 1st June; Negri Sembilan would follow on 1st August. 
Thereafter, other areas x^ ere to be named Priority Areas at two monthly 
intervals. 33
Once operations began, three battalions were withdrawn for 
rest and retraining at any one time but in addition two Armoured Car 
Regiments were spread over the Federation for road patrols.33 On 1st June 
operations under the new plan commenced in Johore. Although no substantial 
results were expected for the first two months, by 21st July Briggs was able 
to state that:
"the new operations are so far encouraging .... Information has greatly 
increased .... some measure of the success of the overall plan can be 
gauged from the fact that since 1st June, fifty-two bandits have been 
killed, captured or have surrendered in Johore as against twenty-one 
in the previous two months’’.31’
30 Ibid., p 11.
01 Ibid., p 8. In terms of movement ’five hours journey’ equated to 1,000 - 
6,000 yards in difficult terrain. In 1950-51, the insurgents had 
penetrated no further into the jungle than this.
33 By June the new deployments in the Federation were as follows:
Johore - six battalions
Negri Sembilan - four battalions
Pahang (concentrated in the Bentong, Mentakab and Triang areas only) - 
three battalions 
Selangor - two battalions 
Perak - a commando brigade 
Pahang (the remainder) - two battalions 
Kedah - one battalion
Kelantan - one battalion. Ibid., p 17.
33 Ibid., p 17.
34 S.T. , 21st July, 1950.
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Similarly agreeable statistics were quoted for other parts of the 
Federation.35
To give organisational effect to the plan, Briggs asked the 
High Commissioner to set up a Federal War Council with himself (Briggs) as 
chairman. The Committee met first on 14th April 1950 and was composed as 
follows:
Director of Operations - Chairman





Navy Liaison Officer, when required.
Procedure was made thoroughly systematic by the issue, in 
addition to the Emergency Regulations, of Director of Operations Directives. 
The first of these set up the Federal War Council, and the War Executive 
Committees.33 The second established Priority Areas and allocated tasks to 
the troops.3"7 The third included a number of matters ranging from the 
recruiting and arming of Auxiliary Police to the control of shops outside 
town border areas.33 In all, Briggs issued eighteen directives in twenty 
months. They were continually revised and added to by subsequent Directors 
of Operations.
In addition to the Federal War Council which at Federation 
level was ultimately responsible for the prosecution of the Emergency, State 
and District War Executive Committees, known as S.W.E.C.s and D.W.E.C.s - 
pronounced like living beings - were also established. Under the Federation 
of Malaya Agreement of 1948, Malaya had become a Federation of nine states, 
each with its Sultan, and two settlements, each with a Resident 
Commissioner. All of these were served by local governments including
35 Ibid•
33 D of 0., Directive No. 1 issued 16th April, 1950.
37 Ibid, , Directive No. 2 issued 12th May, 1950.
30 Ibid., Directive No. 3 issued 25th May, 1950.
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Executive and State or Settlement Councils. The High Commissioner of the 
Federation was similarly served by an Executive and a Legislative Council 
with a Secretariat under a Chief Secretary to coordinate the States and 
Settlements. The Federal Government retained in its own hands decisions on 
finance, defence, external affairs, police and the judiciary. In addition, 
although Singapore was a separate Crown Colony with its owai government and 
administration, there were many problems affecting defence, economics, 
immigration and manpower which needed coordination between the governments 
concerned; a coordination not made easier by the fact that the Singapore 
councils were predominantly Chinese, while those in the Federation were 
Malay. Realising that these separate political entities were slow and 
unsuited to deal with a State of Emergency, Briggs inaugurated the S.W.E.C.s 
and D.W.E.C.s to deal with all Emergency matters. 313 Although some powers 
of a politically sensative nature such as land titles for the Chinese were 
withheld from them, they became at each level, the basis for methodical 
action.^ ________________
33 For example, the High Commissioner had to refer all draft legislation to 
the Rulers of the nine states before it was introduced into the Federal 
Council, and he had to consult them on changes in the organisation of 
the civil service and on immigration questions. The division of powers 
gave the Federal Government the decisive voice on finance, but power in 
many administrative areas remained with the States. This difference 
retarded the pace of Resettlement, which required both finance (Federal 
control), and land (State control). Coordination was not readily 
achieved. Some short cuts were introduced; when the Mentri Besar came 
to Kuala Lumpur to attend meetings of the Legislative Council- they spent 
half a day under the chairmanship of the Chief Secretary discussing 
matters of common concern. It was to circumvent this tedious process 
that Briggs introduced the War Executive Committees.
^  The joint conception embodied in War Executive Committees was to be
followed at all levels, and in every possible sense. At State/Settlement 
level and at District level the composition was:
S.W.E.C. D .W.E.C.
The Mentri Besar (or Resident Commissioner) District Officer 
British Adviser Officer Commanding Police
Chief Police Officer District (O.C.P.D.)
Senior Army Commander Army Commander (either Bn
Executive Officer (Secretary) or Coy Commander)
Each committee appointed its own 
Chairman; either the Mentri Besar or 
British Adviser.
Information Officers, Special Branch Officers, and later Home Guard and 
Military Intelligence Officers were added; initially they were co-opted as 
required. Briggs stressed that Joint Operations and Joint Intelligence 
Rooms were to be set up and jointly staffed by Police and Army without 
regard to rank: 'It is immaterial whether the local military commander is
a Lieutenant-Colonel and the local Police Officer is a Sergeant or whether 
they are respectively a Major and a Superintendent; in each case they will 
establish a joint Headquarters and will work in the closest cooperation 
also with the local Administrative Officer'. Directive No. 2
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As Director of Operations, Briggs had only a small executive 
staff which consisted of one Civil, one Army, one Police and one Intelligence 
Officer.41 However, as the Emergency Directives were formulated, it was 
found that new Emergency measures had to be issued and old ones overhauled. 
Thus, the Government constantly found itself forced to communicate its 
intentions to the local population and, largely for this reason, but also to 
institute a more effective propaganda campaign against the insurgents, it 
appointed a Head of the Emergency Services, who became a member of the 
Director of Operations Executive Staff in June 1950.42
Emergency Resettlement - Relocation and Regroupment
Before reviewing the general progress of the Briggs Plan itself, 
there was one aspect of operational policy which required administrative 
reorganisation on a massive scale; this was the problem of the squatters. 
Squatting, the illegal occupation of vacant land, was a common form of 
Chinese land acquisition in pre-Emergency Malaya. Indeed, squatting had 
been endemic almost from the arrival of the first Chinese immigrants.
Living outside the law, they did not look for justice outside their own 
tight social system, or at least, felt they could not expect it from a 
British or Malay dominated Government. The Government, for its part, knew 
of the existence of the squatters and recognised the potential administrative 
problems they posed but saw no urgency to pursue them: they were after all,
largely out of sight and a useful, even a necessary source of foodstuffs and 
labour. The incidence of squatting, still almost entirely confined to 
Chinese, rose abruptly during the depression of 1931-34 and again during the 
Japanese occupation. The Japanese recognised the value of the Chinese
41 Initially they were: Civil Officer; R.G.K. (later Sir Robert) Thompson, 
formerly Adviser Chinese Affairs Perak, Assistant Commissioner for Labour, 
Perak, Member of Ferret Force, Head of Political and Intelligence Section, 
Internal Security Department. Army Officer; Lieutenant Colonel J.K, 
Shepherd, war service in North Africa and Normandy, formerly G.S.0.1 
(Ops) G.H.Q, FARELF. Police Officer; Mr. D,A. Weir, Acting Superintendent 
of Police, a member of DALFORCE, Officer Commanding Police District 
Kajang, Officer in Charge of C.I.D» Selangor, Intelligence Officer;
Major R.W. Saunders, had been head of Political Intelligence Centre,
Middle East.
42 The first temporary Head of the Emergency Information Service Mr. Alex 
Josey, was replaced by Mr. Carleton Green of the B.B.C, in September 
1950. Josey’s appointment was not confirmed, in his view because the 
liberal approach he intended to employ shocked his superiors.
Josey, Comments.
93.
squatters to the M.P.A.J.A. and in May 1944 started a drive against them all 
the way along the jungle edge from Grik to Kuala Kubu Bahru, a distance of 
190 miles. Each morning for several days they put up spotting aircraft which 
flew low over the area between the main road and the jungle. At the same time 
a cordon of trucks full of Indians and Malays were placed every fifty yards 
along a section of road to shoot anyone attempting to break out. Then the 
cordon closed in and anyone attempting to escape into the jungle was shot. 
Frequently, the only result achieved was to drive the young able-bodied men, 
who were forewarned by the conspicuous Japanese preparations into the jungle 
to swell the ranks of the communist guerrillas.43 Even after the Japanese 
surrender many squatters did not move back to the towns, rubber estates and 
tin mines from which they had come, and by 1948 they may have numbered 
500,000.44
When the M.C.P. began its armed revolt, great numbers of them 
enrolled in the Min Yuen, acting against the British as they had against the 
Japanese as spies, food suppliers, money lenders and propagandists. Many were 
armed and while they worked as rubber tappers or tin miners by day, they were 
insurgents by night.43 The need to separate the squatters from the insurgents 
was clearly perceived46 and an unsuccessful attempt made to solve the problem.
43 Chapman F.S.; Op.Cit., p 278.
44 Estimates vary widely. The Report of the Newboult Committee; February 1949 
(usually referred to as the Squatter Committee) stated that ’their numbers 
may well amount to several hundred thousand’ (S.T., 9th February 1949).
The round figure most commonly found in literature is 500,000 (e.g. Miller 
H.; The Communist Menace in Malaya, London, 1954, Chapter X.) Briggs refers 
to ’some 500,000 squatters’ (Briggs Report, p 1.) The British Operations 
Research Section, Far East, states that 432,000 squatters were resettled,
while the Director of Operations Review,_l'.~ 8-57 states that 'Over a period
of about two years, 423,000 Chinese squatters were resettled in 410 Mew 
Villages at a cost of M$41 million (Review 1948-57, p 17) . The figure given 
in Annual Report 1952 is 461,822. As the result of field work carried out 
by him in 1961-62 Kernial Singh Sandhu established that a total of 573,000 
persons were transferred into New Villages between 1950 and the end of the 
Emergency. Of these 300,000 were squatters, the vast majority Chinese.
The remaining 273,000 were legitimate occupiers of the land and were also 
predominantly Chinese. Sandhu K.S.; Emergency Resettlement in Malaya, Journal 
of Tropical Geography, Singapore, 1964, pp 164-165.
45 These were members of the Self Protection Corps, referred to in Chapter III.
46 For example, a plan prepared by H.Q. Malaya District in September 1948 
pointed out that the insurgents could not live otf the jungle and had to 
obtain food from sympathisers. The plan pointed to the squatters as the 
real problem, and dismissed the deployment and patrolling of troops as mere 
palliatives. H.Q. Malaya District, Local Defence Committee Minutes,
2nd December 1948.
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In Operation KUKRI, which took place in the Sungei Siput area on 15th 
October 1943, the town itself had been cordoned by troops and the 
inhabitants screened. Fourteen known insurgents had been apprehended and 
so many more detained that the screening operation had had to be 
temporarily suspended for lack of space in the detention camps. The 
squatters had been resettled but in an unprepared site, and of the ten 
thousand resettled, five hundred had promptly moved back when they found that 
there was no law against their doing so.47
In December 1948, a committee under the chairmanship of the 
Chief Secretary, Sir Alec Newboult, was set up to examine the squatter 
problem. The committee’s report was submitted in February 1949; its 
principal recommendations were: (a) Wherever possible, squatters should be 
settled in areas already occupied by them; (b) Where this was not possible, 
they should be resettled in an alternative suitable area; (c) Any squatters 
refusing settlement or resettlement should be repatriated; (d) Emergency 
measures to deal with the security problem of certain areas should be 
supported by administrative measures designed permanently to reestablish the 
authority of the government, and (e) Legal means should be introduced to 
provide for the evacuation of squatters by summary process.1’8
Under Emergency Regulation 17D introduced in January 1949, a 
total of sixteen operations were launched between then and October 1949 in 
various localities which resulted in the uprooting and detention of 6,343 
persons.1’8 Just after Briggs arrived, the Government stated that up to 10th 
March 1950, 11,683 squatters who had been detained were now ’settled’ i.e. 
in their original areas, 4,465 had been resettled in other locations, and 
2,396 on estates and mines had been regrouped.58 But the methods used in 
these early attempts - as demonstrated by Operation KUKR.I - were haphazard 
and inefficient and even Government statements concerning this early process 
are apologetic. There were seldon specific grounds for the removal and 
detention of these squatters and though some compensation was paid for the 
removal of property, and for livestock which had to be killed, it was meagre,
47 Q-H.R., G(0ps/SD) Branch FARELF, 31st December 1948.
48 F.L.C.M.C.P., 1950/51, pp B90-91 
1+8 M.C.P., Terrorism, p 16.
58 ibid ♦ , p 91.'
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and those resettled were deprived of their homes and means of livelihood 
until new crops could be grown.51 While it was more humane than the 
Japanese method, any relief the squatters may have felt at simply surviving 
was scarcely being turned into positive support. Moreover, the Government 
quickly realised that detention and deportation were of little use by 
themselves. To carry the policy to its logical conclusion would have meant 
the removal of practically the whole squatter population since almost every­
one was a willing or unwilling helper of the insurgents.52 Second, as the 
Chinese ports were closed by the southward advance of the Chinese Communist 
armies from early 1949 onwards, there was no place to send deportees. Nor 
was there any significant improvement in the security situation as a result 
of resettlement. The majority of the people removed were women, children 
and old men, the younger men in most cases slipping through the cordon.52 
Indeed, the latter may even have been induced by the process to become more 
willing and active supporters of the insurgents.
There was also a political problem. Much of the reason for 
procrastination prior to the arrival of Briggs was that the Malay rulers 
were not prepared to see land titles given to Chinese squatters, nor were 
they willing to have their taxes used to create resettlement areas with 
electric light, schools, clinics, police stations and other amenities which 
were all too often lacking in the Malay villages and Kampongs. However, 
unless title to land was given and unless resettled squatters were allowed to
live in dignity, resettlement threatened to become a cure worse than thei
disease. The difficulty of resolving this basic conflict in attitudes had 
been sufficient to delay resettlement for several years.
The squatter question was given high priority by Briggs:
"During the period (May 1950 - September 1950) certain problems were 
becoming more and more obvious. The first was that the problem of 
clearing communist banditry from Malaya was similar to that of 
eradicating malaria from a country. Flit guns and mosquito nets in the 
form of military and police, though giving some very local security
51 M.C,P., Banditry, p 28. In addition to those resettled during the years 
1949-52, some 26,000 including 24,000 Chinese and 2,000 Indians and 
Indonesians were deported.
52 Briggs Report, p 9.
52 Patterson G.S.; Masai Settlement Area, Mimeograph Johore Bahru, 1950, p 6. 
Only 10 men aged between 24-40 out of a total of 171 males of all ages 
were among 326 squatters moved to Masai in 1949.
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if continuously maintained, effected no permanent cure. Such a 
permanent cure entailed the closing of all the breeding areas. In 
this case the breeding areas of communists were the isolated squatter 
areas, the unsupervised labour on estates, especially small holders’ 
and Chinese estates without managers. ,,5lf
This pointed to a dual problem. It would not be enough merely to resettle
the squatters; estate and mine labour must be regrouped and concentrated so
that in turn the acquiescent could be protected, and the rebellious could be
controlled or caught; the economy must also continue to function. If it
ceased to do so, the problem of financing operations would become acute, and
the value of Malaya to the British economy - for which operations were
largely being undertaken - would be compromised. Secondly, these areas were
going to require a comprehensive range of facilities if they were to become
viable communities, including: (a) Protection; (b) Radio communications
adequate for security purposes; (c) Resettlement long huts and other
buildings; (d) A reception and administrative control organisation, and
(e) Intelligence agents placed among them. And, to make the plan socially
effective, administration would have to follow immediately on the domination
of the security forces. This would include: frequent visits by District
Officers and x^here possible agricultural officers; the establishment of
police posts in nex>7 communities and the establishment of local schools in
which Malay and the simple duties of a citizen could be taught along lines
acceptable to the British; dispensaries x^ould have to be established or
arrangements made for visits by travelling ones; a measure of simple
propaganda including mobile cinemas x^ould have to be introduced, and
finally, a degree of village responsibility in xtfhich permanent titles to
land and arrangements for cooperative marketing might act as rex^ards, x^hile
stoppage of trade might act as a punishment.55 Briggs also noted that xvhere
these services could not immediately be introduced the intention x^ as to be
expressed with the proviso that the better behaved areas Xv7ere to be given
priority. And, so that possible communal strife x^ /ould be defused at the
outset, improvements and facilities were to be applied equally in the Malay
kampongs and in the Chinese areas.56
55 Briggs Report, pp 17-18.
55 Ibid■, pp 11-12.
56 TkiA ™ 19Ibid. , p 12.
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Eventually an entire glossary of terras was created to describe 
the process loosely known as Resettlement, but in general it can be subdivided 
into two distinct processes: (1) Relocation, which involved the removal of
dispersed rural dwellers whether squatters or legitimate settlers, to prepared 
fortified sites often remote from their existing homes. In some cases this 
involved concentration and absorption of dispersed families into an existing 
village: in others it involved the establishment of a completely new 
settlement; and (2) Regroupment or regrouping, which involved the 
concentration and protection of estate and mine labour either within the 
property or close to it, with the emphasis on providing security within easy 
access of the community’s place of work.
Relocation was both complex and expensive, requiring a high 
degree of organisation. The choice of sites was governed by questions of 
economy, communications and security. The area chosen was preferably flat 
with open country around it so that the insurgents were denied a covered 
approach to the village. For similar reasons it was inadvisable to site the 
village close to dominating hills or surrounding features from which the 
insurgents could enfilade the area with fire. Since almost all the squatters 
conducted their own household'agriculture it was preferable for the village 
to be sited on good agricultural land. While theoretically each site was 
chosen after a thorough examination of the soils, water potential, 
accessibility and employment opportunities, many of the earlier resettlement 
schemes were mounted hurriedly and suffered from inadequate organisation and 
prior recconnaissance. In order to make villages easily accessible to 
reinforcement in case of attack, some were sited astride main roads. Eut as 
the villages were fenced and entrances gua 'ded they interrupted normal 
traffic. For this reason, later villages were sited adjacent to main roads 
rather than astride them. Notwithstanding this, the results of one study 
disclosed that of the more than 500 resettlement areas established between 
1950 and 1960, only six were abandoned and resettled elsewhere, mainly on 
security grounds.5'7
57 Sandhu K.S., Op.Cit., p 167. The relocation of squatters was almost 
entirely completed by the end of 1952, after which date only a few new 
villages were created in Kedah. Eighty per cent of these relocations 
were in western Malaya nearly half of them in Perak and Johore. 
According to Sandhu's figures, of the total population of these areas 
86% (493,000) were Chinese, 9% (52,000) were Malay, 4% (23,000) were 
Indian and 1% (5,000) were mixed Siamese, Javanese and Aborigines.
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To prevent the process of removal from being interfered with 
by the insurgents and to deter young men from escaping in advance into the 
jungle, it was generally conducted as an operation of war.
"From the very first hint of this new weapon against them," stated a 
contemporary report, "the communists had directed propaganda and terror 
tactics against squatter communities. They did everything possible 
to wreck resettlement. Their propaganda frenziedly told the squatters 
that resettlement was a plot to overthrow the masses movement. Their 
political groups tried to form cells and even protection corps among 
squatters before they were moved so that their work could be continued 
inside the settlements. In some areas they formed secret dormitories 
on the fringes of the jungle and tried to persuade young men always to 
sleep in them at night so that if the community were moved suddenly 
(and in many districts dominated by the communists, surprise tactics 
by the government were essential) they x^ ould be left out."58
Thus the government planned the removal of the squatters in 
fine detail. Once the new site had been selected, huts wTere erected and 
the new village was guarded by the army. Then before first light on the day 
of removal the squatter area was surrounded by troops who then assisted the 
squatters to load their families and belongings onto trucks which transported 
them to the new area. All crops, gardens and buildings which could not be 
removed were destroyed, for which the squatters received compensation. In 
the latter stages when the resettlement procedure had become relatively 
streamlined, teams of social welfare workers, nurses and doctors arrived 
with the troops and every man, woman and child who was willing was medically 
examined and sent to hospital if suffering from any disease or illness.3"
Although the kindness and compassion with which most of the 
troops carried out resettlement has been favourably commented on by a number 
of writers,68 the removal process was a thoroughly demoralising experience 
for the squatters.61 For these isolated fo_k whose previous contact with 
the civil administration was scant, the sudden appearance of foreign troops 
in overwhelming strength and obviously in a hurry to have the squatters 
secured in the new site by nightfall of the same day, did little to reassure 
their spirits, particularly those who were now entirely cut off from their
58 Miller, Menace, pp 149-150.
58 Pelzer K.J.; Resettlement in Malaya, The Yale Review, Vol. 41, 1952 
p 84 and Miller, Menace, p 150.
68 For example Miller, Jungle War, p 75.
61 Robinson, Transformation, p 93.
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previous source of livlihood (and in some cases, solid profit) and were 
forced to start afresh in entirely alien surroundings. Nor can it be claimed 
that resettlement was always successful in severing the links between the 
insurgents and the squatters. Although the squatters were screened by the 
police (often using informers) during the resettlement process, the 
inadequacy both of police methods and of Special Branch information 
particularly during 1950 and early 1951 resulted in some cases in acomplete 
insurgent Branch Organisation being permitted to move into resettlement areas 
along with the other squatters and provided the nucleus on which a strong 
insurgent support organisation was later formed.52
Yet despite such loopholes in the general process, the attempts
by the insurgents to interfere with resettlement on any significant scale
were a complete failure. Apart from harrassing some villages with fire from
nearby hills, and the penetration of some areas by insurgent food gathering
parties, the inability of the insurgents to effectively disrupt the process
demonstrated a lack of enterprise and exposed the logistical fragility of
their organisation. One insurgent document captured in Johore stated:
"If the masses are unwilling to oppose resettlement they are to be 
intimidated, and any of the masses trying to take refuge in the jungle 
(i.e. with the insurgents),-as a result of our agitation should be 
tactfully discouraged and induced to return to their houses owing to 
the shortage of food in the jungle."03
And, even though the defence of the resettlement areas was, in the initial
stages, rudimentary to say the least, on no occassion during the Emergency
was a resettlement area overrun and captured by an insurgent group.*34
Although less spectacular as an example of social engineering, 
Regroupment was more complex than Relocation. There were some 1,500 places 
of employment which required this process a d in all, a total of 650,000 
persons are estimated to have been regrouped.53 Regroupment areas were
52 Madoc, Interview.
53 Miller, Menace, p 152.
5t+ Madoc, Interview. Miller, Jungle War, p 76.
55 Indians were the predominant group in estate regroupments forming 50%.
The remainder were Chinese (25%), Malay (16%) and Javanese (5%). This was 
quite dissimilar to the structure of the relocation areas where the 
preponderant racial group was Chinese. However, in the tin-rich Kinta 
Valley of Perak the Chinese were the dominant group in the mining 
regroupment areas where they virtually monopolised the labour, and ox'/ned 
many of the smaller mines.
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generally small compared with new villages and on the mines in particular 
the effects of regroupment were not so marked. In many areas men who were 
both miners and small farmers had already been relocated; this was especially 
the case with Chinese mines. Many of the European mine owners on the other 
hand relocated their labour within the mining sites. At times this involved 
little more than the wiring in of existing living quarters and the provision 
of a few guards. The cost of regroupment which was borne substantially by 
the estate and mining companies concerned was a source of friction between 
the estate and mine officials and the Government and continued to vex both 
Briggs and General Templer. Moreover, from January 1951, the problem 
became increasingly urgent as more and more squatter communities were 
relocated and the insurgents deprived of this channel of support, they 
increasingly turned their attention to labourers on estates and mines. Re­
grouping Committees which included representatives of the planting and mining 
employers interests were formed to try and solve the problem. In practice it 
was found difficult to frame a policy which would cover all situations. For 
example, to avoid closer regrouping many planters preferred to engage 
Auxiliary Police to patrol the dispersed labour lines at their own expense 
whereas others felt that the Government should pay all the expenses of re­
grouping including the hire, of Auxiliary Police. Again, the Police, due to 
the expansion of its regular force, drew on the Special Constabulary (formed 
expressly to guard estates and mines) and in some areas considerably 
reduced the numbers of Special Constables to the concern of the mining and 
planting managers. To aggravate the problem, the employment of Regular 
Police and Auxiliary Police doing one job under different conditions of pay, 
was unacceptable to the Planting and Mining Associations because of the 
difficulties of maintaining morale among two groups of men who were equally 
likely to be shot at. Finally, a firm directive was issued on 26th January 
195i which empowered Mentri Mentri Besar and Resident Commissioners to 
order the owners or occupiers of land to erect or maintain the requisite 
buildings, wire enclosures and defensive arrangements on their land. In 
turn, the Government accepted responsibility for a proportion of the costs.00
A parallel security measure was the relocation of isolated 
Malay and Aborigine settlements. The relative immunity of the Malays from 
infiltration by the insurgents was recognised in the resettlement program, 
for only some forty Malay villages were resettled, while some that seemed
66 Briggs Report, p 23.
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physically exposed were not.6/ Most of the relocation of Malays involved 
little or no planning and entailed the concentration of dispersed katnpong 
dwellers closer to main roads, usually to an area where police protection 
was available. Those moved were paid $100 compensation.63 While the Malay 
resettlement areas, unlike the Chinese and Indian areas were not wired in, 
they did not enjoy the social amenities which became characteristic of the 
Chinese New Villages in their final development. Moreover, for the reasons 
which caused their original areas to be occupied in the first place, the 
attraction to return once security improved was often strong and, since the 
end of the Emergency, almost all the relocated Malay lcampongs have gone 
back to their former settlements.63
One experiment which was both strategically unwise and, In 
human terms an appalling disaster was the resettlement of the Aborigines.
There were an estimated 55,000 Aborigines in Malaya in 1950, at least half 
of them in the interior and to a greater or lesser extent under the control 
of the insurgents, who increasingly, as resettlement took hold of the 
squatters relied on them for supplies and information. Although five 
relocation settlements are known to have been established, none was successful 
and all were ultimately abandoned. In addition to the problems which arose 
from the lack of an experienced civilian staff who could understand their
°7 For example, a patrol of the Royal Scots Fusiliers was surprised to find 
a Malay village that had been untouched though it was deep within the 
jungle of North Malaya, The village had not been moved because its 
people had a record of resisting insurgent pressure and had killed several 
insurgents. ’Operation Kastor’, Journal of the Royal Scots Fusiliers,
July 1955.
63 Markandan P.; The Problem of the New Villages in Malaya, Singapore,
1954, p 14.
63 It is difficult to be certain of the number of New Villages which have 
since been abandoned. In 1954, the Government appointed Mr. W.C.S. Corry 
to make a general survey of New Villages. He listed a total of 439 New 
Villages and classified them according to their degree of permanency. He 
considered that 69% were ’Supposedly permanent’, 18% ’Intermediate', 3% 
’Unclassified’ and 10% ’Supposedly impermanent and likely to disappear 
with the Emergency'. However, during field-work in 1962, Sandhu found 
that 47% of the ’Supposedly Impermanent’ New Villages (i.e, 25) still 
existed and were likely to remain. This would leave 410 villages remaining 
in existence. However, the Federation Government's Weekly Digest (usually 
referred to by its Malayan name, Sari Berita) of 31st May 1962, stated 
that 400 New Villages with a population of 300,000 were still in being as 
permanent settlements and, 'were integrated into the rural development 
programme'. One inhibiting factor which decided families and communities 
against returning to their former areas was cost. On average it cost 
M$300,000 to establish a New Village for 1,000 people. Report of the 
Committee on the Problems Resulting from Resettlement in Kluang.
Kluang 1957, p 2.
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primitive culture, many of the Aborigines themselves lost the will to live 
in alien conditions, and literally thousands died as a result.70
Moreover, as deep jungle operations against the insurgents 
became an accepted practice, it was quickly realised that the former policy 
of resettling Aborigines had denuded whole areas of the interior, and in 
the process had created intelligence vacuums. Thereafter, every effort was 
made to return displaced groups to their original areas or at least to the 
vicinity of their hereditary locations. To encourage this, and to protect 
loyal groups of Aborigines from a reassertion of insurgent influence, a 
series of jungle ’forts’ were established. Each was little more than an 
area hacked out of the jungle at which a Police Post of platoon strength 
(30 men) was established, and a light aircraft strip was built. By the end 
of 1955, eleven forts had been established and by encouraging trade and 
eventually (through the Federal Adviser, and State Protectors of Aborigines) 
by establishing a health and education programme, it was estimated that only 
500-600 Aborigines still remained firmly on the side of the insurgents, and 
outside the Government’s influence.71
Consequences of Resettlement . -t
The social consequences of resettlement can only be 
adumbrated here, but it is not too much to state that the process 
substantially changed the human geography of Malaya. For census purposes, 
settlements with 1,000 inhabitants or more were classed as urban; between 
the census of 1947 and 1957, the number of urban centres increased from 163 
to 400, largely as a result of resettlement. The Chinese urban population 
increased by 110% in this period compared with a 62% increase in the period 
1931-1947.72
70 Madoc, Interview. I cannot find a published Government source to 
confirm the estimate of deaths among Aborigines due to Resettlement.
71 These Jungle Forts were: LEGAP, KEMAR and SELIM in Perak; DIXON, SHEAN, 
TELANOH, ISKANDAR and SINDERUT in Pahang; BROOKE and GHABAI in Kelantan; 
and LANGKAP in Negri Sembilan. Eventually a total of 14 were established. 
D of 0 Directive No. 37 issued on 1st February 1956.
72 Del Tufo, pp 44-48, Vlieland, pp 42-48, 1957 Census pp 1-11. The Malay 
urban population increased by 120% between 1947-57, compared to only 7% 
between 1931-47. However, while the increase in the Malay urban 
population was chiefly the result of a drift to the towns, the increase 
among the Chinese was primarily due to Resettlement.
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Relocation in a number of cases disrupted peoples means of 
livlihood, and many were forced to change their occupations. A sample survey 
in Salak South New Village in Selangor carried out in 1953, showed that two- 
thirds of the settlers had been forced to abandon their former agricultural 
occupations.72 For the New Villages as a whole, the percentage of 
agriculturalists dropped from an estimated 60% in 1950 to 27% in 1952, while 
the proportion of wage earners in the rubber and tin industries rose from 
25% to 55%.73
Overall, resettlement had an appreciable effect on the 
national economy. In the short term the production of food crops and rice 
fell, and rubber production also suffered; tin production was adversely 
affected and, had not prices of both rubber and tin been inflated as a result 
of the Korean War, Malaya might have faced immense budgetary problems in 
1951-2 when national expense stemming from the programme was at its height. 
Against this there were advantages in both the short term and the long: 
the easier access of the communities to main roads, and the improved security, 
meant that better market and credit facilities could be made available, while 
amenities which the rural population had not previously enjoyed were now 
available in all New Villages.'*■ Moreover, the concentration of previously 
dispersed squatters into responsible social entities permitted the growth 
of political sophistication within the framework determined by the 
Government and led ultimately to a massive increase in Federal citizenship.
The squatters, in short, were substantially integrated into the new Malaya 
envisaged by the British and. the non-Cornmunist Malayans, while the new 
Malaya envisaged by the M.C.P. was deprived, for the forseeable future, of 
such social basis as it had.
However, for the purpose of this study, the most important 
consequence of resettlement was that it provided a means of clearing the 
battlefield. But while it permitted the essential links between the 
insurgents in the jungle, and their supporters among the previously decentral­
ised squatters and unsupervised labourers to be defined and eventually cut 
by the Security Forces, its success as a technique did not really become 
apparent until Briggs himself had left Malaya and its slow progress was 
inseparable from an array of parallel problems which Briggs experienced as
72 Corry Report, p 12.
73 Sandhu; Op.Cit., p 179.
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Director of Operations
Progress Under the Briggs Plan
Despite the optimism of Briggs' earlier statement of 21st 
July 1950, the plan quickly encountered difficulties which required its 
extensive modification.
Operations in Johore rapidly fell behind schedule, and while 
this was partially due to the slow pace of Resettlement, it was principally 
a result of the unfortunate choice of Johore as the geographical starting 
point for the campaign. The general problem of insecurity in Johore was 
aggravated by certain factors: proximity to the predominantly Chinese city
of Singapore from which financial support for the insurgents came; the 
concentrations of Chinese in the urban areas of the state and on the rubber 
plantations; the special place of Johore in Malayan history as one of the 
earliest seats of M.C.P. strength; and, the particular suitability of 
certain parts of the state for guerrilla warfare i.e. the coexistence of 
areas of thick jungle or swamp with rubber and palm oil estates. And, 
although the Government spoke enthusiastically of 'one hundred square miles 
of bandit territory around Yong Peng in South Johore being "blitzed in 
combined military, police and civil operations', this optimism proved 
unfounded, and until 1958, this area held out against overwhelming 
concentrations of troops and police.71' Without the Government admitting it 
publicly, the original Briggs conception of clearing the map from south to 
north was, from early in 1951, quietly abandoned.
Nevertheless Briggs had placed his greatest confidence in the 
methodical conception of a 'steady-squeeze' process to interdict the 
insurgents' supply lines and he gave this idea his closest attention. First, 
he reviewed the tactics being employed by the Security Forces, which 
showed that the concept of the 'framework' was not being adhered to. Some 
commanders claimed perversely that the dispersion of troops which this 
entailed was opposed to the principle of Concentration of Force: hence they
abandoned their allotted areas for long periods in order to undertake large 
operations and 'sweeps' elsewhere. Meanwhile, the security of the areas 
left unguarded was being jeopardised. To overcome this Briggs issued a 
tactical directive which stressed the importance of maintaining the 
'framework' and of operating in small controlled units:
714 S .T. ; 6th August 1950. Templer, for example, invariably referred to the 
area as 'bloody Yong Peng'.
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"A strong section is a match for any bandit gang especially if it 
uses 'Sting and disappear' tactics,” stated Briggs, "Seldom do more 
than the first few men get the chance of fire action. Moreover, 
such section patrols are more controllable, adaptable, less noisy 
and hence less vulnerable. They are thus more mobile and capable 
of surprise. Their task is similar to that of big-game hunters."75
The principles contained in this directive were put into effect on 15th
November 1950 and Briggs was later able to quote favourable statistics to
support his contention that sticking to the 'framework' was the
fundamentally sound course; but he could not command the troops and police
to do so. He could only direct his intentions through the G.O.C., Malaya
and the Commissioner of Police, and the executive impotence of this
arrangement retarded the real effectiveness of his office. Second,'to
commit the Chinese population to the active support of the Government he
conceived a Home Guard scheme. Some Chinese on whom the ferocity of
terrorism fell, desired to help in their own defence. On the other hand
they were not prepared to volunteer to join the Security Forces and deny
themselves the better wages they could earn elsewhere. Briggs felt that
many would welcome being ordered to help, especially in a collective form.
The Home Guard was introduced, by which each village and resettlement area
was to form and train a Home Guard; and once the District Officer felt
convinced of its loyalty, it was to be issued a proportion of shotguns. A
* f
headman for each village and Home Guard was to be nominated under the 
supervision of the District Officer. Each house in the village was to have 
a Tenant-in-Chief who x-zould be responsible to the Headman for reporting the 
names and movements of people in his area of the village. In large towns, 
armed and uniformed Auxiliary Police Companies were to be formed, as well as 
a Home Guard for registration of the population.70
While the scheme was, in the long term, to be hailed as a 
considerable success in practice it suffered many changes in a short period 
of time. For a start, there were insufficient shotguns even for the few 
advanced Home Guard units and the men were armed with batons instead. With 
the arrival of a Civil Defence Commissioner in preparation for possible 
external war, the Home Guard organisation was amalgamated with Civil Defence,
75 Tactical Directive No. 1, p 3.
D of 0, Directive No. 11 issued 11th June 1951. Briggs and his advisers 
also discerned the distinct psychological possibilities in harnessing the 
deep-seated Chinese desire to acquire power and authority in a group 
situation. The hierarchical organisation of the Home Guard would permit 
this to be put to constructive use. This aspect of the Chinese 'mind' is 
excellently covered in Pye5 p 277 et.seq.
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and Coast-watching was added as a further responsibility. Later again, 
Kampong Guards which in 1949 had been formed in Malay villages and armed 
with shotguns were also included in the Civil Defence organisation. Although 
the Home Guards operated under the control of the local police, they were 
trained and administered by a separate organisation. This excision of the 
Home Guard from complete police control was a major cause of friction between 
Briggs and the Commissioner of Police, W.N. Gray, whose dissimilar 
temperaments and strongly held professional views eventually caused an 
irreparable breach between the two men.77
Thus, while the Home Guard scheme was imaginatively conceived,
it was not until Briggs had left Malaya that it became really effective.
Third, while Briggs was emphatic in stressing the need for an overhaul of the
intelligence service, the response was slow. Briggs had made his initial
representations to Gurney in April, and a study group later known as the
Joint Intelligence Advisory Committee was organised in May. In August, a
Director of Intelligence was appointed. Yet not until twelve months after
that in later opinion, had an adequate number of officers been engaged for
the Special Branch. Nevertheless, the Joint Intelligence Advisory Committee
in a report submitted on 24th October 1950, stated that:
"in spite of more than two years of Government effort and increasing 
military and air support, the Communist potential has increased and 
the organisation is now able still further to increase its activities".78
Thus, after two years of continuing effort to combat a 
relatively low keyed insurrection and despite the efficacy of several 
measures introduced by him, the position in Malaya was clearly deteriorating. 
On 1st November 1950, Briggs reported to the Officer Administering the 
Government in the following terms:
"At the present rate of progress it is my considered opinion that the 
morale of the population will drop to a level below the danger point 
and further losses occur before the plan can take effect. Without the 
adoption of the gravest steps being taken both by His Majesty’s
77 Catling, Waller and Madoc, Interviews.
78 Between June 1948 and October 1950 the Police Force had almost doubled 
(from 9,000 to 16,000); there were 43,000 Special Constables where there 
had been none in June 1948; and, the number of Infantry Battalions had 
increased from 10 to 19. But in the same period the monthly figure of 
major insurgent inspired incidents had increased from 82 (April 1950)
to 201 (October 1950) while the casualties inflicted on the insurgents 
by the Security Forces decreased from 73 to 61, (Appendix B).
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Government and the Federation Government, I cannot hold myself 
responsible for preventing this”.78
That such a report had to be written at all, was a grave 
indictment of a situation which the Governments of both Malaya and the 
United Kingdom had been actively concerned with since June 1948. Yet not 
only had the M.C.P. survived, its strength had increased.
Briggs considered the situation so serious that, accompanied 
by the Secretary for Defence, he flew to London and in late November put his 
views to the Prime Minister in a series of conferences.88 His proposals 
were generally accepted, and included a xHiole range of civil, police and 
military measures.
Within the civilian sector there had always been an inordinate
delay in the provision for finance for the War Council and State War
Executive Committees. It was now accepted that lump-sum appropriations would
be made, and the tiresome process of appropriating item by item would be
abandoned. Again, much time was being lost by government departments in the
preparation for and proceedings of Legislative Council meetings at a time
when the services of officials were urgently needed in matters directly
sconnected with the Emergency, er.g. Resettlement. For this reason Briggs 
argued, greater efforts should be made to recruit officials, especially 
Chinese speaking officials in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, and in the 
meantime the leave due to officials presently serving in the Federation 
should be curtailed.81 Moreover, to give greater official weight to the 
deliberations of the Federal War Council, he asked that less frequent 
meetings of the Legislative Council be held, and that future meetings of the 
War Council be chaired by the High Commissioner himself.
There was also the continuing problem of detainees. In May 
'3 Briggs Report, p 21.
8(1 Ibid. , p 22. These conferences were also attended by the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, the Chiefs of Staff, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and members of Cabinet. Gurney, who wTas on leave in England 
at the time also attended.
81 For example, the Commissioner of Police, whose force was undergoing
an unprecedented expansion, was on vacation leave in the United Kingdom 
from 26th January to 16th July 1951, a period of almost six months.
It was during his absence that the controversy regarding the lack of 
armoured vehicles for the police (referred to subsequently) broke in 
the Malayan and British press. Annual Report, 1951, p 199.
108.
1950, there were 10,500 awaiting repatriation to China and the number was 
increasing by 350 per month. After 1949, the Chinese authorities had been 
reluctant to allow such people to land, but Briggs also concluded that the 
British Government’s tardiness in recognizing the problem was an even 
greater stumbling block:
"Were the Chinese community which is the main breeding place of 
communism, aware that to aid the communists meant deportation from 
Malaya, an immediate improvement in the situation would result. This 
is the one great request of the Malay and loyal Chinese population."32
Due to the differing circumstances in relation to security 
which prevailed between Singapore and the Federation, immigration and visits 
of students to the former had continued. Since many of the students in 
Briggs words 'were already contaminated with communism', he asked that such 
immigration be restricted. He also asked that direction of manpower be 
introduced with the primary aim of providing Chinese recruits for the police 
and, most controversial of all, he called where necessary for the imposition 
of collective punishment on uncooperative towns and villages.33
For Briggs, another constant source of anxiety was the Police.
So serious had the deterioration in the morale and efficiency of the Police
■)
Force become, that each succeeding month had seen a disproportionately high 
casualty rate as the result of successful insurgent ambushes. Considerable 
quantities of arms were lost by the police especially rifles and sub-machine 
guns.34 Much of this was due to rapid expansion and lack of essential 
training, but there were other reasons such as the mixing of Regular Police 
with Special Constables previously referred to and, more significantly, the 
controversial decision by the Commissioner of Police not to armour police
82 Ibid., p 43.
33 Ibid,, p 21. In the event, direction of manpower was only partially 
effective. States were given the power to direct any single male person 
in the Federation between 18 and 24 to serve in the police force. The 
fact that this was not done simultaneously in all states led to an exodus 
from one state to another, to Singapore, and even to China. For example, 
between February and December 1951, 9,648 males of call-up age entered 
Singapore from the Federation to escape the draft. Annual Report 1951,
p 211. Collective punishment is discussed in Chapter V.
34 Up until the time that Briggs left Malaya, the police continued to lose 
more weapons than were captured from the insurgents. For example, in 
1951 the insurgents captured 184 more weapons than they lost.
Government Press Statement, 3rd January 1952.
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vehicles which were consequently highly vulnerable when ambushed. Each of
these factors added its quota of friction within a force already disturbed by
inter racial disharmony. As Briggs had pointed out shortly after his arrival:
"The Chinese have a repugnance of joining army or police forces; nor will 
they volunteer at rates of pay lower than they can get in civilian life, 
which are far greater than those earned by the Malays. It stands to 
reason that a Malay Police Force is greatly handicapped in attempting to 
police a Chinese population.1,88
Moreover, Chinese of the right quality were not in Briggs’ opinion being 
attracted even into the more highly paid detective branch of the police, where 
most of the 400 Chinese were of ’poor quality’.88 This accummulation of 
problems meant among other things, that the formation of forty five Police 
Jungle Companies as a para-military force designed to release military units 
for Britain’s strategic committments elsewhere had to be restricted, and by 
September 1951 only ten were operating. Indeed, Briggs was so concerned 
with the demoralised condition of the Police Force that he reported in 
exasperation:
"the only really stable factors in this Malayan situation at present 
are the Army and the Royal Air Force and upon them the main burden 
of maintaining the Country’s security depends."07
And, lest it be thought that as a retired professional soldier, Briggs was
being unduly partisan towards t^ he armed services, the Commissioner of Police
in a report of his own admitted that:
"Police and other intelligence services have so far failed to obtain 
the information which is vital to success.... The efficiency of the 
Police Force must be raised; and in particular that of Special Branch."88
But the army too had its problems. Although it can be claimed 
that the armed services in the Federation were better oriented and prepared 
for the tempo of Emergency operations than were some other departments, it was 
not until November, 1950 that Briggs was able to prevail on the C-in-C 
FARELF - who was the overall commander of troops in the theatre - to waive the 
annual two months period of general training, which was an unnecessary 
distraction from the more exacting if less orthodox training and conditioning
JJ In October 1951, for example, there still remained a shortfall in police 
officers of 51, of police lieutenants 70, and of Asian Inspectors 182. 
Briggs Report, p 35,
86 Ibid., p 45.
87 Ibid-, P 45.
88 Gray Report, p 10.
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required for countering the insurgents.89
Similar problems existed in regard to the provision of 
equipment of all types. Although food control had been introduced in June 
1951 in an endeavour to prevent supplies reaching the insurgents, it could 
only really become effective when the population was thoroughly controlled 
and its security guaranteed. Most resettlement areas were not surrounded 
by wire, and their perimeters could easily be penetrated at some point by 
insurgent gangs operating nearby. Briggs had continually drawn attention 
to the lack of barbed wire for resettlement areas, but when he left Malaya, 
of 2,156 tons of wire ordered several months before, less than half had 
arrived.90 Moreover, there were sufficient tactical radio sets to fit out 
only ten of the forty-five Police Jungle Companies; even green clothing for 
troops and police was in short supply. In general, the whole problem of 
providing equipment for operational needs, had not significantly improved 
since 1949 when one acute observer of the Emergency had written derisively 
of Britain’s 'Half Cocked War in Malaya’.91
The Departure of Briggs
When Briggs left Malaya on 1st December 1951,92 very few of 
the improvements called for abov’e had been effected. In some areas the 
supply of materiel had improved, but the barbed wire and floodlighting sets 
for the resettlement areas had not arrived and there was a shortage of 341 
Armoured Vehicles for the police. The shortage of key officials continued 
to hamper operations especially resettlement and the development of an 
effective Home Guard; in addition the efficiency of the Police Force 
remained uncertain. In Briggs’ words:
89 Briggs Report, p 46.
90 Ibid., p 55.
91 S,T., 31st December 1951.
92 At the request of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Briggs took 
up his appointment in Malaya on 3rd April 1950 for a suggested minimum 
period of one year. At the same time he placed a maximum period on his 
tenure of eighteen months. He later agreed to an extension to twenty 
months. Briggs Report, p 3. In the latter months of his tour Briggs’ 
health had not been good (Gray, Comments). He died in retirement in 
Cyprus on 27th October 1952, less than a year after leaving
Malaya.
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"Our main efforts must now be directed at making the Police Force 
capable of being the spearhead of our attack, at committing the 
Chinese actively to our side and at intensifying all our efforts 
both administrative and military to maintain the morale of the people 
of Malaya by increased physical and social security and by successes 
against the Communist cells and armed gangs. By so doing we shall 
finally break the Communist morale."33
Although neither Briggs, nor anyone else, was aware of it at the time, the
combined effects of the Briggs Plan, and the M.C.P.'s own internal doctrinal
problems, had launched the insurgent organisation on an irreversible slide
towards destruction. But despite this, many of the enterprises which Briggs
himself had striven to achieve as Director of Operations remained embryonic.
It had taken almost seven months until November 1950, before the main elements
of his plan had begun to be implemented. Almost a year later, 331,000 out
of a total of 573,000 people had been resettled and 315 out of a total of
439 new villages had been established. But in addition to this backlog, the
problem of regrouping labour had also to be faced and was at least as
formidable an enterprise.
With deep satisfaction Briggs noted that where Resettlement 
had taken place over fifty per cent of ’bandit’ casualties were the result of 
information obtained from the public, as against chance encounters on the 
jungle fringes. 3 Captured documents also showed that not only was 
resettlement tending to strangle their normal food supply lines, but insurgent 
attempts to impede the process had been completely f rus trcited.3 5 However, in 
Johore, where the tempo of the Emergency could not be raised to the intensity 
which Briggs required, the incident rate after an initial drop rose again, 
and the hold which the insurgents retained over their supporters both 
willing and unwilling, appeared to be as strong as ever.
Before Briggs arrived, there had been little or no cohesion 
among the representatives of government, police and armed services and while 
formally at least he ’took the strings that were tugging in all directions 
and wove them into a rope of coordination and planned action',33 Briggs 
himself was well aware that the reality was less substantial, and that a 
higher degree of centralised control of the Emergency was essential. For
3 3 Briggs Report, p 38.
94 Ibid., p 27.
35 Ibid., p 42.
96 S .T., 2nd December 1951.
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example, only in areas where abundant goodwill existed among its members, 
was the War Executive Committee System working effectively. Elsewhere it 
was frequently unresponsive, and in some cases downright farcical. In an 
attempt to intensify operations in Johore in May 1951, Briggs temporarily 
modified the War Executive Committee System by appointing two Brigadiers in 
that state to be Deputy Directors of Operations:
"In these areas," stated Briggs, "operational needs must take priority 
and quick decisions must be made and acted on, which necessitate that 
the Committee method of control must to some extent give way to unified 
command."97
In view of the plenary powers which were later entrusted to General Templer, 
it seems surprising that this solution was not applied sooner but its 
possibilities were not recognised at the time either by Gurney or by the 
British Government. In any case, Briggs lacked the administrative authority 
to make the expedient function effectively, and having been employed with 
limited success in this single instance, it was not persisted in.
To a considerable degree Briggs was a casualty of the tardy 
official recognition which Malaya's special problems were accorded by the 
British Government of the day; a backwater status which declined almost to 
strategic dereliction as Britain became increasingly involved with the 
problems of the Korean War. It is difficult to estimate how much greater 
Briggs' contribution might have been had Gurney asked for a Director of 
Operations two years earlier. As it was he was denied the real executive 
power which the nature of his office demanded.
After Gurney's murder, and less than two months before he 
himself left Malaya, Briggs wrote finally to the Officer Administering the 
Government on the subject of executive responsibility. His powers at that 
time were: (1) to coordinate the operations of the Services, the Police and - 
subject to the High Commissioner's directions-the Administration towards 
the Emergency; (2) to decide the general tactical policy, and (3) to plan 
new measures requiring the agreement of the War Council.98 In each case the 
professional head had the right of appeal and under no circumstances did 
Briggs possess powers over domestic issues within a force, even when they 
interfered with the effective prosecution of the Emergency. In the case of 
the Police Force in particular this became an onerous restriction:
97 Briggs Report, p 63.
98 Ibid., p 69.
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"There are certain matters of Police policy, organisation and training," 
stated Briggs, "in which I consider a major change necessary and without 
which I can see little hope of improved efficiency in the Police as a 
whole. Discussion and written representations have had no effect so 
far and it raises the question of whether the Director of Operations can 
hold himself responsible unless such changes are made."39
The solution which Briggs advocated was that the Director of Operations
should be in the High Commissioner's complete confidence and have delegated
to him executive powers over the Defence Branch, and all local forces
including the police; in addition a combined planning staff should exist for
Emergency as well as defence matters. Such proposals seem unexceptionable in
retrospect, yet it was to require the vastly increased authority of Briggs'
successor General Templer, before they were implemented really effectively.
Increased powers were granted belatedly to Briggs during the week 




THE IMPACT OF TEMPLER
A few minutes before 1 o'clock on the afternoon of 6th October 
.1951, Sir Henry Gurney was ambushed and killed as he motored up the road to 
Fraser's Hill, a hill resort sixty miles from Kuala Lumpur.
The ambush party, 38 men of an independent platoon of the 
M.R.L.A., led by Siu Mah, had been in position for almost two days before 
Gurney's Rolls Royce, preceded by an escort of five policemen in an unarmoured 
Land Rover, came into view. When the ambush was sprung, the Land Rover and 
its occupants were quickly put out of action. The insurgents then 
concentrated their fire on the Rolls Royce. It swung to a halt, its tyres 
burst by bullets. In the midst of the firing Sir Henry Gurney got out, closed 
the door, and calmly began to walk towards the high bank on which the ambush 
party was established; he was killed before he reached it. In the car, which 
had been penetrated many times, Lady Gurney, the High Commissioner's private 
secretary and the driver, remained unwounded. Gurney had diverted the fire 
onto himself to save the othersy
Yet despite the nobility of his final action, Gurney's death 
was unnecessary, and it was accompanied by a succession of tragic ironies 
symptomatic of a losing cause. The ambush had been set up, not to kill Gurney- 
but to capture weapons and ammunition from a police convoy which regularly 
used this road. Gurney, moreover, disliked large escorts, and what he had, 
had been mismanaged. When the only armoured vehicle, a Scout Car, had 
stalled further down the road, he went on without it, and it was still 700 
yards back when the ambush took place. Thus, the escort was sufficient only 
to attract attention not to be effective.2 Furthermore, the Royal West Kent 
Regiment, in whose operational area the ambush took place, had not been 
informed of Gurney's journey.3
1 Siu Mah had commanded the attack on Batu Arang, Malaya's only coal-mine, 
on 12th July 1948. S.T., 14th July 1948; and Madoc, Interview.
2 The road to Fraser's Hill was ambush prone and v/as officially classified 
'Red' (dangerous). Police, Army and V.I.P.'s who had to use it were under 
orders to travel in convoy or under heavy escort. Miller, Jungle War, p 77.
3 Blaxland, Regiments, p 97.
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At other times and in other places High Commissioners, like 
royalty, had been blown up or shot down, and although one statement asserted 
that this event ’sent a wave of shock through the country, jolting the people 
in the cities out of their apathy’,4 its effect within Malaya itself was 
almost entirely negative. For a start it came after three years of consistent 
arid public underestimation of the strength of the insurrection. And, seen in 
relation to contemporary events, and even allowing for the cautious respect in 
which Gurney was held by most communities, his death had more the 
characteristics of an incipient debacle rather than of an immediate disaster. 
Politically, it coincided with premonitions of racial strife. On 16th
J
September, Dato Onn bin Ja’afar, President of the United Malay Nationalist 
Organisation (U.M.N.O,)» had launched a new party, the Independence of 
Malaya Party (I.M.P.), on a basic platform of equality for all races.
Although the party gained scant support in the ensuing months, the strength of 
Dato Onn’s prestige threatened to cause a disastrous split among the Malays. 
Almost simultaneously, Dato Onn was himself deposed from the Presidency of his 
former party, and the new leadership, taking its stand on the basis of 
aggressive communalism, resurrected the old 1946 slogan, ’Malaya for the 
Malays’.' Strategically, the Briggs Plan seemed to be in ruins. Many 
squatters had been resettled bu£ seemed either indifferent to their own 
security or sullenly hostile. The Mawai Resettlement area in Johore, the 
first to be formally established, had to be abandoned on 19th October, 
because in its present situation it could not be defended.^ And then, on 
22nd October, not 30 miles from the scene of Gurney's death, a platoon of the 
Royal West Kent Regiment lost sixteen men killed and as many wounded in the 
worst vehicle ambush of the Emergency.7
‘,L Clutterbuck, Long War, p 79. In my opinion based on interviews with Madoc, 
C.C. Too and Waller this effect was evanescent. It is significant that in 
an editorial of 20th February 1952 the Straits Times noted: 'The murder of 
Sir Henry Gurney loosed against the communists an anger and a bitterness 
which could have been directed into effective assault. That opportunity 
was lost. The visit of the Secretary of State revived hope of immediate 
more vigorous direction of the war, but Mr. Oliver Lyttleton left Malaya in 
mid-December, and impatient weeks passed before General Templer’s 
appointment was announced. It is plain that many of the decisions which 
must be taken, and which we have known for months must be taken, were 
left to await the new High Commissioner's arrival.'
5 Political Report October 1951, p 2.
6 S .T,, 1st November 1951.
7 M.C.P., Terrorism, p 144.
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At the end of November, Briggs left Malaya for retirement in 
Cyprus, broken in health and dissatisfied with the powers he had been given 
as Director of Operations.8 The Director of Intelligence, Sir William Jenkin 
resigned, the result of personal differences with the Commissioner of Police, 
Gray. Finally, in early January of the following year, Gray himself resigned.
One writer has contended that since the insurgent menace had 
already been broken by Briggs, this was the best of times.8 It was the worst 
of times. Or certainly it seemed so to Mr. Oliver Lyttleton, the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies in the new Conservative Government, who arrived in 
Malaya on a tour of inspection on 2nd December 1951:
"I had never seen such a tangle as that presented by the Government of 
Malaya.... There was divided and often opposed control at the top.
Civil affairs rested in the hands of the 0 .A.G.(Officer Administering the 
Government), military and para-military in those of -Lieutenant-General 
Sir Harold Briggs. The two authorities were apparently co-equal, neither 
could over-rule the other outside his own sphere. But what was each 
sphere? The frontiers between their responsibilities had not been 
clearly defined, indeed they were indefinable because no line could be 
drawn to show where politics, civil administration or police action, 
administration of justice and the like end, and where para-military or 
military operations begin. The civil administration moved at a leisurely 
peacetime pace .... The police itself was divided by a great schism 
between the Commissioner of Police and the Head of Special Branch. 
Intelligence was scanty and uncoordinated between the military and the 
civil authorities. Our weapons were not fitted to the task; there was a 
serious shortage of armoured or protected cars .... Collaboration between 
the Chinese in Malaya and the communists was widespread. Protection 
money was known to be paid, and some unmistakable signs could be seen.
For example, no oil tankers or filling stations were attacked, not because 
the oil companies paid protection money, but because the drivers and 
agents were well paid and protected themselves".18
At the end of his tour however, Lyttleton had decided what must 
be done and he marshalled his recommendations under six headings:11 The first 
was overall direction of forces military and civil. 'I was determined,’ he
8 In fact revised powers were granted to Briggs and had been published in 
D of 0 Directive No. 18 issued on 27th November 1951, a few days before 
Briggs left Malaya. The crucial clause concerning his powers as D of 0 
now stated: 'His Excellency the High Commissioner has now delegated to the
Director of Operations his policy powers on Emergency matters which come 
within the sphere of the Defence Branch. This includes the Police and the 
Local (Armed) Forces.’
8 Purcell, V.; Malaya: Communist or Free? London, 1954, p 6.
18 Lyttleton, Memoirs; pp 366-367.
11 The Times; 12th December 1951.
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said, ’that there must be one man in charge of both military affairs and 
that he would have to be a general.... I judged that he must be supported by 
a civilian Deputy High Commissioner to take some of the political and 
administrative weight off his shoulders.'12 Next, reorganisation of the 
police force was urgent, and a much higher standard of training of the 
Special Constabulary. Third, education had to be widened: too many Malayans
had only a vague idea of what they were fighting for; and education would help 
to win the war of ideas. Better protection for the resettlement areas needed 
to be achieved quickly, and the Home Guard to be put on a more solid footing. 
Finally, the best men must be recruited in England and Malaya for the 
Administration whose terms of service would be reviewed.
The Appointment of Templer
Lyttleton has never stated publicly why he considered a soldier 
was the only choice. But if one can be excused an example from French 
colonial history, he obviously needed a man like Gallieni or Lyautey - 
capable of controlling a whole politico-military situation in all its 
complexity; a man with a disregard for red tape and a will to attain one 
goal - effective action. After his recent trip to Malaya, he also wanted a 
man who would put a soldier’s pragmatic optimism in place of the 
disillusionment and exasperatioh of his predecessor. But which soldier? 
Lyttleton’s first choice was General Sir Brian Robertson, once Alexander’s 
Chief of Staff in Italy, now C-in-C British Forces in the Middle East; but 
Robertson declined.13 Next was Field Marshal Slim, just completing his tour 
as C.I.G.S., but Slim considered that he was 'too old to go flipping around 
in an Auster aircraft in the trying climate of Malaya'. When, as chance 
x-70uld have it, Lyttleton reported to Prime Minister Churchill on the same day 
as Field Marshal Montgomery had been invited to lunch, there was immediate 
press speculation that Montgomery would be asked. The following day, the 
Colonial Secretary received a letter from the Field Marshal; it read:
Dear Lyttleton,
Malaya: we must have a plan.
Second, we must have a man. When we have 





12 Lyttleton; Op .Git., p 373
13 Ibid., PP 379-380.
Lyttleton commented wryly, ’I may, perhaps without undue conceit, say that 
this had occurred to me'.14 But he appeared to be no closer to his goal, and 
in Malaya things were getting worse. Moreover, to add to Lyttleton’s 
anxieties, the Commissioner-General for South East Asia, Mr. Malcolm 
Macdonald informed him that he could not be held responsible for the safety 
of Malaya if there was further delay in the appointment of a High 
Commissioner, and above, all if a general was appointed, with all the 
implications of military dictatorship which that implied.15
However, by 15th January 1952, Lyttleton's catharsis was over 
and he announced that General Sir Gerald Templer had been appointed High 
Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya, with full responsibility for all 
military and police operations as well as civil affairs. Lyttleton 
emphasized the political as well as the military importance of the post and 
reaffirmed that the Government’s aim was a united Malaya with self 
government.15
Except to soldiers and ex-soldiers, Templer was not generally 
well known. Born in 1898, he was educated at Wellington and Sandhurst. In 
1916 he was commissioned into the Royal Irish Fusiliers and served with them 
in Persia and Mesopotamia. He began to make his military reputation as a 
Company Commander during the Arab rebellions in Palestine, winning a D.S.O. 
in 1935, and a Bar to it in the following year. At the outbreak of World 
War II he was Deputy Director of Intelligence at Lord Gort's Headquarters. 
After Dunkirk he became Brigadier General Staff under General Montgomery, 
then commanding 12th Corps, and was thenceforward one of Montgomery's most 
fervent admirers. In 1942, at the age of 46, he became the youngest Corps 
Commander in the British Army, but relinquished that rank in order to command 
the 56th Infantry Division in Italy. It was this division which was largely 
responsible for holding the Anzio beachhead against such heavy odds that no
14 Ibid., p 379.
15 Ibid., p 380.
15 The Times; 16th January 1952. In my own interview with Templer he pointed 
out how strongly Sir Winston Churchill, the then Prime Minister felt about 
Malaya. Once before when he had been Prime Minister (in 1942) Malaya had 
been lost. Following that experience he had conferred abnormal powers 
upon Vice-Admiral Laycock as Commander-in-Chief, Ceylon, (see Woodburn- 
Kirby S. The War Against Japan Vol. II, London 1961 p 108). By 
appointing Templer to Malaya, Churchill was acting in the same tradition, 
the only difference being that Britain was now officially at peace.
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less than five German divisions were identified opposite its position.17 
He was then given command of the 6th Armoured Division. After the fall of 
Monte Cassino, he was injured when an army truck ran over a land-mine close 
to the jeep in which he was travelling. The looted contents of the truck fell 
on top of him; with a damaged spine and encased in plaster, Templer was 
evacuated to England. 'I was,’ he said later, ’the only Major General to be 
hit by a grand piano.’10 After convalescing, he worked in the War Office, 
until becoming Director of Military Government, 21st Army Group, under 
Montgomery in Germany in 1945. In retrospect, he regarded this as invaluable 
experience for his work in Malaya. He also gave advanced warning of his 
firmness of purpose of sacking Dr. Conrad Adenauer, then Burgomaster of 
Cologne for inefficiency.18 In 1946 he returned to the War Office as Director 
of Military Intelligence, which he again found to be valuable experience for 
Malaya, and remained in that appointment until he became Vice Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff in 1948. He was made General Officer Commanding 
Eastern Command in 1950, and was still holding that appointment when he was 
suddenly called to Ottawa to see Prime Minister Churchill and told of his 
appointment to Malaya.70
As Macdonald’s misgivings had already anticipated, the 
appointment aroused controversy^:
’’The man who is gambling high in this situation is not so much General 
Templer as Mr. Oliver Lyttleton, the Colonial Secretary who appointed 
him. To place a soldier in supreme charge of such delicate and complex 
political problems as those of Malaya today is unprecedented in modern 
British colonial administration."21
In Malaya the Straits Times said it would have preferred a Civil appointment, 
and warned Templer that he would find morale difficult to restore after a 
long mishandling of the Emergency.22 But perhaps the most prescient comment, 
in view of the outcome, came not from a journalist but from a military 
historian, Captain Cyril Falls who had served in Malaya, and also under
1/7 Parkinson; Op , Cit. , p 14.
18 Templer, Interview.
19 Ibid.
20 A published account of the meeting between Templer and Churchill at the 
residence of the Governor General of Canada, Lord Alexander, is contained 
in Alex: The Life of Field Marshal Alexander of Tunis by Nigel Nicolson 
London 1973 pp 301-302. ’
21 The Observer; 20th January 1952.
22 S.T., 16th January 1952.
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T e m p le r :
"There  i s  no doub t  a b o u t  t h e  e n e rg y  o r  a b o u t  t h e  f l a i r ,  o r  a b o u t  t h e  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a b i l i t y , ” he s a i d  i n  r e l a t i o n  to  T em ple r ,  "He i s  
d e t e r m i n e d ,  q u i c k  minded and wary .  I  b e l i e v e  he h a s  a way o f  g e t t i n g  
t o  t h e  h e a r t  o f  h i s  p rob lem s  and he has  a g r e a t  c a p a c i t y  f o r  
b u s i n e s s . . . .  I am n o t  s u g g e s t i n g  f o r  a moment t h a t  he i s  a p a r a g o n  o f  
a l l  t h e  v i r t u e s  and I w i l l  make no p r o p h e c i e s  a b o u t  how he g e t s  o n .
I  w i l l  say  o n l y  t h a t  i f  I ,  w i t h  such  knowledge as  I  have o f  t h e  s e n i o r  
o f f i c e r s  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  A m y ,  had been  l o o k i n g  f o r  a man f o r  t h e  p o s t  
o f  High Commiss ioner  i n  i t s  new form,  I  b e l i e v e  h i s  name i s  t h e  f i r s t  
on w h ich  my eye  would have f a l l e n " . 23
T e m p l e r ' s  Methods
T e m p l e r Ts f i r s t  r e p o r t e d  s t a t e m e n t s  i n  Malaya were  n o t  
a l t o g e t h e r  a u s p i c i o u s .  A f t e r  s a y i n g  t h a t  t h e r e  was no c l e a r  c u t  s o l u t i o n  to  
M a l a y a ' s  s p e c i a l  p rob lem s  -  as  most  p e o p le  would have  a g r e e d  -  h i s  s e c o n d  
r e p o r t e d  s e n t e n c e  t h a t  he was c e r t a i n  t h a t  w i t h  t h e  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  e n t i r e  
p o p u l a t i o n ,  ’he c o u ld  l i c k  t h e  Emergency i n  t h r e e  m o n t h s ' ,  w h i l e  a c c u r a t e  
enough ,  p r e s u p p o s e d  a c o n d i t i o n  which d i d  n o t  e x i s t .  However ,  i n  
p r a c t i c a l l y  h i s  n e x t  a s s e r t i o n  he showed a c l e a r  a p p r e c i a t i o n  o f  t h e  
f u n d a m e n ta l s  o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n :
"The E m ergency ,"  he s a i d ,  " w i l l  n o t  be won by m i l i t a r y  means a l o n e . . . .
The mos t  i m p o r t a n t  men i n  government  a r e  t h e  D i s t r i c t  O f f i c e r s  and  t h e  
D i s t r i c t  P o l i c e  O f f i c e r s " .  ^
T h i s  r em ark  i l l u s t r a t e s  h i s  c r u c i a l  a w a r e n e s s  o f  t h e  d u a l i t y  o f  
b o t h  h i s  own s i t u a t i o n  and th e  s t r u g g l e  i n  which  he was a b o u t  t o  e n g a g e .  He 
had b e e n  a p p o i n t e d  as  a s o l d i e r  to  have supreme command o v e r  c i v i l  a nd  
m i l i t a r y  powers  i n  a t ime  o f  c r i s i s ,  and h i s  t em peramen t  was f o r  v i g o r o u s  
a c t i o n .  The s i t u a t i o n  had  d e t e r i o r a t e d  f u r t h e r  d u r i n g  t h e  f o u r  m o n th s  s i n c e  
G u r n e y ' s  d e a t h .  The d e l a y  i n  r e p l a c i n g  him had  added to  u n c e r t a i n t i e s ;  t h e  
f low o f  i n t e l l i g e n c e  was d i m i n i s h i n g  ( a f t e r  a l l ,  i f  t h e  High C o m m is s io n e r  
h i m s e l f  c o u ld  n o t  be p r o t e c t e d ,  what  chance was t h e r e  f o r  a C h i n e s e  r u b b e r  
t a p p e r  i n  a raw New V i l l a g e ? ) ; t h e  March c a s u a l t y  f i g u r e s  w ere  t o  show the  
l o w e s t  number o f  i n s u r g e n t s  e l i m i n a t e d  f o r  a y e a r  ( 8 3 ) ,  t h e  w o r s t  S e c u r i t y  
Force  c a s u a l t i e s  f o r  f i v e  months (105) and com parab ly  bad  c i v i l i a n  
c a s u a l t i e s  ( 8 1 ) . 25 A l l  t h e  a p p a r e n t  a d v a n ta g e s  l a y  i n  b y - p a s s i n g  t h e  
e n t r e n c h e d  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  powers  of  the  n i n e  s t a t e s  u n d e r  w ha t  w a s ,  a f t e r  a l l ,
23 S , T . , 4 t h  F e b r u a r y  1952.
24 S . T . , 8 t h  F e b r u a r y  1952.
23 Append ix  B.
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a Federation made only yesterday, and replacing the carefully measured 
tread of givernment and law with the impatient stamp of the military. Or at 
least, in concentrating his attention on the trade he knew best. Some 
critics indeed were to accuse him precisely of a dangerously military approach.
Like Briggs however he had grasped firmly that he was engaged 
in a contest for government with the M.C.P. and that the war would be lost if 
it were left to the soldiers and the police. Vast areas of the public had to 
be won over to support the civil government, and a new political order, 
viable in the long term, had to be established in a divided community. While 
energising military operations therefore, he could not allow social and 
political progress to languish or the military effort itself would come to 
nothing. Within days of his arrival he issued a circular to government 
officials which read:
"Any idea that the business of normal civil Government and the 
business of the Emergency are two separate entities must be killed 
for good and all. The two activities are completely and utterly 
interrelated."26
The fact that this statement came as a shock to government officials is
adequate comment on the way the Emergency was run before Templer."7 He then
gave executive expression to this policy by merging both the Federal War
Council and the Executive Council into one policy making body:
"I said a moment ago," he stated in his inaugural address to the Federal 
Legislative Council, "that it was impossible to divorce the Emergency 
element of Government from the normal, peace-time process. We can have 
only one policy making body in the Federation today."28
Moreover, it is significant that in that same speech, he devoted the bulk of
his attention to matters of nation building, rather than purely to the
Emergency.28
28 Government Circular No. 1, quoted in D o 0 Directive No. 22, Issued 
27th May 1952 p 108.
27 Templer found on his arrival in Malaya, that almost without exception, the 
senior members of the Malayan Civil Service saw the difficulties in a new 
idea before they detected its obvious possibilities. This pessimism 
intruded into every aspect of administration. These negative attitudes 
were personified in his view in the Chief Secretary Mr. Del Tufo whose 
retirement was pending in any case. He would have been unlikely to last 
under Templer. Templer, Interview.
28 S.T., 20th March 1952.
28 Ibid., Templer covered the following: War Council, Citizenship, Police,
Armed Forces, Health, Education, Land Tenure, Zouth Movements, Information 
Services, Local Government, Food Production, Finance, National Service 
Bill.
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A renovation of the means by which decisions were reached and 
implemented was long overdue, and had already been requested by Briggs. In 
order to make the chain of command responsibility completely clear, Templer 
issued an Emergency Directive which set out the duties of key members of 
government and of his own staff. This was essential for several reasons. 
First, Templer's Directive from the British Government laid down that he 
would 'assume complete operational command over all armed forces assigned 
to operations in the Federation’, and that he would be empowered to issue 
operational orders to their commanders without reference to the Commanders- 
in-Chief, Far East.30 In other words, Briggs' successor as Director of 
Operations General Lockhart, was now without a job. Templer's formal answer 
was to appoint Lockhart to be the Deputy Director of Operations (D.D.O.), 
(Fig. 10):
FIGURE 10
OUTLINE ORGANISATION OF THE DIREGTOR OF OPERATIONS STAFF 
(Based on DofO Directive No.22 issued 27th May 1952-Appendix D)
Heads of Armed 
Services, Police 
and Home Guard.r.—Planning Office 
(Army, Civil, 
and Police)
His Excellency the High Commissioner - 
Director of Operations (D of 0)
I:
Deputy Director of Operations (D.D.O.)
Director of Intelligence Head of the Emergency
(D of I) Information Service
' !
f Coordination and Liaisori\ 
Office.
Staff Officer - Civil 
\ " 1 " Army
X " " Police /
Operations Research Office 
(Operational, Technical, 
Tactical and Scientific 
research)
Lockhart's real function was now to act as a Chief of Staff, to draw
together the separate and detailed strands of Security Force action which 
had so often failed in the past, in many cases because officers were unaware 
of the way the machinery was meant to work, and even in what direction
30 Appendix D.
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correspondence was meant to be channelled.31 Second, in addition to the 
responsibilities which were to be assumed by the D.D.O. and the other officers 
mentioned above, Templer laid down in detail the responsibilities of both 
the Secretary for Defence, and the Federal Chief Secretary which had never 
been published before. Indeed, the confusion which Briggs had reported had 
already been exemplified in the case of the Mawai Resettlement Area - 
previously referred to - where clearly, the real problem sprang from the 
tentative assumption of responsibility by separate Federal and State 
authorities. Templer solved this problem in characteristic fashion by 
making one official, the Chief Secretary, personally responsible for the 
coordination of all measures concerning the development and welfare of New 
Villages.32 Furthermore, to make sure that the concept of jointness was 
translated into practice, he concentrated his executive staffs into a new 
operational headquarters at Bluff Road, Kuala Lumpur. The same group of 
buildings housed the D.D.O., the Secretary for Defence, the Federal 
Commissioner of Police, the Director of Intelligence and the staffs both 
operational and intelligence, of the Army, Navy and R.A.F. From this point 
onwards these staffs operated in all respects as a Joint Emergency Headquarters 
and the single service thinking which had stigmatized the previous period was 
abolished. Finally, while he was responsible for every aspect of Government, 
Templer's intention was to spend little time in Kuala Lumpur, but to keep his 
judgement sharp and realistic by visiting the firing line: the New Villages, 
the police posts, the infantry battalions, the S.W.E.C.s and D.W.E.C.s. To 
achieve this he left much of the day to day administration to his two deputies, 
Sir Donald MacGillivray, the Deputy High Commissioner on the government side 
and General Lockhart on the military. And, although these two channels of 
executive responsibility gradually changed their composition and their titles 
as the country advanced through self govern ent to independence, they 
retained essentially the same functions until the Emergency was over.
Moreover, like Montgomery, Templer made great use of Liaison Staff Officers - 
all at the Major (GS011) level - with each representing the chief operational 
branches; Civil, Army and Police.^3 These three officers like Templer himself,
31 When Lockhart left Malaya in early 1953 the appointment of D.D.O. was 
abolished and in its place was substituted the Principal Staff Officer to 
the Director of Operations which more accurately designated the nature of 
the appointment. Templer, Interview.
32 D of 0 Directive No. 22, issued 27th May 1952, p 108.
33 See ringed organisation, Figure 10.
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travelled frequently, and when they visited operational areas, S.W.E.C.s and 
D.W.E.C.s, they did so as a team which mirrored exactly the composition of 
the War Executive Committees themselves. They were thus able to make 
decisions or accept action on the Director of Operations' behalf on any 
problem from resettlement and food denial to troop reinforcements and air 
support.
It was in his constant touring round his territory that
Templer's restless energy was most publicly displayed. In his first year,
roughly one tour a week, and he travelled as no other High Commissioner either
before or since. When he was in Kota Bharu in July 1953, the Straits Times
commented that he was on his 70th tour through the Federation and being
escorted for the 42nd time by the 14/18th Royal Hussars. He visited each of
the 439 New Villages at least once and most of them more than once. In a
country where the higher executives in the central administration seldom
ventured into the field and where, because of the generous leave provisions,
only two-thirds of the British members of the Malayan Civil Service were
present for duty at any given time, his 'visitations' became a legend. He
himself probed - in army units where he spoke especially to platoon commanders,
in districts where the leaders of communities were his targets, in estates
where he exchanged views with planters. He made no promises he could not
~>
keep. He was ruthless with British civil servants and army officers who he 
considered had failed in their duties: they were sent back to England on the
next boat or aircraft. He sent congratulatory telegrams to army units which 
had made notable 'kills', and 'rockets' to units which he considered were not 
pulling their weight. In all this, Templer was elevating the prosecution of 
the Emergency into an upper register of achievement. For too long in his 
opinion, events in Malaya had been allowed to drift; a fact which he had 
already detected before coming to Malaya from his vantage point as Vice Chief 
of the Imperial General Staff.
On almost all his visits, Templer took with him his Military- 
Assistant, Major David Lloyd-Owen, an experienced infantry officer with a 
brain as sharp as his own. It was Lloyd-Owen's special task to note verbal 
directives given on the spot and to check that the necessary action was taken 
locally or in Kuala Lumpur. After each tour, Templer invariably had questions 
which he wanted investigated by one or other government department. To ensure 
rapid action he had minutes typed entirely in red, on impressive red-embossed 
King's House stationery. The minute demanded a reply in a certain time. To
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an experienced administrator, a stylised minute might seem unnecessary, but 
in Malaya as Lyttleton had noted, the languid pace of government business was 
one of the basic problems. As an example, Templer found that no common 
tactical doctrine existed in Malaya for troops and police, and seeing a need, 
acted. It is not possible to reproduce a facsimile of the ’Red Minute' which 
he wrote on the matter, but the text read as follows:
MINUTE BY H.E. THE HIGH COMMISSIONER34
1. As you know i am not entirely happy in my mind as to whether the best 
jungle tactics are practised both by army units and by the Police in this 
country.
2. As I understand the matter each Army unit arriving in the country is 
put through a course at the FTC (Federation Training Centre). In that school 
they are taught certain drills, but what those drills are I do not know and 
presumably there is no reason why I should. I realise that these drills must 
be adapted to local conditions in various parts of the country, but it does 
seem to me that there should be certain fixed principles which must be 
adhered to everywhere by all units. It also seems to me that the basic drills 
ought to be laid down in a printed pamphlet which is given to and absorbed by 
all officer and NCO re-inforcements to units in this country. Whether this
is so or not I do not know.
3. Again, whether there is any system of sucking the brains of Commanding 
Officers of units who have had more experience and better success than 
others, such as 1st Suffolks, I do not know.
I
4. As regards the Police, I have been unable to find out what the system 
of battle drills is. Basically, I should have thought they should have been 
the same as the Army drills, though naturally some modifications will be 
necessary owing to variations in armaments etc.
5. I enclose a copy of the drills used by 2nd Battalion, Scots Guards 
and the drills produced for Jungle Companies. These are only two bits of 
paper on the subject that I have been able to get hold of.
6. The F.T.C. is, I think, under G.H.Q. FARELF. Is the teaching there 
directly influenced by G.O.C. MALAYA?
7. I would be grateful if after you have discussed it with General 
Urquhart you would let me know the form.
This particular 'Red Minute' was addressed to the D.D.O; it demanded an 
answer within 3 days, and got it. Templer sent the minute in May; by July, 
an operational and training booklet entitled 'The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist 
Operations in Malaya' had been prepared, and over 6,000 copies distributed 
to army and police units.35 Templer did not write the booklet, but his
34 Duplicate of original in my own possession.
35 ATOM, July 1952.
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alertness had prompted its urgent publication. Under the Briggs Plan, units 
of army and police were moved from state to state to undertake Striking Force 
operations. When they did so they tapped in to the local framework of 
S.W.E.C.s and D.W.E.C.s for coordination and direction. This movement of 
units was constant, and it was vital that all groups were thoroughly 
conversant with each others practices. If they were not, they became not only 
a hazard to each other, but they were also likely to commit basic tactical 
errors.3'3 By laying down a systematic and uniform series of battle drills, 
not only were units already in Malaya able to function more efficiently, but 
also those which were continually arriving in the country could be made battle 
worthy more quickly and the agonising process of adjustment which, for example 
had afflicted the Scots Guards (Chapter II) was largely overcome. The green 
covered ATOM pamphlet, twice revised during the Emergency, became the tactical 
’bible’ for the Security Forces, and has remained the basis of British 
Commonwealth doctrine for counter revolutionary operations ever since.
Revitalizing the Briggs Plan
Shortly after his arrival Templer had endorsed the Briggs Plan 
as the operational prescription on which he intended to base his future plans 
and had reemphasised its main features. In theory, both the S.W.E.C.s and 
D.W.E.C.s had very wide powers. Theyvordered police and military operations, 
controlled food supplies, and set curfews. They also maintained liaison among 
local agencies of government, which meant that the civil administrator could 
restrain the Security Forces from any proposed action likely to cause more 
ill will among the people thqn casualties among the insurgents, while the 
Security Forces could point out to the civil authorities the military 
implications of proposed local regulations. But many S.W.E.C.s and D.W.E.C.s 
had become ineffective. For example, in a report of October 1951, Briggs 
had noted that there was duplication of effort by his own small staff and 
that of the Secretary for Defence, even though both were already overworked.i 
Moreover, the several Armed Services and agencies were issuing separate and 
uncoordinated instructions to their representatives on the S.W.E.C.s, causing 
delay and confusion. The practice, both before and after Templer's arrival, 
has been described by Brigadier Henniker, who was the Army member of the 
Negri Sembilan S.W.E.C:
"We as a state committee would often send decisions for action to the 
lower, or District, Committees; but they, having got them would argue
33 This occurred, for example, in the case of the ambush of the Royal West
Kents' convoy previously referred to.
127 .
t h e  t o s s .
They a r g u e d  t h e  t o s s  f o r  t h r e e  r e a s o n s .  F i r s t ,  i t  was n o t  a lw ays  
p r a c t i c a b l e  to  do as  t h e y  had  been  t o l d  by u s .  We n i g h t  p e r h a p s  have  
t o l d  them to  p u t  two w i r e  f e n c e s  round a new v i l l a g e .  When they  came 
to  t r y  i t  t h e y  found  th e  l a n d  was p r i v a t e l y  owned and p l a n t e d  w i t h  r u b b e r .  
By a c q u i r i n g  i t  c o m p u l s o r i l y  t h e y  would b a n k r u p t  two o r  t h r e e  s m a l l  
h o l d e r s .  So t h e y  s e n t  t h e  p rob le m  back to  us  to  t h in k  a g a i n .
A n o th e r  r e a s o n  f o r  t h e i r  n o n - c o m p l ia n c e  was t h a t  they r e s e n t e d  i n t e r f e r e n c e  
by t h o s e  whom t h e y  r e g a r d e d  ( w i t h  some j u s t i f i c a t i o n )  as  b u n g l i n g  
b u r e a u c r a t s  i n  t h e  s t r a t o s p h e r e .
The f i n a l  r e a s o n  was t h a t  u n t i l  Gene ra l  T e m p le r ' s a r r i v a l ,  a l t h o u g h  
t h e  D i s t r i c t  Commit tee  members were  i n d i v i d u a l l y  the s u b o r d i n a t e s  o f  ou r  
S t a t e  C om m it tee ,  t h e y  f e l t  no c o l l e c t i v e  l o y a l t y  to u s .  From t h e  n a t u r e  
o f  t h i n g s  i t  was c l e a r  t o  them t h a t  our  d e c i s i o n s  could  n o t  have  been  
unan im ous .  The f a c t o r s  t h a t  had d i v i d e d  us d i v i d e d  them a l s o .  By e a ch  
r e f e r r i n g  b a c k  t o  h i s  own s u p e r i o r  he cou ld  e n s u r e  d e la y  b e f o r e  a n y t h i n g  
was d o n e . . . .  t h e  m ac h in e r y  was r i g h t  enough,  i t  was the  s p i r i t  t h a t  was 
wrong .  G e n e r a l  Templer  soon  p u t  t h a t  r i g h t " . 37
T e m p l e r ' s a p p r o a c h  was b o t h  s im p l e  and p r a g m a t i c .  D e c i s i o n s ,  w h e t h e r  by
h i m s e l f ,  by h i s  own s t a f f  a c t i n g  i n  h i s  name, o r  by any o f  t h e  War E x e c u t i v e
Commit tees  t o  s u b o r d i n a t e s ,  were to  be a c c e p t e d  as  ' e x e c u t i v e  o r d e r s ’ to  be
a c t e d  on i m m e d i a t e l y ,  and n o t  as  a b a s i s  f o r  f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s i o n .  Where
n e c e s s a r y  Tem ple r  made a v a i l a b l e  a member of  h i s  own s t a f f  t o  a s s i s t  a S.W.E.C.
t h a t  was i n  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  But  d e c i s i o n s  had to  be t a k e n ,  and e f f e c t i v e
a c t i o n  had  to  f o l l o w .  L ik e  so many o f  B r i g g s ’ o t h e r  . im ag in a t iv e  m e a s u r e s ,
t h e  War E x e c u t i v e  Commit tees  were made to  f u n c t i o n  e f f e c t i v e l y  by  Tem ple r .
G r e a t e r  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  t h e  r e s e t t l e m e n t  a r e a s  had  be e n  one o f  
B r i g g s  c o n c e r n s  and one o f  L y t t l e t o n ' s  s i x  p o i n t s  f o r  d e f e a t i n g  t h e  i n s u r g e n t s .  
In. a d i r e c t i v e  p u b l i s h e d  on 23rd May 1952, Templer o u t l i n e d  how t h i s  would 
be d o n e . 38 P r e v i o u s l y  t h e  d e f e n c e s  o f  most  New V i l l a g e s  had b e e n  
r u d i m e n t a r y .  Now w i t h  b e t t e r '  means i n c l u d i n g ,  c h a i n  l i n k  f e n c e s ,  e l e c t r i c  
g e n e r a t i n g  p l a n t s ,  and t h e  c o p io u s  s u p p l i e s  of  b a r b e d  w i re  and d e f e n c e  s t o r e s  
which had  be e n  d e n i e d  to  B r i g g s ,  Tem ple r  was a b l e  to  consummate t h e  programme. 
However , even  when t h e  d e f e n c e s  had b e e n  improved and some o f  t h e  s o c i a l  
a m e n i t i e s  such  as  e l e c t r i c i t y ,  s c h o o l s  and m e d ic a l  c e n t r e s  had been  
e s t a b l i s h e d ,  t h e  de v e lo p m en t  o f  many New V i l l a g e s  tended  to  s t a g n a t e .
Templer  found  t h e  s o l u t i o n  i n  t h r e e  m ea s u res :  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  e l e c t e d
L o c a l  C o u n c i l s ,  t h e  u se  o f  O p e r a t i o n  GINGER; and the  o v e r h a u l i n g  and a rming 
o f  t h e  Home Guard .
As p a r t  o f  B r i g g s '  i n i t i a l  programme V i l l a g e  Commit tees  had 
been  e l e c t e d ,  b u t  th e y  had  no f i n a n c i a l  a u t h o r i t y ,  and e x i s t e d  o n l y  to  a d v i s e
37 H e n n i k e r ,  Red Shadow; pp 6 5 -66 .
38 D o f  0 D i r e c t i v e  No. 20,  The C lo s e  Defence o f  P o p u l a t e d  A r e a s ,  i s s u e d  
23 rd  May 1952.
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the District Officer.33 By the Local Councils Ordinance of August 1952, new 
elections were held and the resultant Councils were established as statutory 
authorities. The Councils collected rates and licence fees and assisted by 
Government supplements, became the central government’s agents for specific 
facilities such as dispensaries, schools and community halls. The first 
Village Councils under the new dispensation were elected in May 1952 and by 
May 1954, 209 Chinese New Villages had them.'"0 Templer in other words was 
establishing political consciousness at the ’grass roots' level, where it 
counted. Further to develop this consciousness the Government established 
the Civics Course. Between May 1952 and Templer ’s departure in 1954 over 
130 were held. In each course, members of the different communities spent a 
week together, observing the process of government at first hand.41
Operation GINGER was intended to apply administrative dynamite 
where it was most needed. Where a village showed signs of going ’bad', it 
was visited by a team comprised of army, police and administrative 
specialists (e.g. from the Departments of Labour, Social Welfare or Education) 
whose aim depended on what the specific problems were. A mobile dispensary 
van usually accompanied the team and a loudspeaker van provided suitable 
propaganda. The emphasis was on self-help.43 However, while Operation 
GINGER was a palliative, a morel enduring contribution to local development 
and security was achieved by upgrading the Home Guard.
313 D of 0 Directive No. 2 issued 20th May 1950.
1+0 The Local Council Ordinance actually came into effect in August 1952.
Templer’s Speech, 18th March 1953. The rate at which Local Councils were 
established depended very much on the impetus which State Governments gave 
to them. Johore, one of the best states in this regard sent an officer to 
the U.K. for a three month course of training in electoral practice to 
prepare for thi.s. But here, as with many economic matters Templer’s 
programmes were inhibited by the more conservative State Rulers.
Thompson, Interview.
41 They visited Government Departments in Kuala Lumpur, talked with senior 
civil servants, heard lectures and saw demonstrations of military power in 
the form of artillery shoots and aircraft fly pasts. In 1953 alone, some 
3,600 students attended Civics Courses. Of these students, 1,700 were 
Malays, 1,400 Chinese and 500 Indians. They included among others, 340 
Indian labourers, 300 Malay headmen, 670 Village Councillors and more than 
500 school teachers. Annual Report 1953, pp 317-318.
43 Templer referred to Operation GINGER as ’the swift and sudden application 
of administrative action in certain areas, applied either to bring a bad 
community to its senses or still further to encourage a good one.’
Templer’s Speech, 18th March 1953. It was essentially a movement to forge 
a further link in the chain of the Government’s communication with the 
people.
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When the question had been raised earlier, ’Could the Chinese 
population be trusted with arms?' both Briggs and Gray had replied initially 
with a qualified negative.43 Consequently, when the first Chinese Home Guards 
were recruited, their members were equipped with batons and blue and white 
arm-bands, and were employed as wardens. Little use was made of them for 
either defence or food control. In October 1951, a new concept was implemented. 
Operational readiness was to be achieved in three phases; in Phase 1, Horae 
Guards would continue as they were; in Phase 11, they would report to their 
local Police Stations for patrol duty and carry shotguns while so employed; 
finally in Phase 111, once individual Home Guards had been thoroughly screened 
by the police, they were trusted to have shotguns in their homes for 
immediate action against infiltrators and for the defence of the sector of 
the village perimeter nearest their houses.44 After examining the progress 
of this scheme Templer, against strong opposition from the Malay sultans, 
decided that where they were ready to do so the Home Guard would take over 
village security from the police, and the more advanced would be formed into 
sub-units to operate in an aggresive role against the insurgents. Thus, the 
Home Guard was split into two groups. Static Guards had weapons for one- 
third of their strength and until they had reached Stage 111, continued to be 
integrated with the police. The Operational Home Guard was divided into 
twelve man sections, similar to those of the infantry, for use where the 
Security Forces were few. All were volunteers; not liable for active service 
for more than seventy-two days in any year, nor for more than forty-eight 
consecutive hours at a time. In practice, they were frequently attached to 
army units for service in their home areas where their local knowledge was 
invaluable.
By 1954, 150 New Villages had become fully responsible for 
their own security. No weapons were lost to the insurgents, and they 
repelled every attack, eliminating twenty-one insurgents in the process. In 
the less advanced units, only three cases of treachery occurred, and these 
accounted for thirty of the forty-four weapons which the Home Guard lost in 
1954.45 _____ ____________
43 Madoc, Interview.
44 D of 0 Directive No. 17, Protection of Concentrated Villages and 
Resettlement Areas, issued 12th October 1951, pp 82-83.
1-13 The process of upgrading the Home Guard was accelerated by further factors: 
(1) Templer placed it under an Inspector General, Major General E.B. 
de Fonblanque (ret); and (2) its shooting and general efficiency was 
assisted by the use of Army Training Teams which toured the country to 
instruct and train its members. Preview 1954, p 23.
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Templer's judgement was also vindicated by two other Chinese organisations: 
the Kinta Valley home Guard; and the Special Operations Volunteer Force 
(S.O.V.F.). The Kinta Valley Home Guard was established in May 1952, as an 
entirely Chinese force for the protection of the local tin mines and dredges. 
While its operations were never spectacular, it was largely responsible for 
the greatly improved security in the area, and the rise in tin production.
By May 1954, when Templer left, it had lost only nine weapons to the insurgents 
in two years.
The S.O.V.F. consisted of surrendered or captured insurgents 
(S.E.P.s and C.E.P.s) who had volunteered to serve against their former 
friends. By May 1954, some 300 of them had been formed into twelve platoons 
of 25 men, each commanded by a Police Lieutenant. Since being formed in 
July 1953, they had eliminated 12 insurgents, and had been particularly 
useful for intelligence purposes concerning the habits of the insurgents.45
Another area in which Templer wrought an instant revolution 
was in forming multi-racial units for the future Federation Army. When he 
arrived in Malaya, the indigenous forces consisted of five battalions (a 
sixth was soon to be raised) of the Malay Regiment, confined exclusively to 
ethnic Malays. Mindful of his Directive from the British Government, and in 
particular the opening sentence which stated that 'The policy of His 
Majesty's Government in Great Britain is that Malaya in due course should 
become a fully self-governing nation',4  ^Templer, on 17th November 1952, wrote 
to the Colonial Secretary;
"I am convinced that an essential pre-requisite to the grant of 
independence to Malaya is the formation of an adequate Malayan army to 
support the civil authority, and the foundations of that army cannot 
be laid too soon.... It must be a balanced force and it must be 
composed of men of all races who have made Malaya their home".48
He proposed that by the end of 1955, the indigenous forces would comprise
nine battalions of the Malay Regiment, three battalions of the Federation
Regiment, one Armoured Car Regiment (H.Q. and three squadrons), one Signal
Squadron and one Squadron Field Engineers. With the exception of the Malay
Regiment, all were to be open to British subjects and Federal citizens. To
meet the initial capital costs, he asked the British Government for a grant-
in-aid o f 8million (stg) to be spread over two years.
45 Templer, Press Conference 26th May 1954.
47 Appendix D.
48 Templer's Despatch of 17th November 1952.
131 .
Templer's initiative is notable for several reasons not least 
among them as confirmation of his own breadth of vision. But it is also 
noteworthy for the new respect which it evoked from Mr. Malcolm Macdonald 
who had earlier written w7ith such foreboding to the Colonial Secretary about 
the dangers of appointing a professional soldier as High Commissioner. He 
wrote to Templer.
"Dear Gerald,
Whilst you were in England during your recent visit I read 
your despatch.... concerning the expansion of the Federation Land Forces. 
If I may say so, this is an absolutely first-rate document making a 
comprehensive series of most valuable proposals. They are at least as 
valuable from the political as they are from the local military 'point 
of view.
If I as Commissioner-General.... can do anything to support 
you on these proposals in London, you have only to let me know..,.
sd Malcolm Macdonald."40
Unfortunately, good intentions and sound policy were not able to overcome 
the basic and long-entrenched divisions between the communities of Malaya, 
exacerbated by the Chinese character of the insurgency. Recruiting for the 
new multi-racial Federation Regiment was slower than Templer had hoped and 
in the Legislative Council on 25th November 1953 he pointed out that of a 
total Other Rank strength of 43^ only 74 were Chinese and it had therefore 
been necessary to turn down many promising Chinese candidates for commissions 
in order to preserve similar racial proportions to those existing in the 
ranks. However, by April 1954, the first company of the new Federation 
Regiment had deployed on operations. Moreover, in the same address Templer 
stated that although the Malayan Civil Service had for the first time been 
opened to non-Malay citizens the response had been equally disappointing and 
although five vacancies had been available, only two Chinese and three 
Indians had applied, of whom only three had the necessary qualifications.50
40Macdonald to Templer, 20th January 1953.
50Templer's Speech, 25th November 1953. When Templer left Malaya the 








Templer, Press Conference, 26th May 1954.
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Police, Intelligence, Information Services
Shortly after his arrival, Templer decided that three matters 
were to have ’absolute priority'. These were:
(a) the organisation and training of the Police Force, including the Special 
Constabulary;
(b) the improvement of the Intelligence Service; and
(c) the improvement and expansion of the Information Services.
The Police
As both Briggs and Lyttleton had found, the quality and leader­
ship of the Police Force were neither uniform nor reassuring; there were 
several reasons for this. First, the expansion of the force had been over 
rapid. At the beginning of 1952 its strength stood at 26,154 regulars,
99,000 part time Auxiliary Police, and 39,870 Special Constables, and in 
addition it had the task of operational control of the Home Guard. But its 
head had not expanded with its body. Together with the shortage of officers 
referred to in the previous chapter, Federal Police Headquarters had not been 
expanded since Briggs arrived. In March 1952 under the new Commissioner, 
Colonel Young, its headquarters structure was overhauled. In place of the 
two Assistant Commissioners of Police (A.C.P.s) who had previously controlled 
multiple departments, all five departments were now placed under an A.C.P.
Of particular importance, in view of the vastly increased scope of its 
activities, was the emancipation of Special Branch from the Criminal 
Investigation Department. Special Branch now became a separate department 
with its own funds.51 Second, in Templer’s opinion, far too much emphasis 
had been placed on the para-military functions of the police to the detriment 
of public welfare and the place of the policeman as a servant of the 
community. It was urgently necessary to restore the constabulary image and 
to return to watch and ward duties. This process, which became more and more 
feasible as security improved, was crystallised in Operation SERVICE which 
was launched on 15th December 1952. It had immediate success, principally 
because the overwhelmingly Malay police force now saw itself as the friend 
rather than the enemy of the villagers. Moreover, the idea had a chain 
reaction, the Telephone Department in turn launched Operation COURTESY, and 
this was later followed by the Public Health Department, and the force of these
51 D of 0 Directive No. 2 issued 12th May 1950, Appendix A; and Annual 
Repo_rt 1952.
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combined benefits had a visible effect on public morale.53
Even when changed economic circumstances made it necessary to 
retrench part of the Special Constabulary, Templer turned a potential 
embarrassment into a consummate success. The continuing cost of the 
Emergency was causing a heavy drain on Malay’s finances. In 1953 this was 
aggravated by a dramatic fall in the price of both rubber and tin after the 
Korean armistace and by November Malaya faced a deficit of M$146 million.53 
Templer’s answer was not to cut social services (x'/hich a number of people 
expected him to do) but to reduce and rationalise the efforts of certain parts 
of the Security Forces. The Special Constabulary had been formed in the 
first months of the Emergency to protect estates and mines, and to provide 
bodyguards for managers. With the exception of the bodyguards, the over­
whelming majority were employed in a static role which was uneconomical in 
manpower, expensive, and tactically unsound because the insurgents, having 
observed what their beats were, either avoided or killed them. Templer now 
proposed that the majority should be amalgamated into Area Security Units 
(A.S.U.s) of 20 men, who by patrolling and ambushing would carry the fight to 
the insurgents. They would operate close to their original estates, the area 
which each had to patrol would depend on how many incidents had occurred in 
that area in the past. This permitted the Special Constabulary to be reduced 
by more than 10,000. Eventually the A.S.U.s developed a keen offensive 
spirit and after some prodding by Templer became an effective force. 5’+
The Intelligence Services
Some of the early efforts to organise an effective intelligence 
service have already been referred to. When Briggs left, the Special Branch 
of the C.I.D. had been built up to an adequ; e numerical strength. Again 
however, as in the case of the police, organisational problems remained. On 
1st April 1952, Templer appointed a Director of Intelligence, Mr. J.H. Morton
52 Young’s programme was impressive. He wrote personally to every member of 
the Police Force asking each man to ’do everything you can....to extend 
kindness and help to those in need’. By 1953 instances of service were 
being reported at the rate of 20,000 cases a month. Bartlett, p 81.
53 Templer ’s Speech, 25 th November 1953, p 4.
54 It is characteristic of Templer that he called a meeting of representatives 
of the Planting and Mining industries to tell them of his decision in 
person. Protection of Estates and Mines 1953, pp 1-6. Progressively, the 
Regular Police were also cut by 10%.
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who had been in charge of M.I.5 in Singapore and charged him with overhauling 
the intelligence services. It should be remembered that a Director of 
Intelligence, Sir William Jenkin, had already been appointed during Briggs’ 
time. But on his arrival, Jenkin found that he was responsible for 
coordinating intelligence only among police agencies, and that coordination 
on a Federal basis lay outside his jurisdiction. Thus, Jenkin was never able 
to be more than partially effective. At times this led to an extraordinary 
state of affairs. It was not unusual for a zealous Platoon Commander to 
visit up to half a dozen people - many of them local civilians - in order to 
obtain enough fragments of information for a patrol plan; a task which should 
have been done by Special Branch. But more frequently, military patrols up 
to the end of 1950 were based on simple logic, intuition and local knowledge 
of where the insurgents were likely to be found rather than from detailed 
information. Morton was now made directly responsible to Templer for the 
coordination and effective operation of all intelligence agencies. While the 
army continued to produce intelligence peculiarly its own i.e. visual 
reconnaissance from light aircraft, and patrolling and tracking. Special 
Branch alone could have secret agents, and became the principal recipient 
and recording agency for intelligence about the insurgents. At the same 
time, the internal workings of Special Branch were overhauled.
I
In 1948-49, it had been organised on purely ethnic lines. For 
example, separate ’desks’ dealt with subversion among Chinese and among 
Malays. In August 1950, Jenkin had begun to reorganise it on semi-political 
lines, i.e. there was a desk in charge of ’Communism', further broken down 
into four sub-desks dealing with; External Communism, Banditry, Underground 
Communism and Other Manifestations of Communism. The 1952 reorganisation 
made this arrangement more sophisticated an"1 functional: one desk dealt
exclusively with the way the M.C.P. operated, another with its Military 
Organisation, a third and a fourth with subversion among Malays and Chinese 
respectively.55
Of itself however, this reorganisation would only have improved 
the Governments awareness of trends and of the M.C.P’s order--of-battle. What 
was really required was an ability to produce intelligence in a form on which 
the army could base operations. The problem was solved by attaching to
55 Madoc, Interview.
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S p e c i a l  Branch a number o f  M i l i t a r y  I n t e l l i g e n c e  O f f i c e r s  ( M . I . O . s ) 58 whose 
t a s k  was t o  c o l l e c t  o p e r a t i o n a l  i n t e l l i g e n c e  as  i t  was t r a n s m i t t e d  t h r o u g h  
S p e c i a l  B ranch  c h a n n e l s ,  p r o c e s s  i t  i n t o  a form which  army u n i t s  c o u l d  u s e ,  
and g e t  i t  t o  them r a p i d l y  enough f o r  e f f e c t i v e  u s e .  The improvement  was 
g r e a t .  I n  Ju n e  1951, t h e  war d i a r y  o f  t h e  l s t / 7 t h  Gurkha R i f l e s  r e c o r d e d  
o n ly  two i t e m s  o f  i n t e l l i g e n c e  i n t e r e s t  b u t  by O c to b e r  1952,  when th e  
b a t t a l i o n  was o p e r a t i n g  i n  a s t a t e  where  an M . I .O .  was a t t a c h e d  to  t h e  S.W.E.C,  
t h e  number o f  ’e x p l o i t a b l e 1 i t e m s  had i n c r e a s e d  to  s i x t y - f i v e . 57
I n  a d i r e c t i v e  o f  24 th  A p r i l  1952, Templer  d i v i d e d  the  
i n s u r g e n t  o r g a n i s a t i o n  f o r  s u r v e i l l a n c e  p u r p o s e s  i n t o  two r i n g s  o f  armed 
p o t e n t i a l :  an  i n n e r  r i n g ,  n o r m a l ly  deep i n  t h e  j u n g l e ,  which  i n c l u d e d  t h e
S t a t e  P a r t y / R e g i m e n t a l  H e a d q u a r t e r s  w i t h  i t s  p r o t e c t i v e  c i r c l e  o f  M.R.L .A.  
f o r c e s ,  a n d ,  an o u t e r  r i n g ,  on th e  f r i n g e s  o f  e s t a t e s  and p o p u l a t e d  a r e a s  
which h a r b o u r e d  t h e  D i s t r i c t  and Branch  Commit tees  and t h e  Min Yuen.
A l th o u g h  p e n e t r a t i o n  o f  the  i n n e r  r i n g  was t h e  u l t i m a t e  t a s k  o f  S p e c i a l  Branch 
i t  was r e a l i s e d  t h a t  t h i s  c o u ld  n o t  be  done i n  t h e  s h o r t  t e r m .  I n  t h e  
m ean t im e ,  S p e c i a l  Branch was to  c o n c e n t r a t e  on t h e  o u t e r  r i n g .  T h i s  p o l i c y  
was so s u c c e s s f u l  t h a t  by 1954 most  e l i m i n a t i o n s  were b a s e d  on S p e c i a l  Branch 
i n f o r m a t i o n ,  e i t h e r  by s p e c i f i c  i n f o r m a t i o n  g i v e n  to  p a t r o l s ,  o r  by t h e  
combined A rm y -S p e c i a l  Branch  t e c h n i q u e  d e v e lo p e d  i n  food  d e n i a l  and F e d e r a l  
P r i o r i t y  O p e r a t i o n s . 58
The I n f o r m a t i o n  S e r v i c e s
At t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  1952, t h e r e  was a whole  s e r i e s  o f  s e p a r a t e  
d e p a r t m e n t s  engaged  i n  communica t ing  t h e  Governm en t ’s m essage  t o  t h e  p e o p l e .  
They i n c l u d e d  t h e  D e pa r tm en t  o f  I n f o r m a t i o n ,  t h e  Emergency I n f o r m a t i o n  
S e r v i c e s ,  t h e  Malayan B r o a d c a s t i n g  S e r v i c e ,  ( a  pan -M alayan  d e p a r t m e n t  a l s o  
c o v e r i n g  S i n g a p o r e )  and the  Malayan Fi lm  Unxii.
To c o o r d i n a t e  t h e s e  s e r v i c e s ,  Templer  a p p o i n t e d  Mr.  A.D.C.  
P e t e r s o n ,  who had worked i n  t h e  f i e l d  o f  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  w a r f a r e  i n  Burma d u r i n g  
World War I I .  P e t e r s o n ’s a ims s im p ly  e x p r e s s e d  were  t w o f o l d :  f i r s t ,  t o
d e t a c h  t h e  non-communis t  a n t i c o l o n i a l i s t s  from t h e  M.C.P .  and  c o n v i n c e  them
58 D o f  0 D i r e c t i v e  No. 21,  i s s u e d  24 th  A p r i l  1952.  By t h e  e nd  o f  1952 t h e r e  
w e re  30 su c h  M . I . O . s  w o rk ing  w i t h  the  p o l i c e .
57 Q.H . R ; 1/7 Gurkha R i f l e s ,  December 1952.
F e d e r a l  O p e r a t i o n s  and F e d e r a l  P r i o r i t y  O p e r a t i o n s  a r e  d i s c u s s e d  i n  
C h a p t e r  VI.
58
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that the Federation of Malaya was worth fighting for; and second, to lower 
the insurgent’s will to fight and to convince him to defect.59 To achieve 
the first aim Peterson had to have something concrete to sell; in almost every 
aspect of government, this was supplied by Templer and by the enlightened 
policy he was directed to pursue by the British Government. The elected Local 
Councils have already been mentioned. At midnight on 14th September 1952, 
Federal Citizenship, and with it of course the right to vote in Local, State 
and eventually Federal elections was introduced.60
Economic activities were no less impressive and provided 
Peterson with a further line of attack. The Government was enabled to take 
advantage of the fact that Resettlement had brought a hitherto unreachable 
group of the population within range of effective communication, and the 
after care of New Villages consolidated this progress. To protection was 
added running water, electricity, clinics, schools, individual garden plots 
and shops. Direct attacks were made on some of the oldest ills of Asian 
society. Hours of work were regulated by the provision that all shops with a 
staff (i.e. as distinct from self-owned and operated stalls) were to close 
either on Friday or Sunday without loss of pay to the employees.6* Another 
evil, usury, was attacked through the regulation of rates, terms and contracts.
The improvement in Malayan education was a further substantial 
theme. The total number of students in the country increased from 263,400 
in 1941 to 759,831 in 1953. The Government was able to claim, with 
justification, that in addition to fighting the insurgents, it was also 
fighting illiteracy, and was advancing Malaya's social progress against the 
day when the country would be self-governing.6
I Thus, the Government under Templer was intent on establishing a
reputation for truth. In order to convince insurgents who defected that they 
would be well treated and later rehabilitated within Malayan life it also 
planned a multiple attack based on a first class knowledge of individual 
Insurgents and their habits. The Psychological Warfare Section which 
directed this campaign also decided the best approach to use, and it was now
59 Temp1e r, Interview.
60 Weekly News Summary, 19th September 1952. More than 600,000 Chinese were 
given voting rights by this measure, in addition to those who had already 
been enfranchised.
61 Weekly News Summary 28th September 1952.
69 Annual Report 1953, p 387.
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in the fortunate position of having a number of S.E.P.s and C.E.P.s who 
thoroughly understood the minds of their former comrades.53 For a start, the 
rewards to members of the public for information leading to the capture or 
killing of insurgents were vastly increased. Under Briggs, the reward for 
bringing in the Secretary General of the M.C.P. had been M$80,000; it was now 
increased to M$250,000 and commensurate increases were announced for all other 
members of the M.C.P. However, while the old scale had been based purely on 
the rank of the insurgent, the new scale depended on the amount of personal 
risk called for, and the extent of cooperation by the insurgent who 
surrendered or was captured. For example, an insurgent would receive more if 
he personally led a Security Force patrol to attack his erstwhile camp or to 
a point for a successful ambush than if he merely pointed to spots on a map.
The payment of huge rewards to insurgents for inducing the capture or death 
of their former comrades raised questions of ethics and morality in the minds 
of some people (particularly members of the British Communist Party and 
British Labor Party); the Government’s reply was that it produced results.54 
The Psychological Warfare experts were playing on the venality of the 
predominantly Chinese insurgents and directing this weakness towards the 
destruction of the M.C.P. itself. Immoral or not, it proved brilliantly 
successful in conditions of weakening insurgent morale. In the later years 
during 1957-58, it was on the hope of many an ex-insurgent to rehabilitate 
himself in a small business, by bringing in so many dollars worth of 
surrendered insurgents, that the mass surrenders of those years were based.55 
The Psychological Warfare Section also perfected several techniques for 
communicating with the insurgents. Mass leaflet drops for example were so 
successful that the M.C.P. politbureau punished possession of a leaflet with 
death. The use of voice aircraft, which broadcast surrender terms and 
promises of safe conduct to areas of the jungle became so substantial that by 
1954 Dakotas and Austers equipped with loud speakers were broadcasting to 
fifteen separate jungle areas per week. So successful was this combined 
leaflet and voice aircraft campaign that by that year, more insurgents 
surrendered than ever before, and more than half stated that their minds had
53 The best known of such men was Lam Swee who had defected in May 1950 but 
from 1952 onwards a number of lesser fry were continually employed within 
the Information Service. Osman China who defected in Pahang in December 





finally been made up by the Government's communication with them.6^
Collective Punishment - Detention - White Areas
As will be examined in Chapter VI, the operational technique
which finally 'dug out the roots' of the insurgent infrastructure was food
denial, known in its final, highly intensive form as the Federal Priority
Operation. However, while this technique was largely developed under
Templer, it is doubtful whether it could have worked until the end of 1952,
when Resettlement had been completed. Until complete penetration of the
insurgent organisation had been achieved by Special Branch therefore, some
means had to be found to provide the essential intelligence. Templer 's
approach, broadly speaking was to make selective use of the stick of collective
punishment (on towns or areas with a bad Emergency record) while awarding
where it was possible the carrot of the lifting of Emergency restrictions.
Tanjong Malim had a bad record. Near the town had occurred fifteen murders,
five successful ambushes, five unsuccessful, ten attacks on military and
police patrols, seven strikes due to intimidation, numerous attacks on the
town water pipeline; 6,000 rubber trees had been slashed, eight buses and
lorries burned, several trains derailed. Worse, on only three occasions had
anyone helped the Security Forces with information.57 Then, on 25th March
1952, twelve men including the district officer were killed and eight wounded
in an ambush. Two days later Templer, newly arrived, went to Tanjong Malim.
Having had three hundred local leaders assembled, he denounced them with a
vehemence which was to become typical, but was at that stage new and
startling in a High Commissioner. The mildest charge was cowardly silence:
"This is going to stop," declared Sir Gerald, "It does not amuse me to 
punish innocent people, but many of you are not innocent. You have 
information which you are too cowardly :o give."
He then imposed a collective sentence: a strict 22 hour curfew, shops open
for only twTo hours a day, no one to leave town, all schools closed, no bus
services, reduced rice rations. As a final ignominy Tanjong Malim would
cease to be the district capital.^
Review 1954, p 28. It should be pointed out that Psychological Warfare 
was originally included in the Director of Operations staff under the 
Head of the Emergency Information Service. However in March 1954 the 
Psychological Warfare Section was separated under that title, and made a 
separate department within the Director of Operations staff. It worked 
very closely with Special Branch of the Federal Police. C.C. Too, Interview.
57 S.T., 28th March 1952.
68 Ibid.
Ten days later the duration of Tanjong Malim’s punishment was 
made to depend on the result of a questionnaire addressed to the head of each 
household, there, and at a nearby Malay village. The replies were placed in 
sealed boxes, travelled to Kuala Lumpur accompanied by representatives of the 
town and were opened by Templer in their presence. As a result, some thirty 
Chinese, mainly shopkeepers, were detained and a number of arrests were made. 
Then on 26th April men of the Suffolk Regiment, acting on information 
received, killed Long Pin, a local insurgent leader. In a relatively short 
time Tanjong Malim was secure, with an effective Home Guard.
What did Templer achieve by this? First, having arrived only 
seven weeks before the crucial incident, when morale was still suffering from 
the effects of Gurney’s death and from the sense that so little had been 
achieved in so many years, he had demonstrated his authority and determination 
unforgettably. On his orders, the affair was given wide publicity, aimed at 
his own officials as much as at the rest of the country. Moreover, to ensure 
that his test case would not fail, a reorganisation of the local district 
boundary was carried out to allow Tanjong Malim's firmer administration, and 
the town itself received high priority defence stores to improve its 
security.70 Secondly, like Briggs, Templer understood that until villagers 
could answer insurgent demands by saying that if they complied they would be 
punished by the Government, they x^ ould not dare refuse. Further, that without 
increased security, the rule of law could not be established. Finally, the 
distribution of questionnaires, later standardised as Operation QUESTION, 
provided the Government with information previously virtually inaccessible. 
Once Special Branch became more effective, this technique became more or less 
redundant, but for a time it was very effective.71
Templer imposed collective punishment on six other occasions.
It was certainly the most dramatic and controversial of his Emergency 
measures, but it was not new. Indeed, Templer used both collective punishment
°9 Parkinson; Op .Cl t p 25. Templer found Operation QUESTION to be so 
successful that in April 1952, he began to apply it to blocks of four 
and five villages simultaneously. It served a useful purpose until the 
expertise of Special Branch was established and there was no further need 
for it to be used. Templer and Madoc, Interviews.
70 Thompson, Interview.
71 Templer and Madoc, Interviews.
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and detention much more moderately than his predecessor.'72 During Gurney’s 
rule the town of Pusing had been fined 11040,000 for failure to cooperate, and 
quantitatively at least, collective punishment was not so drastic as Gurney’s 
wholesale detentions in squatter areas under Regulation 17D. What made such 
expedients more effective under Templer was that they were applied concurrently 
with other efficacious measures in an improving situation and were mutually 
reinforcing. Templer had complete executive power and used it wisely.
Despite the public outcry which his treatment of Tanjong Malim evoked in 
Britain, the British Government pronounced its full support.73
However, if Templer’s collective punishments can be characterised 
as ruthless, his designation of White Areas was statesmanlike. He began in 
Malacca on 5th September 1953. The insurgents there had been reduced from 
over two hundred to about fifty and in June the Resident Commissioner,
Mr. G.E.C. Wisdon suggested that the proclamation of an area in which all 
Emergency Regulations had been lifted would constitute an important 
psychological carrot. There were risks that the insurgents would then 
infiltrate and cause the abandonment of the scheme, but the population would 
probably be so relieved by the lifting of the restrictions that they would 
denounce any insurgents who returned. Moreover, the offensive uses to which 
such results could be put by the Information Service were incalculable. In 
the event, it worked. When four insurgents tried to return they were 
immediately reported, and no area subsequently declared ’White’ was ever 
forced to revert. When Templer left, 1,336,000 people were living in White 
Areas.74 Templer’s successor as Director of Operations, General Bourne, was
72 What was at least equally important was that Templer imposed these punish­
ments in person and thus there was a direct link established between people 
and High Commissioner; in contrast to the impersonalism of Gurney. In 
August 1953 Templer placed the town of Broga under detention; on 5th August 
1953 the 4,000 people of Sungei Pelek were given a last chance to disown 
communism; on 12th August 1953 a 22 hour house curfew was placed on the New 
Village of Pertang. However, by the end of 1953, the situation had 
improved to such an extent that Templer revoked both E ,R. 17D(perm.itting the 
detention and removal from the Federation of all inhabitants of particular 
areas); and E ,R. 17DA(imposi tion of collective punishment). T...,
8th December 1953.
73 It should be stated here that Colonel Young, the Police Commissioner did 
not agree with the use of E.R’s 17D and 17DA. He was at the time endeavour­
ing to build up the confidence of the people in the police and this 
retarded it. Young, Interview.
/4 In Perils, Kedah, Kelantan, Perak, Trengganu, Pahang, Negri Sembilan,
Malacca and Johore. Templer’s Press Conference, 26th May 1954.
able to join up a series of White Areas into a broad belt across the 
peninsula, which effectively cut the insurgent areas and their communications 
in two.
TemplerTs Powers
What is most striking about Templer's rule is the greater 
extent of his achievement in all fields than that of his post-war 
predecessors, which suggests that the apparently paradoxical measure of 
appointing a soldier to govern during a state of civil emergency, with the 
aim of hastening the return of civil government, may have application else­
where. As Professor Parkinson says,
"The essential measures to reestablish order were so closely related 
to measures of political development, welfare, education and finance 
that the attempt to separate them could only be harmful or absurd.
And, it was in the very essence of this amalgamation that the military 
aspect was made, and has ever since been kept, subordinate to the civil.
An arrangement which only a statesman would choose, and only a soldier 
could enforce."7^
This last sentence is highly significant because it would have been 
constitutionally possible for Gurney to have appointed himself Director of 
Operations. That he did not can be ascribed to two principal reasons. First, 
he did not recognise until too late that a Director of Operations was needed, 
much less one with full powers both military and civil. Second, and more 
important, he failed to realise that the times demanded someone who could be 
both a leader and a commander, rather than two separate lower keyed appoint­
ments of an administrator (himself), and a coordinator (Briggs) .
The contention, that only a coordinator is required in such a 
situation, has indeed since been maintained by at least two writers and needs 
to be examined here because it calls into question the very fundaments'upon which 
Templer's appointment, unique at the time, v s based.
First, Sir Robert Thompson, who served in Malaya and under 
Templer has stated:
"....the Director of Operations is not a commander. The normal chains 
of command both in the armed forces and in government departments should 
continue to operate in the ordinary way, with instructions being issued 
through the ordinary channels of command in accordance of the decisions 
of the National War Council and such further implementing directions as 
rnay be given by the Director of Operations. Second, ministries, military 
headquarters and government departments must do all the work for which 
they are responsible.... If the Director of Operations is not adamant
75 Parkinson; Op .Cit., p 21.
about this, he will end up running an entirely separate government, 
including the railways."78
Second, Brigadier Frank Kitson in Low Intensity Operations, reaffirms that the 
essential purpose of the Director of Operations is to coordinate rather than 
to command and follows Thompson at a respectful distance.77
The main objection to these assertions is that this was attempted 
in the original powers given to Briggs, a man of great ability, and failed.
And, as has been argued in the previous chapter, the principal reason was 
that the restricted authority to coordinate, and the administrative 
responsibility to give effect to that coordination, ran in separate channels. 
Moreover, it was quickly established that control by committee, established 
by the S.W.E.Cs and D.W.E.C.s only operated effectively at lower levels.
At the summit one man, not a committee, needed to be able to enforce 
executive decisions. It was for this reason that Briggs’ powers were 
belatedly extended and Templer chose to exercise the de facto powers of the 
Director of Operations, rather than delegate them to his deputy.
Moreover, a situation where the Director of Operations in 
Thompson’s words, ’will end up running an entirely separate government 
including the railways,' is not only highly exaggerated, but in the case of 
Templer has a whimsical twist, because in his earlier capacity as Military 
Governor of the British Zone of Germany, one of his first tasks had been the 
effective reestablishment of the railway service, which he did by delegating 
the task and then checking that it was done.'78 In Malaya, there was never 
any question of the Director of Operations Staff taking over civil functions 
which could be adequately handled by normal civil process; nor did they 
become immersed in unessential matters. But the breadth of Templer's powers 
ensured that an ineffectual individual, whether military or civilian could 
be - and frequently was - instantly replaced. Furthermore, the reduced 
powers given to Templer's successor as Director of Operations, are very 
apposite to this argument. When he left, security had improved so much that 
the dual appointment was now considered unnecessary. Besides, the time was 
rapidly approaching when power must be transferred to a civilian government 
of an independent Malaya. Accordingly, when Templer's Deputy High 
Commissioner, Sir Donald McGillivray, was appointed High Commissioner, General 
Bourne was appointed Director of Operations with powers similar to those 
finally granted to Briggs. Bourne in his turn was succeeded by General Bower,
7o Thompson, Communist Insurgency, pp 82-83.
77 Kitson, Operations, p 57.
78 Templer, Interview.
who reviewing the Emergency in 1957, said:
"The Malayan Emergency was only directed at maximum efficiency from 1952 
to 1954, when the posts of High Commissioner and Director of Operations 
were combined. Since then, the Director of Operations has retained 
command of all Security Forces, and has had power to direct certain civil 
measures. He has however, had very little say over civil appointments, 
and this has undoubtedly sapped much of the impetus from the Emergency, 
which depends largely on the ability and energy of the Chairmen of State 
and District War Executive Committees and on their permanence of tenure 
in these appointments. There have recently been frequent postings and 
replacements, not always by suitable men. This has sometimes been 
mitigated by good police or army members of the committees, but they 
cannot enforce civil measures, nor can they make up for weak or incompetent 
leadership.1,78
Templer's Achievement
Templer's Directive required him to restore law and order and 
assist Malaya towards self-government with a common form of citizenship, 
without sacfrificing the customs and culture of any community, while assisting 
the Malays to play a full part in economic life.80 Two years was clearly too 
short to complete such a programme, and clearly one must not overestimate the 
contribution of one man. However Templer played a creditable part in the 
political and social development, which depended most on the decisions of 
others, and in the conduct of the Emergency, which is the focus of this study, 
where his personal freedom of action was greatest, and where he had inherited 
a good deal of muddle and not a little despair, he succeeded beyond anyone’s 
expectation. Insurgent inspired incidents which averaged more than 500 a 
month when he arrived were less than 100 when he left and civilian casualties 
had fallen from 100 to less than 20.81 While partly the result of the 
M.C.P.s October 1951 Directives, the efforts by the Politbureau to lift its 
armed attacks and reassert its influence were wholly unsuccessful. Moreover,
78 Review, 1948-57, p 26. Moreover, in his Later book 'No Exit From Vietnam' 
Thompson recants his earlier view: 'For all the criticism levelled at the
military (which in this case is his own) there is much to be said for a 
General being appointed as pro-consul, provided that this elevates him to 
a civilian and political position from which he can give directions to all 
heads of agencies including the Commanding General of the forces (this was 
General Templer's position in Malaya as High Commissioner and Director of 
Operations) . The advantage of Generals in this role is that they understand 
politics as being the art of the practical and are not always looking for 
the impractical ideal. Nor do they like being controlled by events.' 




despite the Security Forces reduced opportunities to inflict telling 
casualties compared with 1950/51, the rate of contact remained high and 
monthly eliminations fell only from 116 to 80. Above all, the insurgents 
were not replacing their losses, and during Templer’s brief rule their 
strength had been reduced by more than half.82
To the steady success of Framework operations based on the 
Briggs Plan had been added the Federal Priority Operation based on intensive 
food denial. And while this technique was employed to 'dig up the roots’ of 
the insurgent organisation in populated areas, the Deep Jungle Operations 
based on the versatility of the helicopter and the systematic construction 
of Jungle Forts to win over the aborigines reduced the insurgency to a remote 
nuisance.
New citizenship laws introduced by Templer in 1952 not only 
increased the number of Chinese and Indian citizens, but came when the 
introduction of elections to local and higher councils for the first time 
made the citizen an elector. In November 1952, Templer told the Legislative 
Council that the time had come for the states and the two colonies Penang 
and Malacca. To heighten political consciousness of the role of government, 
the Civics Courses were introduced.83 By 1953, public interest in political 
participation was evidenced when 78% of eligible voters (much higher than the 
London boroughs as Templer pointed out) turned out for the first town council 
election in Kota Bharu.81* Then on 27th April 1954, a Federation White Paper 
announced the creation of a revised Legislative Council, of 52 elected 
members and 46 appointed from various categories of public life. The first 
elections to the council were held in July 1955, and the Alliance Party (a 
combination of U.M.N.O., the Malayan Chinese Association and the Malayan 
Indian Council) took 79.6% of the vote.88 Moreover, Malay candidates of 
the Alliance Party were elected in predominantly Chinese constituencies and 
the obverse was true in some Malay dominated constituencies.
It was also possible now for Chinese and Indians to enter the 
Malayan Civil Service or the multi-racial units of the Federation Armed 
Forces. If few wished to do so, that was hardly Templer’s fault. Templar’s 
directive had stated inter alia that ’the Malays must be encouraged and
82 Ibid.
83 Already referred to p 128 above.
84 Weekly New Summary, 4th July 1953,
88 Fifield, Diplomacy, p 40.
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assisted to play a full part in the economic life of the country*. To some 
extent, the Kampongs had been left behind in the allotment of resources to 
New Village development, because as Templer put it in the. Legislative Council, 
’If a person has one arm broken and the other slightly bruised one deals 
with the broken arm first.*85 Increasingly, from 1952 onwards, the economic 
position of the Malays was improved through the Rural and Industrial Develop­
ment Authority (R.I.D.A.). Water supply and electrical reticulation schemes 
were introduced into a large number of Kampongs. Major irrigation and 
drainage programmes were undertaken, and the extensive Perlis and North 
Kedah plains opened for rice growing. Cooperatives to reduce dependence on 
usury and to introduce many Malay communities to commerce and banking were 
introduced. R.I.D.A. also extended loans against crops and sponsored such 
enterprises as small rubber planting, fisheries, animal husbandry, road 
building, domestic water supply and community centres.87
However, Templer was the first to admit that his achievements
in pursuit of his Directive had fallen short of his hopes. As he stated in
his final press conference before leaving Malaya:
"You can’t force people into being a united nation by government 
order, any more than, having brought a horse to water, you can 
force it to drink."88
Yet in the most extensive, and certainly the most vehement public 
criticism of Templer's rule in Malaya by the distinguished scholar Dr. Victor 
Purcell, even Templer 's more generally accepted achievements are given scant
recognition.88 ___________________
85 Templer's speech, 18th March 1953, p 6.
87 To some degree, R.I.D.A., which had been set up in 1950 to enhance the
economic position of the Malays, although well supported by Templer, was 
never as successful as was hoped. In his report on R.I.D.A. (Kuala 
Lumpur, Government Printing Office 1957) Mr. D.E.M. Fiennes criticised the 
three watertight compartments into which the rural community was divided: 
plantations; Chinese small holders; and Malay farmers. He said that 
almost every educated Malay went into government service, and virtually 
none into organising the development of the productive economy of the 
Malay people. For this reason R.I.D.A. achieved little success. Moreover, 
on the basis of contemporary evidence large scale usury may be an 
ineluctable problem. As one report puts it: 'Rural indebtedness is a
basic social problem. There were 211 pawnshops operating in Western 
Malaysia last year, for example, charging interest rates of up to 60 per 
cent. The Economist, January 30, 1971, p xxix.
88 High Commissioner's Press Conference, 26th May 1954,
88 Purcell, V.P; Malaya: Communist or Free? London, 1954.
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In attempting to categorise Purcell’s charges against Templer, 
the enquirer is confronted by the widest possible range. However, for the 
purposeof this analysis, there are three that deserve examination. First, 
during his visit to Malaya in August - September 1952, Purcell likened Malaya 
under Templer to a vast ’armed camp’ in which the dominance of the military 
was overpowering, and where affairs were conducted ’in an atmosphere of 
martial urgency’,
"Everywhere there were the symbols of force - troops, barbed wire, 
helicopters, road blocks, and mobile police in their myriads. The 
essentially civilian atmosphere of pre-war Malaya had vanished and a 
fashionable barbarism was taking its place."90
Second, that Templer fostered prejudice against the Chinese and
discriminated against them.91 And third, that Templer had been tardy in
advancing Malaya towards self government.92
The first is little more than a statement of the obvious.
Malaya had become an armed camp because this is the nature of such a State 
of Emergency, where bellicosity on the part of the counter-insurgent is both 
inevitable and essential. Moreover, Templer was successful against the 
insurgents, precisely because he created a 'muscular organisation’ which was 
very proficiently destroying them. Had he not done so it is conceivable 
that the Emergency might still be going on. As for Templer’s famous out­
bursts, they may perhaps have been excessive at times, but he often had 
cause and if it led to resentment (which it seldom did) it was nevertheless 
acceptable provided it was followed by renewed activity.93 For Templer it 
was essentially a means to an end. Insofar as his outbursts were directed 
at the Chinese, which frequently they were not, they helped project his
90 Ibid., p 231. Purcell was not resident in Malaya, but visited there as 
the guest of the Malayan Chinese Association.
91 Ibid., p 248 passim.
92 Ibid., p 259 passim
93 Nevertheless, in recounting the incidents involving the removal of the 
portrait of Dr. Sun Yat Sen (p 237) and Templer’s exaggerated remarks to 
the former Minister of Agriculture Che Abdul Bin Ishak (p 238) Purcell's 
exaggerations suggest what was almost a caricature of each situation. 
Similarly, when Templer referred to the semi-novel Jungle Green as 
’authentic’ he was not referring to the anti-Chinese sentiments expressed 
by some of the characters in it, but rather that the book conveyed a true 
picture of the life of the soldier and particularly the national 
serviceman in Malaya. High Commissioner's Press Conference;
Op.Cit., p 2.
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image as the personification of an overwhelming power which the M.C.P. could 
not hope to match.9t+ Timing mattered a lot and in this case, the example of 
Tanjong Malim was very timely indeed.
As to the charge of Templer’s prejudice against the Chinese, 
he was if anything pro-Chinese in that he trusted them far in advance of his 
officials, as the arming of the Chinese Home Guard shows. If there was 
prejudice against the Chinese, Templer showed no signs of it himself. More­
over, had he been over-indulgent towards them, this would have been counter­
productive in a plural society. What he could do within the realities of 
the situation he did. Purcell’s specific charge that he stopped the 
Malayan Chinese Association's Lottery, and then rebuked them for 
discontinuing welfare work in the Ne\7 Villages, the purpose for which Gurney 
had allowed it, is only part of the truth.95 Since its inception the M.C.A. 
had become increasingly involved in politics, and Templer found that lottery 
funds were being used for political purposes.96 Had he allowed the lottery 
to continue, he would have been very obviously discriminating against the 
Malay and Indian communities.
The third charge that Templer had been tardy in advancing 
Malaya towards self-government97 is a criticism of British colonial policy 
much more than of Templer. Furthermore, there is more prudence in one of 
Templer's key statements on this subject than Purcell cares to admit:
"It would be a tragedy," said Templer, "not only for Malaya but for 
the whole of South East Asia if the power were handed over so 
precipitately that the remarkable progress now being made in all 
directions was thrown out of gear, quite apart from the communal 
difficulties that might arise."98
9i^ On this point the reader is again referred to the excellent exposition 
of M.C.P. psychology by Professor Lucien Pye who found that most of the 
S.E.P.s perceived the Government as being (before Templer) quite 
distant from them and therefore weak (pp 205-206). The S.E.P.s'esteem 
for authority suggests strongly that they were very respectful of strong, 
and even of arbitrary rule. Pye, p 274 passim.
95 Purcell, V.P.; Op.Cit., pp 107-108.
96 Madoc, Interview.
97 Purcell, V.P.; Op.Cit., p 259 passim.
90 Ibid., p 259.
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The communal . difficulties which Malaya has experienced since 
emphasise the wisdom of this view.09 Above all, Templer had to balance the 
need to win over the Chinese, against the risks, already demonstrated over 
the Malayan Union, of alienating the Malays, who were both the mainstay of 
the Government position and the 'people of the land', for whom the British 
had undertaken an nistoric obligation. There was also the risk that too 
rapid an advance towards self-government, before the Emergency was 
substantially reduced, might have left the indigenous expertise in politics 
and administration a legacy with which it could not cope. As it was, Malaya 
was on the threshold of achieving a large measure of self-government when 
Templer left and if, as Purcell infers, the problem could have been simply 
solved, it is surely surprising that greater progress had not been made 
under Templer's predecessors.
Finally, Purcell's further assault on Templer:
"For a soldier or a policeman in danger of ambush to see things in any 
long term view is next to impossible.... He is bound to regard talk 
of relaxing the Emergency Regulations as a kind of treachery to 
himself."100
This entirely ignores the following specific achievements of Templer: the 
creation of the White Areas; the scrapping of Emergency Regulations 17D and 
17DA; the creation of the multi-racial units of the Federation Army; the 
arming of the Chinese Home Guard and the establishment of the Kinta Valley 
Home Guard; and the merger of the War Council with the Legislative Council, 
which increased civilian participation in the conduct of the Emergency at 
the expense of the military.
There is something of Templer's times in Malaya which resembles 
the tide in the affairs of men. His success was due partly to his being the 
right man at the right time and place. That Gurney's death also coincided 
fortuitously with a new Government at Westminster meant that the way was 
clear for Britain's policy to be unshackled from past failures. Templer was 
in a unique position. Not only could he profit from the mistakes of his 
predecessors, he also inherited in the Briggs Plan the recipe for success 
which manifestly required greater executive authority for success to be
00 The writer is here referring to the riots of May 1969 of which one writer 
gave as his opinion: 'The great tragedy of May 1969 was that the 
authorities gave protection to one racial group only and the rioters 
were suppressed on the basis of race.' Slimming J.; Malaya: Death of a 
Democracy, London, 1969, p 61.
100 Purcell, V.P.; Op.Cit., p 275.
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consummated. The Plan had already exposed the fragility of an insurgent 
organisation in a complex society. Now Templer, with vastly increased means, 
was enabled to create an organisational steamroller for its greater 
destruction. He was also given every support by the British Government. In 
the same way that it reaffirmed its confidence in him after episodes like 
Tanjong Malim, it also gave him vast material support which Briggs had not 
had. By the end of 1952, more than 900 armoured vehicles had arrived for 
the Police, and the Army’s flexibility was enhanced by troop carrying 
helicopters. The trickle of defensive stores became a flood. The comparison 
with Montgomery's position immediately before Alamein is irresistible, and 
with both men the relentless progress towards success became inexorable.
Above all Templer provided vigorous leadership when it was 
most needed. When he arrived, the Security Forces were toiling almost in 
despair: when he left the insurgents were battling to survive. Some
eighteen months later still, Sir Donald McGillivray, Templer's successor as 
High Commissioner, was able to announce to the Legislative Council that the 
British Government no longer considered the Emergency a bar to self 
government.101 If, as Purcell was aware, victory depended on political 
advance, political advance also depended on success in the conduct of 
operations. And that was where the calibre of the individual leader counted 
most, for few men react more sensitively to the quality of their leaders 
than men whose profession requires them to risk their lives. The degree to 
which their morale was transformed has been aptly expressed by Brigadier 
Henniker:
"Why," demanded those on the ground, "do we never seem to win? We have 
suffered, we have worked, we have fought and endured. We have done 
all that has been asked of us and yet we go on continually being 
worsted. Why? .... The leaders gradually become exhausted and begin 
to have doubts. Glib critics pillory them as being out of date and 
working on the wrong lines.... Gradually and imperceptibly a feeling 
grows that the High Command is a failure.... What is the remedy? The 
answer is as old as the Odyssey itself. It is a Man.... Alexander and 
Montgomery were the men who brought back to the Desert Armies a spirit 
of victory. The contribution of these men lay not so much in what they 
did as what they were.... here, then, in January 1952 was the need of 
the hour - a Man. And General Templer was that :man."102
101 Commonwealth Survey, Vol. 2, No. 2.
102 Henniker, Red Shadow, p 27.
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CHAPTER VI
THE CONDUCT OF COUNTER INSURGENT OPERATIONS
The operational complexity of the Emergency presents almost 
as great an intellectual challenge to the historian as it did a physical 
challenge to the men of the Security Forces.
Yet in the records of sustained conflict it remains a 'low 
intensity operation', with no identifiable or decisive battles.1 No single 
clash cost either side more than a platoon in casualties. The most intensely 
fought encounter was caused by a mistake at the minor tactical level. In 
March 1950, a platoon of the Malay Regiment left its base at Pulai in 
Kelantan for a routine three day patrol. Returning, the commander broke an 
established rule and used the same route. The patrol was ambushed and lost 
seventeen killed and six wounded.2 Similarly, on 22nd January 1950, an 
insurgent commander's decision to stay the night in his existing camp, after 
contact had already been made with the Security Forces during the day, cost 
the lives of twenty-two of his men.2
However, these actions were exceptional and an encounter in 
which the government side could claim half a dozen insurgents killed was a 
rarity. A battalion which, having completed its tour, had eliminated a 
hundred insurgents was feted by press and radio more than if it had been 
awarded a battle honour.
For despite the preponderance which the government side 
enjoyed in weaponry and economic resources, other factors made the campaign 
more equal. First, the country itself was a guerrilla's paradise. The 
operational area comprised the whole peninsula (slightly less than half the 
size of Italy) only one-fifth of which had been modified by the hand of man,
1 The phrase is taken from the book Low Intensity Operations, by Brigadier 
F. Kitson, London (H.M.S.O.), 1971 referring to Subversion, Insurgency 
and Peacekeeping.
2 Established from government records of the Emergency, particularly 
M.C.P., Terrorism and M.C.P., Banditry. According to Miller,, who covered 
the Emergency for the Straits Times and is a reliable witness, the 
insurgents lost 29 in this action and possibly more. Miller, Jungle War 
pp 66-68. On this basis it was easily the largest single action of the 
campaign.
3 A further e was killed and 12 later reportedly died of wounds. Only one 
Gurkha am the Security Forces was killed. M.C.P., Terrorism, p 82.
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most of it along the south and west coastline. (Maps 1 and 2).4 The 
peninsula has a backbone of jungle covered mountains which rise to 7000 feet 
and from which fast rivers flow east and west. The remaining four-fifths is 
trackless evergreen forest and undergrowth.5 A hundred feet above the ground 
the trees completely shut out the sky, and from their branches hang curtains 
of vine and creeper which join the undergrowth to make a jungle so thick 
that a standing man is often invisible at twenty-five yards. Here, the main 
danger is becoming lost. Five yards from a track looks the same as five 
miles, and men have died two hundred yards from a main road. Patrols often 
went around in decreasing circles for days. The jungle also imposed other 
problems; fields of fire were poor, and the difficulties of command and 
control placed a premium on the initiative and training of the individual 
soldier and small unit leader seldom found in other campaigns-. In Malaya, 
no site of economic or social significance is more than a few hours march 
from the jungle. Thus, whoever most effectively moves and fights in the 
jungle, controls Malaya. With more than 500,000 squatters acting as a 
screen between the insurgents and the government, and the Chinese population 
in general unassimilated with the rest of Malayan life, the otherwise great 
disparity between the insurgents and the government in regard to numbers and 
resources was reduced.
The Search for a Strategy
Given the government's unpreparedness in June 1948, even a 
well based plan could scarcely have been expected to fructify until the 
intelligence service, police and armed forces had been prepared and trained.
14 In particular Map 2 - Vegetation and Mining.
5 For operational purposes this four-fifths may be divided into:
(a) Rubber Plantations where, owing to the fixed pattern of the trees and 
the lack of undergrowth, visibility was often good up to several 
hundred yards and movement possible even at night.
(b) Primary Jungle where trees grow at a very high density and up 150 feet 
and more in height, but the undergrowth was not sufficiently dense to 
unduly impede movement.
(c) Secondary Jungle where the trees grow at a smaller density but a dense 
undergrowth of bushes, creeper and bamboo make movement very difficult.
(d) Swamp which occurs in parts of the coastal areas where a man could 
sink up to his waist and visibility was reduced to a few yards by 
trees and undergrowth.
Interspersed with the above are found belukar (low scrub and bushes), 
lallang (long grass) or cultivated land. There is plenty of game in the 
country including elephants, tigers and wild pig but frequently patrols 
would operate for some time without encountering anything more than lizards, 
monkeys and birds. ATOM, p 34.
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But there was no such plan, and the first two years saw a succession of 
expedients, none of which enabled the government to seize back the 
initiative.
The original action of the Commissioner-General which put the 
estates and mines in a state of defence has already been mentioned. During 
the interregnum between Gent’s departure on 29th June 1948, and Gurney’s 
arrival on 6th October, the Officer Administering the Government, Sir Alec 
Newboult, was obliged to undertake measures which might not be retained by 
his successor. In the event, this is exactly what happened. Since the armed 
forces had been placed ’in aid of the civil power’, Newboult looked to 
Boucher to plan and direct the fight:0 when Gurney arrived, he decided that 
the Commissioner of Police, Gray, would perform this function. But, as 
already mentioned, Gray, presiding over a vast expansion of his own force, 
had neither the time nor the organisational machinery to direct operations. 
Although he had been Commissioner of Police in Palestine when Gurney had been 
Chief Secretary, Gray was not a professional policeman. Moreover, while his 
military record in the Second World War had been impressive, he had acquired 
it as a relatively junior officer.7 Now he was meant to give directions to 
Boucher, a relatively senior officer, in a geographical situation where 
Boucher was experienced and he was not. Thus, the foundations for a true 
working relationship between the two men, and more particularly between their 
two services, was never laid and in the absence of firm control from the 
High Commissioner, no firm strategy emerged.8
Moreover, in August 1948, Gray had made it clear that the 
police were not ready to take the lead,8 and in practice, until the force 
itself and in particular Special Branch had reached a higher stage of 
development in 1952, the police never did. This led to a situation where not
8 S.T., 23rd June 1948. In a leading article entitled 'Interpreting 
Terrorism'.
7 Gray had ended the war as a Lieutenant Colonel, Royal Marines with a D.S.O. 
and M.C. He became Clerk of the Course at Newmarket Racecourse after 
leaving Malaya. Waller, Interview; and Gray, Correspondence.
8 Gray said of Gurney: 'I held a very high regard for his ability and 
integrity and his political wisdom, but I think he was perhaps not strong 
enough for the incredibly difficult situation with which he was confronted 
in Malaya - he was too nice'. Gray, Correspondence.
Minutes, C-in-C FARELF Conference, 21-22 September 1948.9
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only were police and army units virtually fighting two separate but 
adjacent campaigns,1^  but Major General Boucher, supported - at least 
tacitly - by the C-in-C FARELF, was guiding operations without appearing to 
do so. Already in the short time that he had been responsible for directing 
events, Boucher had seen the need for a force which could harry the insurgents 
until the general body of troops could be adequately trained; this force 
became known as Ferret Force.
Ferret Force consisted of a number of small units under 
officers, most of whom had served in Force 136 during the Second World War.
The rank and file were for the most part Malays from the Malay Regiment and 
Gurkhas, with some British troops and trackers from Borneo. Each officer 
knew at least one Malayan language and had available men who could interpret 
Chinese, Malay or Tamil. In all, six groups of Ferrets were raised.11 
Originally, it was intended that the force should operate inside the jungle 
but experience quickly demonstrated that the insurgents, who were then trying 
to organise themselves into properly formed bodies and depended on settle­
ments for all their supplies, were seldom more than an hour’s march inside 
the jungle fringe.12
The Ferret Groups had mixed success. Ferret Group 6 patrolled 
in the Ipoh area for seven weeks at the end of which it claimed to have 
killed two insurgents and probably a third. More importantly, it had
10 por example, during Operation SOCCER during September 1948, a battalion 
effort involving both sweeps and night ambushes, in an area of which about 
one-quarter was heavily inhabited by Chinese squatters. Yet the police 
officially knew nothing about it and t^ok no part in it. The battalion 
later conceded that this had been an e.ror and that the local knowledge
of the police would have been invaluable. Q.H.R.; lst/2nd Gurkha Rifles, 
30th September 1948.
11 M.C.P., Terrorism, p 5. Each group was divided into four patrols, 
normally of twelve other ranks together with interpreters and a tracker. 
When the troops in the patrol were Malays they worked under civilian 
officers; British or Gurkha troops worked under their own officers. A 
Ferret Group was usually about 80 strong. With each group were eight 
Liaison Officers who were used to interpret and gather information. The
_ regroups were given rapid and rudimentary training in small arms and basic 
techniques of patrolling in a ten day course run by the Malay Regiment at 
Port Dickson and were then sent on operations. Brooke, Interview.
12 It became general practice in most groups for three patrols to search 
different areas simultaneously, leaving one patrol to rest and guard the 
base. The usual length of a patrol was eight to twelve hours and 
individual patrols worked for three days out of four. *.
Ferret Report, p 8.
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captured two insurgents, a Gestetner machine used to print propaganda leaflets, 
some documents and a small quantity of weapons.13 Another group had come 
upon a number of 'bandits’ collecting food in an abandoned squatter area. It 
wounded one insurgent who 'proceeded to tell all he knew with great 
enthusiasm, and as a result of the 2nd/2nd Gurkhas were able to discover two 
important camps and to chase a large body of bandits through the jungle for 
about a fortnight with several contacts.14 However, such successes were 
fleeting, 'The rest of the story,' states the report of Ferret Group 6, 'is 
one of incessant and gruelling patrol work with no positive results to show. 
Only once in a while could we carry out an operation as a group with a 
specific objective.'
Ferret Group 2 encountered similar problems:
"During the period under review (6-30th September 1948) Group 2 carried 
out 69 day patrols and 11 night patrols varying in duration from 
3 hours to 12 hours. Insurgents were met on only nine occasions and 
unfortunately in very small parties. Two insurgents were wounded and 
later captured without arms, seven were captured while hiding in the 
vicinity of vacated camps, and one was wounded in a running fight but 
disappeared in a deep swamp and was presumed drowned."15
But despite the meagre results which this group could claim, its leader
Hannah had important observations to make about the general performance of
the Security Forces. He found for example, that in some areas the police had
important information to give, but no systematic and reliable means of
doing so:
"and since the Police through time, have built up the best intelligence 
network in Malaya, it would seem to me essential that a uniform system 
of filing and recording such information a is available, should be 
instituted throughout the Federation not Only in a state or general 
headquarters but also in circle H.Q.s with which local military commanders 
are in close touch."15
Until the police could be freed from static defence duties however, and 
Special Branch had been fully developed, even better coordination was of 
limited value.
Thus, several lessons which had to be relearned again and 
again at such cost until finally embodied in the Briggs Plan, had already
13 Their attention was drawn to one camp 'because of the bravado of the 
bandits in having firing practice in the jungle.' Ibid., p 9.
14 Ibid., p 11.
•*
15 Ibid., p 18.
16 Ibid., pp 18-19.
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been established by the Ferrets: the feasibility of using small aggressive
patrols, the fundamental importance of close coordination with the police 
and the need to gain a lasting ascendancy over an area because, as the 
insurgents themselves admitted, they did not worry over much about large 
police-military sweeps as they ’come and go', but they disliked the Ferret 
Groups who ’go too far and stay too long.’17
Some lessons so learned were not forgotten. The usefulness of 
small patrols including men with knowledge of the local area, and the local 
languages and customs, led to the establishment of the Police Jungle Squads, 
usually composed of some twenty Special Constables led by a European Police 
Lieutenant.19 Also out of the Ferret experience, a Civil Liaison Corps of 
interpreters and experienced locals who could be attached to army units was 
formed and gave good service until the idea was incorporated in the Briggs 
Plan.19
But the assertion made by one writer that an intensification 
of the Ferret Force idea 'would have shortened the war' seems dubious in the 
light of the available evidence.211 First, one of the principal reasons for 
disbanding the force - which had virtually been completed by the end of 
1948 - was that most of its leaders had been diverted from key jobs within 
the civil administration, from which they could be ill-spared, so that there 
was an elastic limit to the number of Ferret groups which could be raised. 
Second, an extension of the Ferret principle, especially before helicopters 
became more readily available, would have required an independent logistic 
organisation for an abnormally small and ^oecialised force so widely dispersed 
as to be ineffectual except in a short term ’pathfinder’ role.21 In other 
words, the same factors which caused Field Marshal Slim to question the value
17 Ibid., p 11.
19 By the end of 1949 there were 253 of these squads. A good account of the 
experiences of an officer who commanded several jungle squads is given in 
Moran J.W.; Spearhead in Malaya, London, 1959 and The Camp Across the 
River, London, 1961. They patrolled and operated in a similar manner to 
an infantry platoon.
19 M.C.P., Banditry, p 5.
29 O ’Ballance, p 169.
21 For example, in September 1948 the Ferret Groups were deployed as follows: 
Group 1 - Sungei Siput (Perak); Group 2 - Tronoh (Perak); Group 3 - 
Triang (Johore); Group 4 - South Johore; Group 5 - resting; Group 6 - 
Port Dickson (Negri Sembilan). Ferret Report, p 2.
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of elite units, namely that they drain more than their fair share of talent 
from other units and, by being trained, equipped and mentally adjusted for 
one kind of operation, do not give a worthwhile return for the resources 
which they absorb, an extension of Ferret Force would have been an 
aberration.22 There was nothing strikingly novel in Ferret tactics, which 
were basically aggressive infantry patrolling. What was needed was to raise 
standards of jungle craft so that all units in Malaya would be capable of 
sustained operations. The reports of Ferret Force show that much of their 
own patrolling was not particularly proficient, and as the Emergency 
developed their performance was surpassed by the better Malay, Commonwealth 
and British battalions in the Federation, and by the Jungle Squads and Federal 
Jungle Companies of the Malayan Police.
In addition to the value distilled from the Ferret experience 
there were false lessons which more prominently caught the headlines. On 
the basis of seven weeks' experience, Lt.Col. R.N. Broome, (ex Force 136), 
was rash enough to state:
"This apparently aimless patrolling throws a great strain on 
the men, and no troops can be expected to do it indefinitely at the 
pressure the Ferrets worked at. But it is this patrolling 'on spec' 
which brings results in the end."23
Without realising it, Broome was both rationalising a necessity - because, 
as Ferret experience showed, it was rarely possible to obtain precise 
knowledge of insurgent movement - and pointing a crooked path to the future 
since, in his wake whole generations of troops and police engaged in 
speculative patrolling with greater or lesser success. And, in a further 
statement which supported admirably Boucher's own ideas of 'disinfection', 
Broome again stated that great advantage was to be gained by 'flooding' an 
area likely to contain insurgents. Broome went on to qualify this assertion 
by pointing out that such areas would only remain 'disinfected' provided 
that the Security Forces remained there. Unfortunately, because it reflected 
the penchant of many commanders for large scale operations - particularly 
those who had served in the Western Desert, or more recently on manoeuvres 
with the British Army of the Rhine - Broome's statement was accepted without 
its essential qualifications, and for a long time thereafter the concept of
22 Slim, pp 546-549. Slim's most trenchant comment about Special Forces is 
that,'Armies do not win wars by means of a few bodies of super-soldiers 
but by the average quality of their standard units.' (p 547)
Ferret Report, p 11.23
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'flooding' an area with large bodies of troops enjoyed an unmerited and 
relatively unfruitful popularity.
But even without these examples from the Ferrets' experiences, 
both Boucher in Kuala Lumpur and Ritchie in Singapore had arrived at similar 
operational precepts. Boucher's intentions have already been referred to.
In September 1948, General Ritchie compared the previous three months in 
Malaya with what he knew of Greece and China and told his senior officers 
that, in communist doctrine, guerrilla warfare unfolded in three phases:
(1) Gaining control of small areas by terrorist methods; (2) Enlisting and 
impressing the natives into fighting units; and (3) Operating from these 
areas as firm bases. A defensive policy by the security forces would be 
fatal. No matter how meagre the information it was essential to adopt an 
offensive military policy. The enemy had to be continually harried and kept 
on the move to disrupt his training and to prevent his organising into large 
units.2,f
The spirit was admirable, and so little was known of the 
insurgents' organisation that there was little alternative. Moreover, the 
government could not have known yet that the M.C.P.'s intention to form large 
units was frustrated by its own command and logistic problems. Ritchie's 
general concept was therefore enthusiastically implemented and these tactics 
were persisted in long after the insurgents had learned to avoid 'sweeps' and 
'thrusts'. In some cases, almost by default, they were replaced by small 
units patrolling and by embryonic measures of food denial which anticipated 
the methods introduced by Briggs and Templer. Finally, while no clear and 
comprehensive series links all these techniques into a common strand of 
development, they rapidly bifurcated into small and large scale operations. 
The large scale sweeps and cordons harnessed food-control as part of their 
essential fabric and, with Special Branch assistance, developed into Federal 
Operations and Federal Priority Operations which later tore up the roots of 
the insurgent organisation, district by district. At the lower end of the 
spectrum, patrolling, ambushing and attacks on insurgent camps which, after 
the introduction of the Briggs Plan became collectively known as 
'Framework Operations' were the normal means by which a S.W.E.C. or D.W.E.C. 
conducted the Emergency in its area, and these relatively unspectacular 
operations continued to fulfill an important function until the end of the 
Emergency. *
24 Minutes of C-.in-C Conference, G.H.Q. FARELF, 21-22 September 1948.
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LARGE SCALE OPERATIONS
Even as early as November 1948, the Operations Section at 
G.H.Q. FARELF had tersely established what was to remain true until the 
formal abandonment of large scale jungle sw7eeps in 1951: they often moved
the enemy on temporarily, but seldom inflicted casualties.2-5 The troops 
knew this too. Writing in 1949, Major R.E.R. Robinson, a rifle company 
commander, stated bluntly that the bigger the operation, and the higher the 
level at which it was planned, the less its chance of success; the 
preparations were impossible to conceal, the troops were difficult to 
control in the jungle, the insurgents simply vanished.26
These operations were usually of two types: the first
consisted in cordoning an area thought to contain insurgents and then sending 
an independent force in to eliminate them; the second, in sweeping or driving 
the insurgents onto a line of ambushes. In the first three months of 1949 
for example, North Malaya Sub District carried out thirteen major operations 
and had four in progress at its close. Operation NAWAB, typical of many, had 
a battalion of the Kingjs Own Yorkshire Light Infantry attacking into an area 
thought to hold insurgents. The lst/6th Gurkhas acted as cut-offs behind 
them, while several troops of the 4th Hussars together w*ith the police set 
up ambushes to the south and west. NAWAB yielded one insurgent killed and 
fifty-nine arrests. Again, Operation LEO was conducted in Johore for ten 
days during October 1949. The twenty-four platoons involved operated in 
74,000,000 square yards of jungle. Their orders were to sweep from a start 
line to an intermediate and then to a final line. The final line was 
arranged so that the troops converged into a series of ever-smaller boxes.
Entry into each box was preceded by bombing and straffing. By then the 
insurgents should be penned into an area of six grid squares. One rifle 
company would then spend twenty four hours ferreting them out. The air strikes 
in the view of the Commanding Officer lst/2nd Gurkhas, had alerted the 
insurgents and the troops were too thin on the ground to catch them. After­
wards, the results of LEO were entirely negative.27
25 Letter from G.S.0.1 (Ops) to G.H.Q. FARELF, Lessons From Operations,
8th November, 1948.
26 Robinson, R.E.R. Major, 'Reflections of a Company Commander in Malaya’, 
Army Quarterly, October 1950, pp 80-87.
27 Weekly Intelligence Summary (INTSUM), November-December 1948.
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Food Denial - Early Attempts
A more promising adaptation of large scale tactics to deny 
rice to the insurgents was attempted in Operation SNOW WHITE, launched in 
central Malaya during July and August 1949 because of growing fears that the 
Mentakab - Jelebu - Menchis area was falling under insurgent domination.
Eight rifle companies with three batteries of artillerymen acting as infantry, 
as well as the police were used. It began with the compulsory sale to the 
government of all private rice stocks above a certain size. The police then 
blockaded the area to prevent more rice from coming in, and the troops were 
committed to the jungle to ambush the insurgents whom hunger should now 
force to move.
A great quantity of rice was collected, but otherwise SNOW 
WHITE was disappointing. As in other operations, many abandoned camps were 
destroyed and several insurgent units had apparently been forced to move, 
but only three insurgents had been eliminated. In the light of later 
experiences, the main reason for failure lay in the time allotted to SNOW 
WHITE. One month was too short to exhaust the food dumps which the insurgents 
had already established and could live on from eight to ten weeks. Only then 
would they have been forced to take real risks to re-open their food lines.28
Even after the Briggs Plan had been introduced, the large scale 
operations, now known as Priority Operations still failed to achieve results 
commensurate with effort expended. In June and July 1951, three operations, 
GRASSHOPPER, WARBLER and SEDGE were designed - in conjunction with 
relocation, regrouping and food control - to smash the insurgent 
organisation in Johore, and were a combined effort on the part of the army, 
police and civil administration. The main object of GRASSHOPPER was the 
denial of the Johore-Malacca and Johore-Negri Sembilan border areas as a 
sanctuary and a source of food for insurgents escaping the pressure exerted 
by WARBLER in Johore. The difficulties experienced in this series of 
operations are best expressed by the regimental historian of 1st Battalion,
The Green Howards:
"It was from every point of view a complex operation.... It involved 
three state governments, those of Negri Sembilan, Malacca and Johore, 
and their respective Police Forces. In all, four police districts 
belonging to three Police Circles were directly involved, and four more 
circles cooperated or were engaged in some way or other. Added to this, 
two Brigade H.Q.s and troops of four battalions were involved.28
28 G.H.Q. FARELF, Review of 1949, 1st July - 31st December 1949 p 2.
28 Oldfield, p 62.
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The operations were consequently conducted in three phases, lasting from 
28th June to 26th July. In Phase 1, the area was saturated with troops.
Areas for which troops could not be spared were bombed to drive the insurgents 
onto ambushes. In Phase 11, operational areas were redrawn and patrolling 
continued. In Phase 111, emphasis was placed on setting ambushes where the 
rubber plantations and jungle met. But success continued to be elusive:
"Operationally, the results of ’Grasshopper* had been disappointing.
No bandits were killed as a direct result of preplanned operations, 
and the expected influx of terrorists over the Johore boundary into 
Malacca had not materialised.... There had in fact been no noticeable 
alteration in the general lack of support received from the civilian 
population. Liaison between the military, Police and Civil 
Administration had been tested and found completely satisfactory at all 
levels, but the sober fact remained that the crippling blow that was 
to fell the enemy in the area was still to be administered."30
Development of the Federal Priority Operation
From frustrations like these however, emerged a solution. By 
1952, officials directly connected with the Emergency had learned that 
success depended on three factors: (1) The plan had to include the denial
of food and supplies to the insurgents as one of its basic ingredients;
(2) Information provided by Special Branch which was progressively improving 
in quality, was a valuable and at times vital adjunct to information from 
other sources such as patrolling; and (3) The longer an operation 
concentrated in one area, the greater the accomplishment in kills and 
disruption of the insurgents’ ties with the masses.31 Furthermore, the 
application of large scale effort was likely to remain unfruitful unless by 
chance the operational area included an entire insurgent district 
organisation together with all its branches. Before 1952, Special Branch 
knowledge of insurgent boundaries was incomplete. In consequence, even if 
an operation destroyed several branches, the insurgent district, with one 
branch intact, was capable of regrowth. But by 1952, Special Branch had 
established that the insurgent boundaries did not exactly coincide with those 
of either the Administration or the Police and as often as not the 
discrepancy occurred at a state boundary: here the question of ’clearance’
became involved. (Map 3).
Briefly, the problem was that to avoid clashes with friendly 
forces, the troops and police in one state or district could not pursue
30 Ibid., pp 65-66. .
31 Interviews with Templer, Henniker, Madoc and Brooke.
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insurgents across a state boundary without clearance from the S.W.E.C. in 
the adjoining state. Furthermore, many state boundaries followed natural 
barriers such as mountain ranges, which, because of their inaccessability, 
were additionally likely to become safe havens for the insurgents. Tri-border 
areas were even more attractive to them.32
A solution to these problems emerged in rudimentary form from 
Operation HIVE which began on 25th August 1952, in the Seremban District of 
Negri Sembilan. At that time no one had achieved a notable success in a 
large scale operation, and General Briggs himself had gradually abandoned 
his faith in priority operations in favour of framework operations which 
relied on a steady but sure trickle of kills from patrolling and ambushing.
In Operation HIVE, the Commander of 63 Gurkha Brigade, Brigadier M.C.A. 
Henniker attempted to eliminate both the insurgents and their infrastructure 
in the Seremban District.
The area of operations was about 25 miles square. To ensure 
that the insurgents did not have warning, Henniker decided on a deception 
plan, a mythical operation in a different part of the state.33 The basis of 
HIVE was the Special Branch's successful penetration of the insurgents' 
intelligence system in Seremban. Special Branch had gradually discovered 
that it was - with some notable exceptions - easier to 'turn', i.e. suborn a 
known member of the insurgent's organisation than to introduce an agent of
their own. For HIVE, all known insurgent suppliers in the Seremban area
t
were arrested to force the insurgents to hurriedly recruit new suppliers 
whom Special Branch could 'turn'. This process also depended on the
32 After the M.C.P.s October 1951 Directives had ordered a general retirement
into deep jungle bases, attempts to set up such bases were made in the 
following areas: the Kedah/Thailand border area, which offered the
additional advantage of a priveleged sanctuary in Thailand; the Perak/ 
Kelantan/Thailand border area; the South Perak/Selangor/Pahang border area; 
the Taselc Bera area of the Negri Sembilan border; and the Ulu Langat swamp 
area of the South Selangor/Pahang border. Intelligence Appreciation, 1954 
P 4.
33 Henniker spared no efforts to mislead them:
"We ordered hundreds of maps, pinned them into a composite series of 
Bahau, and distributed them to those who would have needed them had the 
operation been a real one. We had maps made, showing all the likely 
food supply areas, and sent them out as well. We sent, in an unsealed 
envelope, a letter to the Managing Director of Malayan Railways asking 
for a special loading ramp to be built in the Bahau Railway Station.
To ensure wide circulation of this letter amongst the clerical staff who 
would open it the letter was endorsed 'Top Secret', 'Personal and 
Confidential' . Next day, to make doubly sure that the letter had wide 
circulation, we sent another Top Secret letter (this time in a properly 
sealed envelope) asking the Managing Director to withdraw the previous 
one as quickly as possible." Henniker, Red Shadow, pp 134-135.
162.
knowledge that since 1949 every insurgent district had built up stocks of 
food to guard against temporary disruption of the supplies normally collected 
by the Min Yuen. Henniker knew that such dumps existed in the Seremban area 
because his troops had located twenty-five in the previous three months and 
he estimated that there were others. Thus the operation had to last long 
enough for the insurgents to exhaust their dumps and be forced to rely on 
suppliers many of whom would be under Special Branch control.
The general intention was simple. An Outer Ring was defined 
and the area surrounded by troops who had been built up from a normal 
complement of three companies for framework operations to three battalions. 
Within the Outer Ring, the insurgents were to be hunted and destroyed by 
patrolling and tracking. Stage 1 involved the deployment of the whole of 
2nd/7th Gurkhas and two squadrons of the Special Air Service Regiment on the 
Outer Ring, operating in deep jungle and supplied by air. Their tasks were 
twofold. First, they were to ambush all known tracks and animal pads using 
small ambush parties backed by a central reserve. Second, they were to 
conduct a slow and systematic search of the Outer Ring. Thus, in addition to 
preventing an insurgent exodus, they located and ambushed some tracks 
previously unknown. In Stage 11, Special Branch were to find out from their 
informers which areas inside the Outer Ring actually held insurgents. In 
Stage 111, all known suppliers were to be arrested, to disrupt the 
insurgents’ normal system of supply, thus forcing them back on their dumps, 
and to obtain further information. This was followed by a pause, Stage IV, 
in which the troops of 2nd/7th Gurkhas were rotated to more promising areas 
while the insurgents consumed their stocks. In Stage V, mopping-up could 
begin as increasingly hungry and demoralised insurgents were forced out of 
the jungle to reestablish contact with the masses, so offering lucrative 
targets for ambush parties.
An important item in the plan was to prevent food getting out 
of Seremban town. Food check points were established by the police at every 
possible outlet, and the Home Guard patrolled other parts of the town 
boundary. There were many loopholes which could not be blocked, and others 
were only discovered later. All rice dealers at the same time were permitted 
to hold five per cent excess stock to make up for waste but in Henniker’s 
words, 'This in itself would feed the eighty-six men of the opposition for a 
lifetime.'34 Moreover, since food was grown in the area, it travelled from
34 Ibid., pp 136-137.
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countryside to town market, from market to shops and thence perhaps to other 
villages, so that many possible leaks existed.
While the operation fell short of Henniker?s hopes, it was 
more systematically successful and the technique showed greater promise of 
refinement, than any previous large scale operation. Intensive searching by 
patrols located six camps, three of them big enough for thirty to fifty men.
At the same time all known suppliers were arrested, 107 of them including 50 
Masses Executives. To avoid ’blowing’ their cover, some of the informers 
already working for Special Branch were also arrested. As this necessarily 
dried up all sources of information, the 2nd/7th Gurkhas, who had been 
searching inside the Outer Ring were rested. At this point, as if to 
emphasise the folly of large scale operations, two insurgents were killed by 
troops of the Fijian Battalion outside the Outer Ring, but none had been 
eliminated within it. Then an insurgent courier entering the area was killed 
with a quantity of useful documents. Information poured in as informers 
reestablished contact. The patrols had located over a ton of food. In the 
first period lasting five weeks, only four insurgents had been killed and one 
captured: but in the second, of four weeks, the increased pressure from the
systematic beleaguerment of one area began to tell and the total eliminations 
rose to twenty-five, over a quarter of the insurgents in the district.35
Operation HIVE was the first serious attempt at a relatively 
sustained operation and by any standards was highly successful. However, it 
had its shortcomings. For a start the blockade of food from outside was not 
completely successful. In addition to rice grown locally, Special Branch 
later found that food had been smuggled through check points in bicycle pumps 
and false bottoms of tins of pig swill.36 To further improve the check 
points, the Special Constables manning them were later reinforced by troops. 
The most important limitation was that two months was still not long enough 
to complete the destruction of the District Organisation. Those branches 
which were not destroyed (and at this stage Special Branch did not know 
precisely who comprised them) were sufficient to sustain the remaining 
organisation although it never again regained its former potency. Moreover, 
a factor which had before received general acknowledgement was now confirmed - 
namely, that the insurgents, even though under considerable pressure, did not 
leave the area to commence operations elsewhere. In Henniker’s words:
35 Ibid., p 153.
36 Madoc, Interview.
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"They frequented one particular area for two reasons. First, they had 
a Communist job to do there; to cultivate the masses, to procure food 
for their comrades, to protect a propaganda unit, or whatever it might 
be. The big men were permitted to move about from one area to another, 
just as generals move about their theatres of war. The rank and file 
were no more permitted to leave their general area than are regular 
troops allowed to quit the battlefield when it gets too hot for them. 
Secondly, they hesitated to leave because of their food lines. If they 
went into a strange area it would be risky establishing a new food 
line. They might be betrayed.."37
The results of HIVE were subjected to the closest scrutiny by 
the Operations Research Branch of the Director of Operations - which had been 
set up by General Templer - and by Special Branch. At the same time a second 
operation, HAMMER, was launched along similar lines in Selangor. Several 
improvements were made and 44 insurgents eliminated, over half by surrenders. 
However, the District Organisation in the HAMMER area contained five branches 
of which only two were attacked, and although disrupted, they were not 
destroyed. The results reinforced the view that permanent damage could not 
be inflicted on an M.C.P. district unless the whole clandestine organisation 
was included in the area of the operation. The rebuilding process did occur 
in this district a few months after HAMMER.30 For its part, HIVE was forced 
to conclude prematurely because the troops were needed elsewhere. At this 
time, a heavy concentration of troops in one area could only be achieved by 
denuding others. The risk was accepted that in these areas terrorism would 
revive, as it frequently did. By 1953 however, the insurgents were fewer, 
and the more aggressive use of Special Constables in Area Security Units 
started by Templer, and the increasing effectiveness of the Home Guards, 
allowed greater flexibility in deploying battalions. This led to Federal 
Operations which were major food denial operations planned directly by 
Templer's staff and systematically introduced by him on 6th August 1953. 
Subsequently, in 1956 they became known as Federal Priority Operations, and 
although constantly refined, they were the ultimate large scale operation 
employed in Malaya.39
37 Henniker, Op.Cit., p 140.
38 Madoc, Interview.
39 An excellent example of the sustained use of these operations to destroy 
the insurgent organisation in a State occurred in Pahang. Beginning in 1953 
under Templer's stimulus, the Pahang SWEC launched a succession of contiguous 
and mutually reinforcing operations; IBEX, HAWK, AGILE, APOLLO and ROOSTER, 
which were so devastating that by the end of 1955 the Security Forces had 
destroyed the insurgent organisation in four-fifths of the state and the 
Government had been able to create the largest White Area in the 
Federation. Review 1955, p 2.
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Both Federal and later Federal Priority Operations had three 
distinct phases.
Phase 1 was a preliminary period of not less than three months 
during which intelligence was built up about a particular insurgent area.
Food suppliers were pinpointed, and the masses organisation was examined for 
potential agents. Where a potential agent was likely to be 'unwilling', the 
files of detainees or S.E.P.s who might have known him were searched to give 
Special Branch a key to turn him. Where necessary, any contacts used in the 
area previously were re-established, and the resistance of known food 
supplying communities was softened up.
In Phase 11, the operation itself began with increased food 
control and Security Force pressure. Special Branch first selected the best 
killing-ground, usually where supplies were handed over to the insurgents, and 
any adjacent areas known to contain food dumps. These were usually near the 
supplier's place of work, sometimes on the edge of a village. In some cases 
Special Branch required the Security Forces to dominate the killing ground 
for a period to worry the suppliers and force some of them to become 
informers. This domination was best achieved by constant ambushing. Ambush 
parties usually moved into position during curfew, before the suppliers 
arrived for work and waited for contact to be made. Once Special Branch had 
enough informers the killing ground was left alone by the Security Forces 
until Special Branch had acquired precise information on which specific 
ambushes could be based. On this basis the concept of operations was then 
built up. While this killing area was being prepared, the remainder of the 
M.C.P. district was made untenable for the insurgents by Security Force 
activity.
Phase 111 included the exploitation of the insurgent's loss of 
morale and the increased flow of intelligence by ambushes, patrolling and 
attacks on camps. Food control was strictly maintained. As insurgents 
surrendered Special Branch interrogated them and then exploited them in the 
following order of priority:
a. An attempt was made to 'turn' the S.E.P. or C.E.P. back into the 
jungle in order to lead his comrades into an ambush.
b. As soon as possible he was photographed for leaflets which could be 
used by the Information Services in psychological warfare.
c. Subsequently, the S.E.P. might be used to lead the Security Forces to 
occupied camps, lead them to food dumps, or show the Security Forces routes
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currently being used by the insurgents.40
Even when the insurgents had tumbled to the dispositions of the 
Security Forces, they would still try to contact their Masses Executives 
because other food supply organisations in the district were frequently unable 
to support them. And, even when they had food dumps to fall back on, they 
still required intelligence. While the initial advantage in such an 
operation was provided by Special Branch, the Security Forces could 
consolidate this advantage by using the best troops available in ambushes 
based on good information, and by exploiting fully operational intelligence 
provided by Special Branch, including the maximum use of reliable S.E.P.s.
The operation was followed as it had been preceded by the establishment of 
Special Branch Listening Posts in case the M.C.P. attempted to rebuild its 
organisation in the district.
Deep Jungle Operations
A separate but parallel large scale operation, used 
increasingly as the insurgents set up cultivated plots in the jungle after 
1951, was the Deep Jungle Operation.
Although it was evident from the number of illegal gardens which 
appeared on aerial photographs, that an area might be under development as an 
insurgent base, the only confirmation was frequently to go in and find out. 
There were several reasons for this. By 1964, Special Branch had been able 
to penetrate the insurgent organisation by inserting agents of their own, by 
turning suspects about whom they had damning evidence, or by using S.E.P.s 
against their former comrades. However, „ iese techniques could not be used 
half so effectively against insurgents in the deep jungle. In these areas 
lived many of the hierarchy with their bodyguards, in some cases as many as 
a platoon. They could be contacted only by jungle courier carefully 
selected from the most trusted party members. And, whereas by 1954 Special 
Branch had infiltrated the 'Open Route Couriers' who operated outside the 
jungle, they had not managed to insert even one agent into the organisation 
inside. Moreover, the insurgents had enlisted much of the aboriginal 
population as an intelligence screen. The government had launched a plan to 
win the support of the aborigines by operating from a netwTork of Jungle Forts, 
but it would obviously take time and the longer the aborigines remained under
40 D of 0 Directive No. 28 issued 6th August 1953; and D of 0 Directive,
The Coordination of Special Branch Planning with Security Force 
Operations, issued 20th June 1956, pp 2-6.
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insurgent domination, the slower the subsequent process would be. For these 
reasons, and even though they had many of the hallmarks of the old fashioned 
’sweeps’, Deep Jungle operations were considered necessary.
Operation TERMITE was conducted from July to November 1954, 
east of Ipoh in Perak. Information from long-range patrols of 22 Special Air 
Service Squadron, a special forces unit developed from the Malayan Scouts,42 
indicated that a considerable concentration of insurgents was living there 
with the aborigines, protected by a well organised screen of aboriginal 
informers and patrols. By their dispositions, the insurgents appeared to be 
confident that the Security Forces could not reach them. The Director of 
Operations decided to attack from the air, a decision unusual in a war which 
offered so few targets for aerial bombardment, and even less opportunity for 
paratroops. Selected targets were accurately bombed, after which three 
squadrons of 22 SAS Regiment were parachuted onto the target areas and 
suspected escape routes in the deep jungle.43 Once they had established 
blocks, the ground forces closed in. These consisted of elements of five 
infantry battalions supported by artillery, two platoons of the Police Field 
Force, one platoon of the Special Operations Volunteer force and eighty armed 
aborigines. The majority of the forces employed were supplied by air through­
out the operation, and much troop-lifting and casualty evacuation was carried 
out by helicopter.
The immediate results were disappointing. Only fifteen 
insurgents were eliminated, and the aborigines whom the operation was 
intended to win over, were so frightened by the bombing that they could not 
be contacted for several days. Still, the long term results were more
42 Five types of Special Forces were used in Malaya during the Emergency. A 
FARELF commanders conference decided in April 1949 that paratroops were not 
worth the necessary overhead. However, in 1956 a Squadron of the 
Parachute Regiment did arrive in Malaya but was scarcely used in its 
specialised role. In April 1953, the Sarawak Rangers consisting of Iban 
(Sea Dyak) trackers was activated for the third time since 1846. The 
Malayan Scouts (later renamed as 22 Special Air Service Regiment) became 
operational in Malaya in January 1951. However, their original role, which 
was to operate in deep jungle, more than two days journey from the nearest 
motorable track, did not become effective until 1952. The SAS operated in 
small patrols usually of three men. They carried 17 days rations. The
two other special forces; Ferret Force and the Special Operations Volunteer 
Force (SOVF) have already been referred to. Weekly News Summary, 13th 
March, 3rd April, 25th July 1953.
43 In order to 'rope down’ from where they had landed in the top of the 
jungle canopy, the soldiers used Abseil gear which had originally been 
developed for fighting forest fires in North America.
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inspiring. Patrolling in the area was continued into 1955 when a permanent 
Jungle Fort was established from which a platoon of the Police Field Force 
dominated the jungle for fifteen miles around.44
Moreover, after the initial attempt by the government to 
concentrate the aborigines in controllable areas had ended in such appalling 
disaster, its later enlightened attempts were far more successful. By the 
end of 1954 this policy, based on the establishment of the Jungle Forts, had 
led to a situation where of the 50,000 to 60,000 aborigines living, in the 
jungle, most of whom at one time or other had supported the insurgents, only 
some 4,000 continued to do so.46
The ability of the aborigines to gather intelligence for the 
government, and provide the Security Forces with tactical information about 
the movement of the insurgents was so effective that groups of aborigines who 
had been resettled away from their traditional areas in 1951, were returned 
because these areas had in the meantime become intelligence vacuums. It was 
also found that properly led squads of aborigines were superior to other 
elements of the Security Forces when used against certain targets. Their 
jungle craft was better and they could carry out long patrols with a 
minimum of encumbrance. By 1956 a clear policy of employing them had 
emerged. In addition to Aborigine Auxiliary Police armed with shot guns, 
who assisted the garrisons of jungle forts as guides, offensive squads of 
properly trained and armed aborigines known as Police Aboriginal Guards were 
trained to hunt down M.C.P. couriers and cultivators.46 Eventually they were 
so successful that in the final years of the Emergency an aborigine force 
known as the Senoi Pra'ak (literally ’Fighting People'), numbering no more 
than three hundred, accounted for more insurgents than the rest of the 
Security Forces put together.47
Large Scale Operations - Final Summary
Thus the Malayan Emergency, like several other counter­
insurgency campaigns, showed a surprising immunity from direct applications 
of large scale conventional military power. Until forces were employed
44 Annual Report 1954, p 415.
46 Review 1954, p 11.
46 D of 0 Directive No. 37, The Emergency Control of the Deep Jungle and of 
Aborigines, issued 1st February 1956, pp 8-10.
47 Thompson, Communist Insurgency, p 153.
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adroitly and on sound intelligence as in the Federal Priority Operations, 
few lasting successes were achieved. And even against this technique, the 
insurgents in several areas proved remarkably tenacious. Operation COBBLE 
in the Segamat District of Johore required 500 police and 1,200 soldiers over 
many months to root out 30 insurgents. And in the final Federal Priority 
Operation of the Emergency, Operation GINGER 11 in Perak, more than seven 
battalions of troops as well as reinforced police and Home Guards were 
concentrated for fifteen months against an estimated 170 insurgents.11®
SMALL SCALE OPERATIONS
In an almost exactly inverse relationship to the growing 
disillusionment with large scale operations from late 1948 onwards, many 
battalion commanders sought a more profitable answer in patrolling and 
ambushing.
The lst/10th Gurkhas reported that after the first few months 
of the Emergency, having been left to their own devices, they had switched 
from jungle sweeps to small patrols operating offensively within very 
restricted areas, which they called saturation patrolling.1+8 Early in 1949, 
1st Battalion, the Devonshire Regiment expressed a preference for small ten 
man patrols operating for several days at a time in widely separated sectors 
of jungle.50 And similarly, in February 1949 in Johore, when the Seaforth 
Highlanders were ordered to kill or capture all insurgents in an area, instead 
of plodding through it from one side to the other, they divided it into 
company sectors and ordered companies to establish a series of patrol bases 
within them from which to operate. Company Commanders in each sector were 
told to take every precaution to avoid being surprised by a superior force, 
and patrols working out far from the base were ordered to number not less 
than sixteen all ranks.5*
As has already been argued, the large scale operation' in 
Malaya had little success until food denial became its chief ingredient.
Until then, the most successful battalions were frequently those left to 
fight in their own way. For example, whereas the Guards in particular had
1+8 Madoc, Interview.
1+8 Q.H.R. , lst/10th Gurkha Rifles, 30th September 1948.
50 Q .H .R ., 1st Devons, 31st March 1949.
51 Q .H .R ., 1st Seaforths, 31st March 1949.
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been employed on abortive sweeps, others were more fortunate. The 1st ' 
Battalion, The Green Howards arrived in August 1949. Until well into their 
second year the whole battalion was frequently employed on large scale 
operations, sometimes at brigade level. Later, their companies were given 
areas of responsibility and allowed to decide upon their own operations.
Their platoons however, were still controlled by wireless from Battalion H.Q., 
and normally stayed in the jungle from four to ten days. In the final stage 
of development of their battalion tactics, Company Commanders ran their own 
operations and controlled their own platoons. This battalion was one of the 
most successful for several reasons: in the areas in which it operated, its
officers and men established good relations with the local administration and 
police; the results of its operations were invariably submitted to close 
scrutiny afterwards; and maximum benefit was extracted from every 
opportunity to retrain. The battalion's success might have been greater still 
had it been permitted to remain in one area for a prolonged period, instead 
of participating periodically in frustrating sweeps. A more static period 
followed in Negri Sembilan, in which their score of kills and captures 
reached 16 by the end of their first fifteen months. A retraining period in 
Singapore was then followed by two more unfruitful months in Johore where 
they had insufficient time to get to know the area. A further fifteen months 
in one area at Tampin allowed them time to build up their liaison with the 
local administration and police and, as their success mounted, the trust which 
the local inhabitants had in them produced more and better information, on 
which more kills were based. They had killed or captured (not counting 
deserters) sixty-six insurgents. Their final two months before returning to 
England in October 1952 was spent in the Cameron Highlands, where their 
accumulated experience and practised professionalism assisted them to 
eliminate a further 20 insurgents. In all, they had eliminated 103 insurgents 
against their own losses of one officer and eight men killed in action and a
1 7 1 .
further eleven dead from other causes.^2
At the same time, changes in military technique were not enough. 
For these to be fully effective, intelligence had to be available from other 
sources. Until the latter half of 1952, when specific information from 
Special Branch allowed whole insurgent districts to be targetted in a manner 
which gave the initiative to the Security Forces, even moderately successful 
results from patrolling could seldom be guaranteed. Of 54 patrols sent out 
between February and March 1952 by the First Royal Marine Commando in 
Selangor, only 14 resulted in contacts which caused casualties to the 
insurgents, xdiile 26th Gurkha Brigade in Johore sent out 58 patrols of which 
17 caused casualties. In the same months however, the M.R.L.A. launched 45 
incidents in Selangor and 312 in Johore, which were not intercepted.53
The average size of patrols at this time over the whole 
Federation was 15. The size of the patrol was dictated as much by tradition 
as by anything else. A full strength platoon of one officer and thirty men 
could be neatly broken down into two patrols of fifteen commanded by the 
Platoon Commander (Lieutenant), and by the Platoon Second-in-Command 
(Sergeant), when both patrols were deployed simultaneously. Alternatively, 
a weak platoon could still provide one patrol of fifteen. Even out of
52 Compiled from Q.H.R.s for 1st Green Howards and from Oldfield. The most 
successful British battalion to serve in Malay during the Emergency, in 
terms of the number of insurgents it eliminated was 1st Battalion, The 
Suffolk Regiment. They arrived in Malaya in June 1949; when they departed 
in January 1953 the number of kills and captures achieved by them stood at 
195, at a loss to themselves of 12 killed and 24 wounded. Their greater 
success appears to have stemmed from ( > Good leadership; (2) Greater 
stability, in that they spent most of their time in one area around Kajang;
(3) They placed great emphasis on proficiency in small-arm shooting; and
(4) The overwhelming number of their soldiers were from country and farm 
areas in Suffolk and were used to hunting. Q.H.R ., 1st Suffolk.
53 INTSUM for this period.
54 However in several units the number of patrols deployed depended on the 
number of qualified and trusted patrol commanders available. One Company 
Commander in lst/2nd Gurkha Rifles patrolled himself with one platoon 
leaving two platoons in base because he did not trust their commanders.
Q.H .R., lst/2nd Gurkha Rifles 30th June 1949. The time spent on a single 
patrol depended on such matters as alertness, sickness and fatigue. In the 
first months of the Emergency most jungle operations lasted three days or 
less. By March of 1949, the period wTas three to four weeks. A Company of 
lst/6th Gurkha Rifles was in the jungle for 27 days up to July 1949. It 
became standard practice in some battalions for troops to spend 20 days on 
operations and 10 days in base. By 1960 one battalion preferred to work 
on a 10 day (Jungle), 5 day (Base) cycle. Q,H.R., lst/3rd East Anglian 
31st January 1960.
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fifteen men, according to the statistics of the operational intelligence 
section, only four could bring effective fire to bear in any contact.55 There 
were positive advantages in the large patrol however. Until the advent of 
helicopters, a patrol which had received a casualty immediately required four 
men as a stretcher party, and in jungle they would have to be regularly 
relieved: in addition two scouts were always needed, and usually two Bren
Light Machine Gun groups of two. If an occupied insurgent camp was located, 
the patrol could be divided into an Assault Party equal to the estimated 
number of insurgents, and a series of two-man Blocking Groups could still be 
despatched to ambush possible escape routes.
Unlike in Vietnam, where Viet Cong mining operations made 
movement along tracks hazardous, patrols seldom encountered mines and there 
was no case after 1949 where mines were used in an anti-personnel role. And 
so, not only were tracks invariably used for movement in preference to 
’jungle bashing’, which was slow, tiring and noisy, but techniques such as 
’cross-graining’ were employed to locate tracks used by the insurgents as 
resupply routes.
Once resettlement had been completed at the end of 1952 and 
food denial had become the basic operational concept, framework operations 
became a relatively measurable technique which did not greatly alter (except 
in the decreasing number of insurgents) until the end of the Emergency. 
Militarily, this was a low-keyed conflict against a fleeting enemy, with 
hundreds of hours onerously spent walking, wading, slithering and sliding, 
punctuated by brief moments of contact. Army and police patrols and ambushes 
all played similar roles, which harrassed the insurgents out of all 
proportion to the relatively small number of contacts made.56
55 Ops Research Memo No. 3, for July and August 1952, pp 1-3.
5o A further characteristic which battalions had to accept was the degree 
of dispersion compared with conventional pratice. Thus in 1954, the 
Battalion H.Q., Support Company and Headquarters Company of 1st Battalion, 
Queens Royal Regiment, were at Tampin, A and B Companies at Rompin,
C Company at South Johol, while D Company was 50 miles away at Ayer Tekah. 
Journal of the Queen’s Royal Regiment, November 1954, p 170.
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FIGURE 13
Army Contacts By Types of Engagement 57








Patrols 47.6 43.5 40.7
Ambushes 36.7 32.5 33.0
Attacks on insurgent 15.7 24.0 26.3
Locations 100% 100% 100%
The increase in the number of attacks on occupied locations - 
camps, gardens and bivouacs (Fig. 13) - resulted from a Director of Operations 
Directive, in the latter half of 1954, that troops were to be assigned to 
specific areas of jungle and were to employ 'company domination tactics', to 
eliminate specified independent insurgent platoons.59 In terms of the number 
of kills per contact these operations became most profitable, accounting for 
1.05 kills per contact in the period January-June 1955, compared with 0.62 
kills per contact in the same period, as the result of ambushes. From March 
1953 to July 1954, 84.2% of preplanned attacks on camps, and 100% of those on 
bivouacs killed at least one insurgent.59
Against an enemy as easily alarmed and wary as the insurgents, 
minor mistakes and accidents frequently negated hours and days of painstaking 
work. During the first half of 1954, a Company of 1st Battalion The Queen's 
Regiment attempted to destroy an insurgent group known to be based on Mount 
Dphir near the Johore-Malacca border. An ambush was set on an unoccupied 
camp consisting of fifteen men, who for t\.j days lay still, without talking, 
smoking or cooking and were then relieved by another fifteen. On the tenth 
day the insurgents returned to their camp. The sergeant in charge of the 
ambush had his carbine ready to fire the shot which would spring the ambush, 
when someone else in the party prematurely discharged his weapon. Every man 
then fired into the scrub, and although two insurgents were thought to be 
hit, none were subsequently found.60
57 Ops Research Memo No. 4/55 
°9 Review 1954, p 11.
59 The total number of attacks of both kinds was 156. Ops Research Memo,
No. 8/54.
0.H .R., 1st Queens, April-June 1954.60
174.
Overall, battalions scored about 20% more patrol contacts than 
they succeeded in springing ambushes. The average number of contacts was one
per month. Information was important and helpful; it took a patrol twice as
long to make a contact when it was not operating on information. In 1953, 
the Operations Research Section compared the effectiveness of patrols and 
ambushes based on information, with those which were not. It found that in 
1952, the odds of achieving a contact on the strength of information were
1 in 10 for an ambush and 1 in 17 for a patrol, and that the absence of
information reduced these odds to 1 in 33 and .1 in 88 respectively.6*
About 35% of contacts were ambushes. The experience of all 
ambushes showed that it was twice as effective to cover the area within which 
contact was expected with a number of very small parties, as to place a large 
number of men on a single track. As regards the hour of day, 40% of all 
ambushes were sprung between 7 and 11 a.m., and 20% between 6 and 9 p.m.
Seventy per cent were sprung within six hours of the ambush position being 
first occupied. By 1954, a soldier, on average, spent 1000 hours on patrol 
before making a contact, and the contact did not occur until he had spent 
four hours on the patrol on which the contact was made. Similarly, a 
soldier spent 300 hours in ambush before making a contact, and the contact 
did not occur until he had been in the ambush position for 24 hours.62 The 
range at which fire was opened was critical. Analyses of past ambushes 
showed that fire should not be opened at more than twenty yards by day, and 
less by night. Once a patrol made contact its chances of scoring a kill fell 
off sharply if fire was opened at more than 100 yards. Moreover, shooting from 
the hip was futile.63
The perseverance required in patrolling was no less than that 
required in ambushing. For three years the most successful of all British 
units, 1st Battalion The Suffolk Regiment, had waged a private campaign in 
the Kajang area against one of the most feared insurgents, Liew Kon Kim.
The latter's one weakness was an addiction to womanising, and despite the 
wall of intimidation which he had built around himself, information given to 
Special Branch in July 1952 by one of his discards enabled the former to 
locate his base camp, somewhere in the Kuala Langat southern swamp. The 
water here was usually thigh deep, and the undergrowth and mangrove were so
61 Ops Research Memo 1/53— k----------------------- ----------- _
6  ^ Review 1955, p 10.
6 3 Ops Research Memo 1/53.
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thick that visibility seldom exceeded ten yards and a distance of two miles 
was the maximum target for a day's march. The swamp measured 10 miles by 8. 
In this, their final operation against Liew Kon Kim, the 1st Suffolk were 
assisted by two companies of another battalion, and together with police and 
Home Guards who were used to seal other exits from the swamp, they waded and 
floundered for three days and nights in search of him. Brief periods of rest 
v;ere spent on improvised platforms, on mangrove roots, or else on islands 
where there was less water but always some. After four days unsuccessful 
searching the troops were regrouped and B Company of the Suffolks were 
redeployed by railway truck along a logging line and inserted in a different 
part of the swamp. They advanced on a frontage of nine patrols, and on the 
sixth day one patrol, after losing itself in a morass of bomb craters, 
finally caught up with Liew Kon Kim and killed him and his two escorts.54
The following breakdown of the total number of successful 
ambushes and patrol contacts, between May 1952 and the end of April 1953, 
also permits a comparative appraisal of the performance of the army, the 
police and the insurgents in this period, five years after the start of the 
Emergency.
64 Q •H ♦R ., 1st Suffolk, July-September 1952.
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FIGURE 14
The Performance of Army and Police in Ambush and Patrol 
May 1952 - April 1953 55
May-Aug 1952 Sep-Dec 1952 Jan-Apr 1953
Police Patrols
Contacts 158 102 113
Kills 53 22 16
Captures 4 5 2
Kills & Captures per contact .36 .26 . 16
Army Patrols
Contacts 200 161 170
Kills 75 53 76
Captures 9 7 5
Kills & Captures per contact .42 .37 .48
Police Ambushes
Sprung Ambushes 85 79 59
Kills 53 47 31
Captures 3 3 2
Kills & Captures per ambush .65 .63 .56
Army Ambushes
Sprung Ambushes 109 135 95
Kills 77 100 83
Captures 6 2 4
Kills & Captures per ambush .76 .75 .91
Moreover, the above figures which show a consistently higher comparative 
performance by the army than by the police, also demonstrate that it is not 
necessarily more advantageous to employ more police and fewer troops - as 
one writer has asserted - even though the latter are more expensive to train 
and equip.65 Quite apart from the strength and firepower of the insurgents, 
which in Malaya was easily matched even by lightly equipped Police Field 
Force units, the Malayan Police were themselves dependent on military training 
and techniques for the acquisition of the skills they needed in the jungle, 
and in many cases on the wartime experience of the British Police Lieutenants 
who led their Jungle Squads and Jungle Companies.
On the other hand, the insurgents' performance in the same 
period, was far inferior to that of either array or police and illustrates 
how successfully the Security Forces held the initiative.
Ops Research Memo No. 6/53, Tables 2, 11 and 13. 
Thompson, Communist Insurgency, pp 108-109.
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FIGURE 15
Ambushes Sprung and Casualties Inflicted by Insurgents - May 1952
to April 1953
(Comparable figures for Security Forces are given in Parentheses)57
Ambushes against Police 














The Company Bases from which the Security Forces operated, were 
seldom attacked (and never overrun) by the insurgents. Police posts however, 
offered the insurgents a target for which there was nothing comparable on the 
insurgent side and attacks on them yielded 49, 13 and 8 killed in action in 
the three periods previously analysed.
Again, the cost in casualties to the Security Forces of their 
patrol contacts was very low when compared with the losses suffered by the 
insurgents in the same actions:
FIGURE 16
Security Force Casualties-May 1952 to April 1953 
(Comparable Insurgent Losses given in Parentheses) ^8
'  \ \  t
May-Aug 1952 Sep-Dec 1952 Jan-Apr 1953 
Killed in patrol contacts 13 (148) 2 (75) 5 (92)
Killed while ambushing 5 (130) 2 (147) 4 (114)
It is also significant to compare the results achieved by the 
different national groups during the height of the Emergency:
FIGURE 17
Average Kills per Contact by Racial Groups - 1953 to 1955 69
1 1953 ' 1954 1955
Fiji & East African Battalions 1.03 1.20 1.17
Gurkha Battalions 1.00 1.02 0.98
Malay Battalions 0.62 0.76 0.65
British Battalions 0.63 0.65 0.78
(Average for all Battalions 0.82 0.88 0.89
5/7 Ops Research Memo No. 6/53.
68 Ibid.
69 Review 1955, p 10.
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The opinion of successive Directors of Operations and 
Commanders was that the- Fijian Battalion was the best to serve in the 
Emergency.7  ^ The days of tribal war were not far behind the Fijians and 
their skill in fieldcraft and silent movement was of a high order. Their 
technique was to divide the battalion area into zones through which ranged 
patrols of varying sizes, and while most were small some were really 
formidable. The Fijians' senses were also extremely acute, and they could 
move through the jungle with great speed and silence. Moreover, their unvarying 
action on contact was to attack. The insurgents, not knowing how many were 
attacking, would turn and run. But the Fijians, who were superb trackers, 
keen shots, and of fine physique were more than capable of out-running the 
insurgents.7
In comparing the above figures however, some allowance needs to 
be made for the difficulties under which the different groups operated. In 
a campaign in which junior leadership, initiative and relative experience 
counted heavily, groups like the Fijians who were volunteers, and mostly under 
regular army officers, were better placed than the British battalions in 
which the junior officers and soldiers were predominantly National 
Servicemen. Other forces too had their problems. In the period to 1954, 
the Malay Regiment had expanded from two battalions to seven, and with each 
increase the existing battalions had been milked of some of their more
7 9experienced officers and senior N.C.O.s in order to launch the newcomers.
While kills per contact gave one measure of a battalion's 
operational efficiency, a second can also be seen in the number of 
eliminations per battalion:
7(^ Interviews with Templer, Henniker and Brooke.
71 As the commander of the brigade in which the Fijian Battalion served 
put it, 'A Fijian with a Bren Gun can run faster than a Chinaman for 
his life.' Henniker, Interview.
72 Moreover, in the same period the Malay Regiment had to find a proportion 
of N.C.O.s for a battalion of the Federation Regiment, an Armoured Car 
Squadron, a Signal Squadron, and an expanded depot and,training 
organisation. Review 1954, p 13.
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FIGURE 18
The Average of Battalion Eliminatioiis (1953-1954) by
Racial Groups 7 3
1953 1954
Fiji and East African Battalions 60.5 42.0
Gurkha Battalions 32.7 28.1
Malay Battalions 15.7 14.5
British Battalions 22.8 16.0
(Average for all Battalions) 28.4 21.8
Since the daily elimination of insurgents over the whole 
Federation seldom amounted to more than a dozen, there was a constant search 
at every level for better methods. Yet amidst all the experiments, it is 
surprising how few technical advances had a significant effect on tactical 
operations. An Infra-Red Alarm System, which was intended to give warning 
of movement along a track was found to be cumbersome and unreliable.74 A 
Sniperscope attached to the American Ml and M2 Carbines used by many of the 
troops to provide a means of observation and sighting at night was too heavy 
for prolonged use and insufficiently robust and reliable. However, a simple 
bracket which allowed a torch to be fitted to the barrel of a Bren Gun or a 
carbine, to focus a beam of light along the line of fire, improved accuracy 
against both static and moving targets and brought some success in night 
ambushes.75
The insurgents, like the Mau Mau in Kenya, became so timid in 
their attempts to avoid contact with the °ecurity Forces, that it became
73 Ibid.
74 Similarly, a Forward Listening Area Device which could pick up the ndse
of men approaching an ambush position by means of small microphones placed 
out in four different directions and pass the resultant signal through an 
audio-amplifier to a listener wearing headphones who could then trigger 
an ambush, had limited success. Again, a Small Arms Detector which gave 
warning of the approach of anyone carrying a weapon, and a Patrol Sender 
Unit which provided one way radio communications between different patrols 
in different parts of the country, were found to be too specialised to be 
of real practical value. Ops Research Memo No. 1/57, pp 23-29.
75 Ibid.
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increasingly difficult to find them.'76 One of the most effective means of 
doing so was by employing Iban (Sea Dyak) trackers from Borneo, many of whom 
had been practising head-hunters. These were introduced early in the 
insurgency and had been used with great success but their numbers were 
limited. This presented a problem. Malay villagers do not normally frequent 
the jungle, and the Aborigines until relatively late in the campaign were 
inaccessible and difficult to handle. A Tracker Training Wing was therefore 
opened at the FARELF Training Centre, and after trials it was found possible 
to train British soldiers to be trackers. Instructional courses lasting 
two months were begun in 1954 and, provided they practised daily thereafter, 
the best soldiers trained in this way could become competent trackers.
Specially trained tracker dogs, employed with a specialist 
handler were also used and had mixed success. Much depended on the 
confidence which patrol commanders had in them, but in comparison with the 
Mau Mau uprising, where they were used with great success and patrols seldom 
went out without a dog, tracker dogs were never enthusiastically adopted in 
Malaya. The higher temperature and humidity of Malaya and the prevalence of 
pests such as leeches made them less dependable and accounts for much of the 
difference.77
The basic small arms and light automatic weapons used by troops 
and police, changed only slightly during the course of the Emergency and, 
with minor exceptions, a clear pattern had been established by 1954. On 
patrols the most successful weapon was the United States Ml Carbine, while 
the Bren Light Machine Gun was universally rated as the best weapon in an 
ambush. Initially, the rifle most frequently carried in Malaya, the Number 5
75 Troops in Malaya searched for the following sign: (1) Change in the colour
of the vegetation; (2) Unnatural formations in the vegetation; (3) Bruises, 
breaks and cuts in the vegetation; (4) Water on certain areas whereas the 
remainder is dry; (5) Mud or soil on grass or bushes; (6) Scars (or foot­
prints) in bare or muddy ground; (7) Latex exuded from a bruised rubber 
root; (8) Disturbances in insect life. ATOM, p xxi-2. Operations 
Research also assisted in identifying the characteristics of insurgent 
camps. Ninety-eight per cent of them (over five years) were within two 
miles of habitations or gardens. They were likely to be within 50 to 100 
yards of a stream large enough to show on a map scaled 1 inch to 1 mile. 
Almost all were located between 150 and 250 feet above sea level; the 
favourite location was on the spur of a mountain, which offered escape 
routes. The camps were clustered, with up to four or five in two or 
three adjoining grid squares, although they had all been built at 
different times. Individual camps were often under outstandingly tall 
and bushy topped trees. About 70% of the camps were placed so as to 
catch the morning sun. Ops Research Memo 3/53, pp 1-8.
7  ^ Ops Research Memo 1/57.
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Rifle, was handicapped because of the time spent in manual reloading, and 
was rapidly supplanted by the FN Self Loading R.ifle when it became available 
in quantity in 1956. The Browning Automatic Shotgun (maximum range 75 yards), 
proved very effective in ambushes where hitting power and spread of shot were 
more important than range. But in this connection neither the Sten, Patchett, 
nor Owen group of sub-machine carbines were popular with the troops and were 
seldom carried. One reason was the unreliability of ammunition, which was 
mostly of 1945 vintage combined with the knowledge that if the weapon did not 
kill first time, the firer was unlikely to get a second chance.78 Both types 
of grenade in general use throughout the British Army at the time, the 
Number 36 (Fragmentation) Grenade, and the Number 80 (White Phosphorus)
Grenade were used primarily in attacks on insurgent camps, either during the 
assault, or - in the case of the Number 36 Grenade - fired from the EY 
(Grenade Firing) Rifle to prevent escape.
While the Emergency remained throughout an infantry war, other 
arms of the service did play their own distinctive parts (Fig. 19):
78 The importance of marksmanship training in Malaya was accentuated by the 
fact that at the Jungle Training Centre at Kota Tinggi only 1 out of 10 
soldiers being trained in 1949 could hit a 'bandit' target at 30 yards. 
Minutes, Commanders Conference FARELF, 25th-26th April 1949. The order 
of usefulness of weapons in patrol contacts and ambushes in 1952, based 
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Units Committed in Malaya
Jun' Jan Oct Aug ' Jun Jan Jun iJan Jan
1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
Armoured Car




- - - - - 1 1 1 1
(Artillery) 1 1 1 - - - - - 1
Field Batteries 
Heavy Anti-Aircraft
1 1 1 1 2 2 1
Batteries - - - - - - 1 1 1
Field Engineer
Regiments - - - - - - 1 2 2
Infantry Battalions 
Commando Brigades
10 15 19 19 21 23 22 22 23
(Royal Marines) 
Malayan Scouts
1 1 — — — — ~
(became 22 SAS 
Regiment)
22 SAS Regiment
- - 1 1 1
(three Squadrons) - - - - - 1 1 1 1
New Zealand
Squadron (SAS 
Regiment) — _ _ _ _ 1
Squadron - 
Parachute Regiment __ — _ __ __ 1
The Line Infantry battalions built up to a total of twenty- 
three during Templer's period of which three were usually resting and 
undergoing retraining in Singapore at any one time. By the end of 1954, 
operations in Perak and Johore had become so important that fourteen of the 
available battalions were deployed in the 2 two states: a concentration
which was only made possible by the greater capacity of the police to take 
over most of the routine patrolling in other areas. The Armoured Car 
Regiments were fully extended in providing convoy escorts throughout the 
Federation and .occasionally undertook the task of mobile blocking points 
and check points during food denial operations. After the departure from 
Malaya of W.N. Gray, the former Police Commissioner, the policy of providing 
the Police Force with armoured vehicles became general and 970 were in use by 
the time Templer left Malaya.8®
Review 1948-57, Annex B. From 1st September 1953 the command arrangements 
in the Federation were regularised to give greater efficiency. H.Q. 17th 
Gurkha Division became responsible for what had been South Malaya District 
(including Negri Sembilan, Malacca and Johore); H.Q. 1st Federal Division 
became responsible for Kedah and Perak; and 1st Independent Infantry 
Brigade was responsible for Pahang Trengganu and Kelantan.
80 Blaxland, Regiments, p 103.
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During the first three years little use was seen for artillery 
in its conventional role and 26 Field Regiment Royal Artillery, which was in 
the Federation in June 1948, was used as infantry. Mot until Operation 
PURSUIT which attempted to surround the insurgent group responsible for 
murdering Sir Henry Gurney, was artillery employed in a sustained 
conventional sense.81 However, by 1954, because of increasing evidence from 
interrogations that artillery fire and bombing caused some drop in morale, 
more and more artillery was employed to provide harrassing fire.82 For 
similar reasons, most battalions which until then used their integral Mortar 
Platoons in a normal patrolling tole, now activated them and to increase the 
weight of fire which they could produce, their smaller 3 inch mortars were 
replaced by 4.2 inch, a weapon normally employed by the Artillery.
The Employment of the Navy
The contribution which the Navy could make to the Emergency was 
necessarily limited. But by patrolling the coast in association with the 
police it ensured that no weapons or military supplies reached the insurgents 
from outside.88 In 1952 for example, the navy had six Seaward Defence 
Vessels at sea for an average of 135 days engaged in coastal patrols. In the 
process, they checked more than 1,000 coastal craft without finding any 
evidence of smuggling.81f Occasionally, more spectacular operations were 
undertaken. During Operation PROSIAC in 1951, the first undertaken by the 
Malayan Scouts in deep jungle, the navy transported the group by sea and 
river from Port Dickson in Negri Sembilan, around the coast to Ulu Rompin in 
Pahang. In 1954, H.M.S. Defender sailed nine miles up the Johore River to 
shell targets in the Telok Sengat area and in the same year there were 39 
bombardments of suspected insurgent camps by destroyers, frigates and mine­
sweepers, and five air strikes from carriers operating off the coast. But 
this was harrassing fire rather than precise bombardment and no known 
insurgents were eliminated by the bombardments themselves.
81 Ibid., p 98.
82 I have been unable to find any really convincing evidence that the amount 
of artillery used in Malaya should have been increased. By September 1957, 
1,000,000 rounds of Field Artillery ammunition had been fired mainly of a 
harrassing nature. Unlike South Vietnam, the insurgents in Malaya seldom 
stood and fought against organised opposition. Thus calls for fire in 
support of ground troops in contact were virtually non-existent.
Review 1948-57.
88 No known supplies reached the insurgents from external sources. Templer 
and Madoc, Interviews.
8Lf Annual Report 1952, p 218.
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Undoubtedly, the navy’s greatest contribution was in 
helicopter support for troop lifting. At the beginning of 1953, 848 Naval 
Helicopter Squadron began operations using S55 Helicopters, each capable of 
carrying, five fully equipped troops. Until then, because of the speed of the 
insurgent warning system based on the aborigines, the operations of the 
Security Forces in deep jungle had been relatively ineffective. By speeding 
up the movement of troops and patrols, and even by winching down explosives 
so that a helicopter landing zone could be prepared, the flexibility of the 
helicopter was transformed into a positive operational asset. In 1954, the 
Squadron flew 215,000 operational flying hours and lifted more than 10,000 
troops, and while this was a minute figure compared with operations in the 
Second Indo-China War, it made a spectacular difference to the amount of 
time lost in Malaya in transferring troops from one area to another, and in 
the wear and tear on the troops themselves.
The ability of helicopters to operate out of small jungle 
clearings, and to provision army and police detachments and Jungle Forts 
caused Templer to make representation to the British Chiefs of Staff in 
February 1954, and by the end of the year the number of troop lifting 
helicopters had been increased from eight to twenty and in addition seventeen 
Light Helicopters were made available.85 From then on helicopters made a 
significant contribution to the Emergency.
i
The Use of the Air Force
From 1948, the pattern of counter-insurgent operations in the 
jungle depended on air supply, and this auxiliary use of air rather than
N
offensive operations remained the R.A.F.s predominant committment.88
An important feature of the Briggs Plan was the use of the 
Operations Rooms established by S.W.E.C.s and D.W.E.C.s. Here requests for 
air support were transmitted on a Ground/Air Net thus allowing the operations 
of the R.A.F. to be neatly dovetailed into the local plan. It was not 
uncommon for an R.A.F. Forward Air Controller to accompany an army patrol, 
and an R.A.F. officer was frequently present as a liaison officer for a
85 Templer, Interview.
88 As a D of 0 report stated: ’The whole pattern of anti-terrorist
operations in the jungle is dependent upon the ability of the R.A.F. to 
drop supplies to troops in the jungle. Air supply therefore continues to 




An army or police patrol normally carried five days supplies, 
but as operations were found to be more successful the longer the troops 
stayed in the jungle, a patrol normally took at least one air drop.88 
Re-supply aircraft also carried a radio set which could be tuned to the 
frequency of the troops on the ground.
The relative importance of various types of aircraft and their 
degree of use can be seen from the following table of sorties undertaken by 
the R.A.F. during 1954:
























The greatest number of sorties (Austers), was flowTn by army pilots on such 
tasks as the observation and direction of fire from guns, target marking for
87 Brooke, Interview.
88 Each patrol carried coloured marker panels for denoting the centre of a 
Dropping Zone (D.Z .) or helicopter Landing Zone (L.Z.). An inflatable 
coloured balloon which could be let up through the jungle canopy to denote 
the location of the patrol was also carried. Brooke, Interview.
89 The total number of sorties in 1954 (39,248), is much higher than in the 
Mau Mau Rebellion in Kenya (6,071) for the same period. However, in the 
Second Indo-China War a greater number of sorties than this was flown per 
month. Ops Research Memo 1/57 p 70.
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for offensive air strikes, and most important of all reconnaissance which 
included the direction by wireless of army patrols on the ground.90 By reason 
of the intensive flying undertaken by them, the information obtained by 
Auster pilots formed the basis of some of the most successful Security Force 
operations.91
By 1954, the Valetta had replaced the Dakota as the basic R.A.F. 
Transport aircraft. It was used chiefly for both supply and leaflet drops 
and, as deep jungle operations increased, for parachuting men of 22 Special 
Air Service Squadron into the jungle.92 An aircraft, which in a sense was 
even more spectacular than the helicopter made its appearance in 1954; this 
was the Prestwick Pioneer. Rated by the R.A.F. as a STOL (Short Take-Off and 
Landing) aircraft, it had an astonishing ability to operate out of the 
150-250 yard long airstrips which were being located at each Jungle Fort.
Each aircraft could carry four passengers or 800 lbs of cargo and by the end 
of 1954, three aircraft were operating in the country.92 They were used 
mainly for communication flying to the Jungle Forts including police garrison 
exchanges. Because the cost of maintaining them was one-tenth that of a 
helicopter, it was found to be more economical to hew strips out of the 
jungle rather than use helicopters for these tasks.
The dispersion of the insurgents in Malaya, the lack of 
specific information concerning their whereabouts, and the limitations of 
visual and photographic reconnaissance, all militated against the effective 
use of offensive air support. There were important exceptions where pin-point 
bombing was aimed at the specific elimination of a group of insurgents, but 
in two cases where this occurred, information of high quality was first 
acquired by ground patrols or by a clever Special Branch
90 Ibid., pp 70-71. An Auster pilot was frequently required to ’home' a 
patrol onto an insurgent camp or illegal cultivation in the jungle.
91 Brooke, Interview.
92 In 1953, 54 million leaflets on general topics, and another 23 million 
addressed to specific individuals or groups were dropped into insurgent 
areas Annual Report, 1953. ’Voice’ broadcasts because of the specialised 
equipment required, were undertaken by specific aircraft; normally 
2 Austers and 3 Dakotas. Templer, Interview.
This was increased to 10 by 1955 when they carried 5,446 persons and 






During 1952, the effectiveness or otherwise of air support in 
Malaya, was for the first time subjected to intensive statistical research, 
the objects of which were:
a. To assess the part played by air strike and air supply in 
operations;
b. To show where air support was proving most effective; and
c. To assess the most effective methods of air support.95
The report which emerged collated and quantified a vast mass 
of data on air strikes and other aspects of air support which affected the 
efficiency of ground operations, and although its findings were related only 
to the year 1952, nevertheless they were important in supporting or 
demolishing some general conceptions which had already emerged.
In summary the conclusions were: First, that battalions varied
considerably in their use of air support, but those which eliminated the most 
insurgents also made most use of it. Second, that battalions which were the 
least successful in eliminating insurgents, also used a disproportionately 
large amount of the available air strikes. And third, that on average, air 
support assisted in about 50% of total eliminations of which strikes 
comprised 33% and supply drops 17%. Of the total number of strikes carried
I
out, 36% were successful in assisting in the elimination of one or more 
insurgents.96
The phrase 'assisted in' is highly relevant in this context, as 
of course is the corporate definition of air support which includes both air 
supply (i.e. of rations, ammunition, and operationally urgent items of 
equipment parachuted to the troops); and air strikes (i.e. offensive air 
support by strafing, rocketting or bombing). The analysis established that
94 The two occasions referred to were outside the time frame of this study.
In 1956, Goh Peng Tuan, political commisar of the 5tn Independent Platoon 
was eliminated when Lincoln bombers guided by a Ground Located radar, 
which had been previously sited on a nearby hill, bombed his camp in a 
Johore swamp. In May 1957, the same technique was used to eliminate Teng 
Foo-Lung, of the Negri Sembilan State Committee. Brooke, Interview. The 
first incident has been described thoroughly by Lt.Col. R.C.H. Miers, in 
Shoot to Kill, London 1959, pp 56-72.
95 Op. Firedog, p 1.
96 Ibid., pp 11-13.
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air strikes during which only strafing and rockets were used were the least 
successful form of support. It required 30 sorties by Vampire aircraft to 
'assist in' the elimination of one insurgent. The analysis also established 
that although 'blockades' (i.e. pattern bombing to prevent insurgent 
movement), and 'softening up' (i.e. harrassing attacks), appeared to be the 
most fruitful employment of offensive air support, the results achieved 
inside three days of the bombing taking place were negligible, and that it 
was in the follow-up by ground troops after three days that eliminations 
began to occur.57
Nor did the elimination rate increase as the weight of bombs 
(i.e. bomb load multiplied by number of aircraft) increased, in fact the 
reverse was the case.98
Thus, the results of Operation FIREDOG appeared to indicate - 
and this was subsequently confirmed in the present writer's case by 
interviews with two Directors of Operations" - that in Malaya, as in both
the First and Second Indo-China Wars, offensive air power was neither the
)
match winner nor even the equaliser in breaking the insurgents will to fight. 
In Malaya, the pursuit of even a minor tactical success was never achieved 
by stepping up either the bomb load or the number of sorties flown; it was 
achieved by precise information, and even then a number of factors including 
weather, timing and coordination with ground troops had to be favourable for 
success to be achieved. It was the auxiliary tasks undertaken by the Air 
Force in Malaya; supply and leaflet dropping, 'Voice' aircraft, casualty 
evacuation, and the provisioning of Jungle Forts by Pioneers and 
helicopters which were really fruitful.
97 Ibid., p 13.
98 Moreover, on the ground, the tactical situation was complicated by the 
fact that offensive air strikes, and also artillery and mortar fire were 
not permitted in areas of rubber because of the damage caused to the 
trees. The insurgents realised this and on the approach of a flare­
dropping Auster, which usually preceded an air attack the insurgents were 
likely to take to the rubber. Attempts to convert this into a technique 
were both expensive and unsuccessful. Brooke, Interview.
Templer and Brooke, Interviews.99
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CONCLUSION
Within the framework of an operational analysis this thesis 
set out to prove four contentions, namely that:
a. If the Government of Malaya had acted more promptly and decisively in 
1948, the M.C.P. could have been neutralised at far less cost in lives 
and money than subsequent operations demanded;
b. Having failed to avoid large scale terrorism, and even allowing for the 
harsh terrain, it was still the failure of the Government to make a 
coherent plan which rendered a protracted campaign inevitable;
c. The Malayan Communist Party’s failure was due as much to the party's 
faulty appreciation of its own strength and the lack of an adequate 
strategy as to the efficiency of British counter-measures; and finally,
d. Success was not achieved until the Government integrated its own 
strategy by arbitrary controls.
In many respects the early period of the Emergency exemplified 
the best and worst aspects of British colonial government. Worst, because 
during the first five months of 1948, the clear signs of incipient 
insurrection were not taken seriously by the Government whose haphazard 
intelligence machinery had failed to discern either the direction or 
magnitude of the threat. In the same way neither the Police nor the Army 
were apprised of the situation or of their likely involvement in it. 
Consequently, the first two years saw a succession of expedients, none 
sufficient to gain the initiative. The measures taken were adequate only to 
contain the insurgents, never to defeat them. In an atmosphere of 
dangerously weak liberal reform, the M.C.P. was allowed to flourish unchecked.
It had clearly announced its intention to set up a Communist Republic. As a 
well established subversive party with a clandestine political arm it was 
enabled to harness the nascent and largely uncontrolled trade union movement; 
and finally, to commit to armed revolt its own military force, previously 
equipped and subsidised by the British, and only partly disarmed. It was 
permitted to do so because the security services were understrength and 
ill-directed. The responsibility of the British Government, astonishingly 
unrepentant after the debacle of the Japanese invasion of 1941-42, has been 
indirectly admitted in an official report by at least one Director of Operations
"A Police Special Branch must be maintained permanently in being in all 
territory under our control, and must be of adequate strength and quality 
to keep effective watch on subversion and on preparation for violence
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and terrorism. Its strength must be increased as the threat increases. 
Whatever this may cost, it will avoid far greater cost and danger later. 
Similarly, every civil and military measure will be far cheaper and 
much more effective if carried out in time. This must clearly bee 
balanced against the risk of causing a delicate and dangerous situation 
to explode, but in Malaya almost every measure could and should have 
been taken earlier than it was."1
Although the British Military Administration in the confused 
aftermath of the Second World War had sought and received expert advice to 
the contrary, it chose nevertheless to set up an intelligence bureau, the 
Malayan Security Service, with reduced funds and inadequate staff and 
without systematic links with the police - the only agency capable of 
detecting subversion in the rural areas. In Singapore, the Commissioner- 
General, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald showed greater awareness of the threat than 
the High Commissioner, Sir Edward Gent. Whatever his other qualities, Gent, 
who had categorised the long list of politically inspired murders during 
the first five months of 1948 as 'a war of nerves by the forces of disorder’, 
was unwilling or unable to recognise that a full scale revolt was imminent, 
and was not the man to lead the country at that time. But in Gent's defence, 
he was not alerted to the cause of rural insecurity by the M.S.S. report of 
April 1948. Neither was he encouraged to take prompt or pre-emptive action 
by the British Government. When at last, under extreme pressure from the 
planting and mining interests, he declared a state of emergency, the moment 
for effective action had passed.i
From then until Templer?s arrival the root of the problem was 
insecurity. As Sir Robert Thompson has said,
"What the peasant wants to know is: Does the Government mean to win the
war? Because if not he will have to support the insurgent. The 
Government must show it is determined to win. Only in that way will it 
instil the confidence that it is going to win."2
This was the dilemma of the uncommitted Chinese. Until they were convinced
of the government's certainty of purpose, and until their security could be
guaranteed, they were virtually forced at the risk of their lives to ’sit on
the fence’. Moreover, in contrast to the planters and miners who had
powerful associations and lobbies in both Kuala Lumpur and London, the
isolated tappers and squatters were completely vulnerable. They had little
hope of protection against the threat of murder, abduction and looting of
their food stocks, and in such circumstances overt support for a government
1 Lieutenant General Sir Roger Bower. Review 1948-57, p 28.
2 Tho on, Communist Insurgency, p 146.
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which could not protect them was a luxury they could not afford.
To protect them the government had first to concentrate them; 
this it was strangely slow to do. If the proposals of the Newboult 
Committee had been implemented in February 1949 instead of May 1950, 
insurgent support would have been severed at its source; because only 
gradually as the insurgent support organisation became more sophisticated, 
did its tentacles reach into virtually every layer of Chinese society in 
Malaya: certainly until the end of 1949 it depended predominantly on the 
squatters.
Persuasive testimony to the difficulty of rooting out even a 
small part of the insurgent infrastructure which had thus been permitted to 
develop can be seen from successive Federal Priority Operations which 
required overwhelming concentrations of troops, police and resources to be 
successful.
What did the M.C.P. achieve? Militarily, it had contained a 
force varying between five and twelve times its own strength and had 
sustained an incident rate which had not been reduced below 100 a month for 
five years, By which time the superiority of the Security Forces was 10 to 1. 
But, up to the time Malaya became independent in 1957, the insurgents had 
killed only 7 out of every 10,000 people and had wounded or abducted a further 
eight. For the M.C.P., as for Malaya itself, the results of the 
insurrection were sterile. ! In an economic sense, much of the revenue of the 
country had been diverted into fighting the insurrection, while politically, 
the barriers of suspicion which divided the races of the peninsula had been 
made more rigid, further diminishing the possibilities of a politically 
stable independent state, free of communal strife. Unable to overcome the 
muddle and confusion of its own strategic and racial problems, the M.C.P. 
had become a spent force by 1954.
On the government side, until the appointment of General 
Templer to be both High Commissioner and Director of Operations, there was a 
clearly discernible difference between the British Government's stated 
intention to remain in Malaya and complete the destruction of the insurgents, 
and its apparent will to do so. Even a far sighted administrator like Sir 
Henry Gurney had failed to see the need for a separate Director of Operations. 
Had he done so in 1949 when there was a lull in insurgent activity, the 
effort required to suppress the insurgency would have been far less.
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Moreover, even when Sir Harold Briggs was appointed, his powers were so 
circumscribed that his talent and experience were seriously underemployed. 
Briggs was a realist. His report of 1st November 1950, in which he clearly 
indicated to the governments both in Malaya and the United Kingdom that 
'without the gravest steps being taken' morale would drop dangerously and 
further losses occur before his plan took effect, was almost Wellingtonian 
in its cold, candid and unemotional good sense. Yet despite the obvious 
seriousness of the situation, and the need for a fundamental overhaul of 
both the operational machinery and the methods being used, it was Briggs 
himself, acting on his initiative and not Sir Henry Gurney (who was on 
leave in the United Kingdom at the time) who argued the case with the 
British Government. Even then, the urgency was only grudgingly acknowledged, 
and when Briggs was finally granted executive power over the Defence Branch, 
the Armed Services and the Police, it was already too late for him 
personally. And meanwhile, Sir Henry Gurney had been murdered.
His death was not of itself the catalyst for new lines of 
action. While political expediency alone demanded that it be met by an 
immediate and overwhelming response from the British Government, a successor 
was not named for several months and when General Lockhart arrived to succeed 
Sir Harold Briggs as Director of Operations, he was given no wider powers 
than Briggs had been. Indeed, the unnecessary and ironical nature of 
Gurney's death was a fitting epitaph to the muddled policy which the British 
Government had pursued since the end of the Second World War. After three 
years, not only were the insurgents undefeated, but in spite of considerable 
casualties their numerical strength was greater than it had been since early 
1948. And even worse, for the people of Malaya it was impossible to see an 
end to the insurrection. True, the insurgents had been unable to proclaim 
even one liberated area; but it was not so much that they were likely to
overthrow the government or capture towns, or even sizeable villages, as that
they had held on. And \-7ith the crumbling of colonial empire, the immense 
consequences of the communists' victory in China and their dramatic
intervention in the Korean War, the M.C.P. and its adherents might have been
forgiven for thinking that time was on their side.
It was in this atmosphere of disillusionment, both in Malaya 
and the United Kingdom with the official handling of the Emergency that the 
incoming Conservative Government appointed Sir Gerald Templer, a soldier on 
the active list, to be both High Commissioner and Director of Operations,
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with greater political power in a state of undeclared war than any British 
soldier since Cromwell.
Templer’s impact was probably greater than that of any other 
British colonial official in the history of the peninsula. Simultaneously 
he re-geared the Briggs Plan which had shown signs of faltering and he 
provided the dynamic without which the integration of government, police and 
armed forces could not have been consolidated. He introduced new methods of 
police training and new jungle tactics. He began the reorganisation of the 
intelligence system and appointed the first real Director of Intelligence.
He set in motion the psychological warfare campaign and through a 
revitalised police force he launched Operation SERVICE which had incalculable 
effects for the Malayan community. In essence, Templer injected a new 
spirit of urgency and by the astute and moderate use of power ensured the 
success of counter insurgent operations. When he left in May 1954, not only 
had the back of the Emergency been broken, but Malaya itself was on the verge 
of self-government.
This break with tradition represented the very best aspect of 
British colonial government because by the firmness of its action, the 
Government demonstrated to the people - and the insurgents - that it intended 
to win in Malaya. Thereafter, the Emergency became a large scale mopping-up 
operation and the counter insurgency machinery which existed at the end of 
the Emergency was little changed in essential techniques from what it had 
been in Templer's time.
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APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION1 IN MALAYA 
10th APRIL 1950 BY Lt.GEN. Sir H.R. BRIGGS
"My immediate aim on arrival at Kuala Lumpur on the 3rd April 1950, was 
to get as much information as I could from the authorities and from members 
of all communities, individuals and associations, to add to the excellent 
briefs I had received in England and Singapore. I made a rapid and 
extensive tour of the Federation partly for this purpose and partly to get 
a good view of the country.and its characteristics.
By 10th April 1950, I was able to give His Excellency, Sir Henry Gurney, 
an impression of my views which were briefly as follows:
1. Our object was to eliminate the whole Communist organisation in Malaya 
before further measures could be initiated by Red China and to restore 
confidence in Malaya.
2. The morale of the Communists and the strength of their adherents 
increased in proportion to their successes, the influence of external events 
and their propaganda. Their fighting strength was decided by the number of 
weapons they possessed.
They relied for supplies, recruits and information on the Chinese 
population, particularly in squatter areas but also in the populated areas, 
in both of which they had their cells. These cells remained undetected and 
unscathed through denial of information. Jhinese areas were widespread and 
close to the numerous objects of attack and most of them were outside the 
civil Administration which suffered through acute shortage of Chinese­
speaking officers.
Communist propaganda, being more attractive and easier, was more 
effective than ours, which was weak. Many of our Press reports were 
inclined to help the Communist propaganda.
Though Communist communications were poor, their information locally 
was good. The jungle was ideal for ambushes and "snatch and grab" raids as 
it made surprise and a "get-away" easy. The Communists therefore had the 
initiative which had to be wrested from them.
1 Briggs Report, pp 3-5.
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3. Successes against bandit gangs, though essential to security and morale, 
were in effect only a'lap on the knuckles". It is at this "heart" we must 
aim to eliminate the Communist cells among the Chinese population to whom 
we must give security and whom we must win over. By so doing and removing 
the bandits’ sources of supply and information the task of the Security 
Forces would be simplified and the enemy forced to fight for these in areas 
under our control. Thus only can the initiative be wrested from the 
bandits.
4. Control of the Chinese population would entail bringing it within the 
Administration, a major task for the civil Government. It would mean taking 
officials from less important jobs, co-opting volunteers and "oiling the 
wheels" of the State Administrations. Speed in obtaining financial approval 
for Emergency tasks must be made possible.
It must be realised that the Chinese are here for good and such land as 
they occupy must carry promise of a permanent title subject to good 
behaviour. Such a measure would give a feeling of security to the Chinese 
squatters and knock away the main plank for Communist propaganda.
5. Security of the population and the elimination of the Communist cells 
must be the primary task of the Police. Unfortunately our Intelligence 
organisation is our "Achilles Heel" and inadequate for present conditions, 
when it should be our first line of attack.
Our information must come from the population or from deserters and, 
until we can instil confidence by successes and security among the 
population, our information will be worse than that of the Communists.
We have not got an organisation capable of sifting and distributing 
important information quickly.
Police supervision and training has been inevitably weak owing to 
shortage of officers and its great expansion. Communications must be made 
sufficient to ensure perfect control.
6. The primary task of the Army must be to destroy the bandits and jungle 
penetration. They must also support the Police. The Air Force is 
particularly valuable for air supply of our forces and offensively against 
enemy morale. Owing to the invisibility of bandits in the jungle, killing 
is problematical only.
7. The need for the closest co-operation between the Administration,
Police and Army requires joint headquarters at all levels.
8. Present operations proved, and the future size of the Administrative 
and Police tasks will confirm, that success everywhere at one time will 
not be possible. Furthermore, a real success somewhere is necessary to 
improve confidence and morale in Malaya. The fact that six battalions 
are arriving in Malaya should allow the strengthening of selected areas 
by troops without undue risk elsewhere. The Administrative and Police 
potential would not permit any strengthening beyond such selected areas. 
Tactically the Southern States should be selected for this combined 
intensified action.
The guiding principle governing such priority areas must be that the 
Administration and the Police must be left so strong that when these extra 
troops are removed a recrudescence of terrorists* activity can be prevented. 
The timing therefore, must depend on the Administrative and Police "build­
up" which cannot be rapid.
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APPENDIX D
DIRECTIVE ADDRESSED TO GENERAL TEMPLER BY SECRETARY 
OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES, PUBLISHED 
7th FEBRUARY, 19521
The policy of H.M. Government in the United Kingdom is that Malaya 
should in due course becoem a fully self-governing nation. H.M. Govern­
ment confidently hope that that nation will be within the British 
Commonwealth. In assisting the peoples of Malaya to achieve this object, 
you will at all times be guided by the declaration of policy expressed in 
the preamble of the Federation of Malaya Agreement and by the statement of 
the special responsibilities of the High Commissioner contained in Section 
19 of that Agreement.
To., achieve a United Malayan nation there must be a common form of 
citizenship for all who'regard the Federation or any part of it as their 
real home and the object of their loyalty. It will be your duty to guide 
the peoples of Malaya towards the attainment of these objectives and to 
promote such political progress of the country as will, without prejudicing 
the campaign against the terrorists, further our democratic aims in Malaya.
The ideal of a united Malayan nation does not involve the sacrifice by 
any community of its traditional culture and customs, but before it can 
be fully realised the Malays must be encouraged and assisted to play a 
full part in the economic life of the country, so that the present uneven 
economic balance may be redressed. It will be your duty to foster this 
process to the best of your ability.
H.M. Government believe that the British have a mission to fulfil in 
the achievement of these objects and that even after self-government has 
been attained, the British in Malaya will have a worthy and continuing 
part to play in the life of the country.
Communist terrorism is retarding the political advancement and economic 
development of the country and the welfare of its peoples. Your primary 
task in Malaya must, therefore, be the restoration of law and order, so 
that this barrier to progress may be removed. Without victory and the 
state of law and order which it alone can bring, there can be no freedom
1 The Times; 8th February 1952.
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from fear, which is the first human liberty.
In furtherance of your task, not only will you fulfill the normal 
functions of High Commissioner, but you will assume complete operational 
command over all armed forces assigned to operations in the Federation 
and will be empowered to issue operational orders to their Commanders 
without reference to the Commanders-in-Chief, Far East. You should 
establish the closest consultation between yourself and the Commanders- 
in-Chief, Far East, in matters of common concern.
You may assure the Malayan peoples of all communities that they can 
count on the powerful and continuing assistance of H.M. Government not 
only in the immediate task of defeating the terrorists but in the longer 
term objective of forging a united Malayan nation. H.M. Government will 
not lay aside their responsibilities in Malaya until they are satisfied 
that Communist terrorism has been defeated and that the partnership of 




A. PRIMARY SOURCES 
1. Interviews and Private Papers
Brooke, Maj.Gen. F.H. Commanded 1st Malay Infantry Brigade 1953-54. 
Subsequently became G.O.C. Federation Army and Deputy Director of 
Operations 1956-59. Granted interviews and gave access to notes.
Campbell, Col. A.R. Served as a Company Commander with 1st Battalion The
Suffolk Regiment 1949-53. Recounted his experiences in Jungle Green
/
published 1953. Granted interview and gave access to private papers. 
Catling, Sir Richard. Assistant Commissioner of Police, Federation of 
Malaya 1948-54. Subsequently became Commissioner of Police, Kenya 1954-63 
during the Mau Mau insurrection. Granted interview.
Clutterbuck, Maj.Gen. R.L. Served in Malay as a staff officer on Director 
of Operations' staff 1956-58. Has since written two books on the Malayan 
Emergency. Granted interview and gave access to private manuscripts.
Fenner, Dato Sir Claude. Member of Malayan Police prior to Second World 
War. Escaped to India and became member of Force 136. Was Acting Head 
of the Malayan Security Service in 1946. Became Director of Special 
Branch in 1954 and Commissioner of Police 1958. Granted interview.
Henniker, Brig. Sir Mark. Commanded 63 Gurkha Infantry Brigade in Malaya 
1952-54. Has since recounted his experiences in Red Shadow Over Malaya 
published in 1955. Granted several interviews and gave access to private 
papers.
Lloyd-Owen, Maj.Gen. Sir David. Served as Military Assistant to the 
Director of Operations 1951-53. Subsequently became Commander 24 Infantry 
Brigade Group in East Africa 1962-64. Granted interview.
Madoc, G.C. Was a member of Malayan Police prior to the Second World War 
and became Acting Director of the Malayan Security Service in 1947. In 
1950 he became Assistant Superintendent Special Branch, and Director 
Special Branch in 1952. Was Director of Intelligence Malaya 1954-58.
Granted several interviews which were recorded.
Templer, Field Marshal Sir Gerald. Served as High Commissioner and 
Director of Operations, Federation of Malaya 1952-54. Was Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff 1955-58. Granted several interviews.
Thompson, Sir Robert. Served throughout the Emergency in the Malayan Civil 
Service. Was Staff Officer (Civil) to Sir Harold Briggs in 1950. Secretary 
for Defence 1959-61. Was Head of the British Advisory Mission to Vietnam
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1961-65. Has written several books on the Emergency and the Second 
Indo-China War. Granted interviews.
C.C. Too. Became a member of the Emergency Information Service in 1951. 
Subsequently Director of Psychological Warfare. Granted several 
interviews and gave access to extensive private papers and notes 
including unpublished manuscripts of the Emergency.
Waller, P.B.G. Served as personal staff officer to the Commissioner of 
Police 1950-51. Later commanded Police Field Force units in Pahang. 
Granted several interviews and gave access to personal notes and 
unpublished manuscripts.
Young, Sir Arthur. Commissioner City of London Police 1950-57. Was 
seconded to Commissioner of Police Malaya under Templer 1952-53. Was 
responsible for launching Operation SERVICE. Granted interview.
2. Documents 
a. Published
Communist Banditry in Malaya: The Emergency 
June 1948 - December 1949 (Malayan 
Government Publication)
Communist Banditry in Malaya: Extracts from 
Speeches by the High Commissioner Sir 
Henry Gurney, K.C.M.G., October 1948 to 
December 1949 (Malayan Government 
Publication)
Communist Terrorism in Malaya: The Emergency
June 1948 - June 1952 (Malayan Government 
Publication)
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